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| THE BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE | |
| - the Patimokkha Training Rules | |
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Translated and Explained by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (Geoffrey DeGraff)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data pending
Copyright 1994 Thanissaro Bhikkhu
This book may be copied or reprinted for free distribution without permission from the copyright holder. Otherwise, all rights reserved.
A limited number of printed copies of this book are available by request, free of charge. As the book weighs about 2 pounds, donations to help defray postage costs are invited. Inquiries concerning the book may be addressed to: The Abbot Metta Forest Monastery P.O. Box 1409 Valley Center, CA 92082 U.S.A * * * This electronic edition is offered for free distribution via DharmaNet by arrangement with the author.
Formatted for DharmaNet by John Bullitt
First DharmaNet Edition 1993 Second DharmaNet Edition June, 1994
DharmaNet International P.O. Box 4951, Berkeley CA 94704-4951 * * * * * * * *
"Now, Ananda, if it occurs to any of you -- 'The teaching has lost its authority; we are without a Teacher' -- do not view it in that way. Whatever Dhamma and Vinaya I have pointed out and formulated for you, that will be your Teacher when I am gone." -- D. 16
Introduction: Dhamma-vinaya Chapter 1: Patimokkha Chapter 2: Nissaya Chapter 3: Disrobing
Chapter 4: Parajika Chapter 5: Sanghadisesa Chapter 6: Aniyata Chapter 7: Nissaggiya pacittiya One: The Robe-cloth Chapter Two: The Silk Chapter Three: The Bowl Chapter Chapter 8: Pacittiya One: The Lie Chapter Two: The Living Plant Chapter Three: The Exhortation Chapter Four: The Food Chapter Five: The Naked Ascetic Chapter Six: The Alcoholic Drink Chapter Seven: The Animal Chapter Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter Nine: The Treasure Chapter Chapter 9: Patidesaniya Chapter 10: Sekhiya One: Proper Behavior Two: Food Three: Teaching Dhamma Four: Miscellaneous Chapter 11: Adhikarana-samatha Chapter 12: Appendices I. Controversial points: Dawn II. Controversial points: Sugata measures III. Controversial points: Meals IV. Pali formulae: Determination V. Pali formulae: Shared ownership VI. Pali formulae: Forfeiture VII. Pali formulae: Confession VIII. The pupil's duties as attendant to his mentor
This book is an attempt to give an organized, detailed account of the Patimokkha training rules and the traditions that have grown up around them. It is aimed primarily at those whose lives are affected by the rules -- bhikkhus who live by them, and other people who have dealings with the bhikkhus -- so that they will be able to find gathered in one volume as much essential information as possible on just what the rules do and do not entail. Students of Early Buddhism, Theravadin history, or contemporary Theravadin issues should also find this book interesting, as should anyone who is serious about the practice of the Dhamma and wants to see how the Buddha worked out the ramifications of Dhamma practice in daily life. The amount of information offered here is both the book's strength and its weakness. On the one hand, it encompasses material that in some cases is otherwise unavailable in Eng-lish or even in romanized Pali, and should be sufficient to serve as a life-long companion to any bhikkhu who seriously wants to benefit from the precise and thorough training the rules have to offer. On the other hand, the sheer size of the book and the mass of details to be remembered might prove daunting or discouraging to anyone just embarking on the bhikkhu's life. To overcome this drawback, I have tried to organize the material in as clear-cut a manner as possible. In particular, by analyzing each rule into its component factors, I have tried to show not only the rule's precise range but also how it connects to the general pattern of mindfully analyzing one's own actions in terms of such factors as intention, perception, object, effort, and result -- a system that plays an important role in the training of the mind. Secondly, I have provided short summaries for the rules and have gathered them, organized by topic, in the Rule Index at the back of the book. If you are new to the subject of Buddhist monastic discipline, I suggest that you read the Rule Index first, to grasp the gist of the rules and their rela-tionship to the Buddhist path, before going on to the more detailed discussions in the body of the book. This should help you keep the general purpose of the rules in mind, and keep you from getting lost in the mass of details. I am indebted to the many people who helped directly and indirectly in the writing of this book. Phra Ajaan Fuang Jotiko (Phra Khru Nanavisitth) and Phra Ajaan Thawng Candasiri (Phra Nanavisitth), my first teachers in Vinaya, gave me a thorough grounding in the subject. Ven. Brahmavamso Bhikkhu gave many hours of his time to writing detailed criticisms of early versions of the manuscript during the long period of research that led up to the book, forcing me to deepen my knowledge and sharpen my presentation of the topic. There was a brief period when he and I thought of co-authoring the book, but the many questions that needed to be settled concerning form and content eventually required that one person go it alone, and it fell my lot to be that person. Still, much of the precision of the book is a result of his efforts, even in cases where I had to differ with his opinions. As the manuscript began to approach its final form, Ven. Phra Nanavarodom, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Thiradhammo Bhikkhu, Amaro Bhikkhu, Suviro Bhikkhu, Bill Weir, and Doris Weir all read copies of it and offered valuable suggestions for improvement. I, of course, remain responsible for any errors it may still contain. I dedicate this book in gratitude and respect to my preceptor, Phra Debmoli (Samrong Gunavuddho) of Wat Asokaram, Samut Prakaan, Thailand, and to all my teachers in the path of the Dhamma-Vinaya.
Thanissaro Bhikkhu (Geoffrey DeGraff) Metta Forest Monastery Valley Center, CA 92082-1409 U.S.A. May, 1994 * * * * * * * *
A Anguttara Nikaya As Adhikarana-samatha Ay Aniyata BD Book of Discipline Cv Cullavagga D Digha Nikaya Dhp Dhammapada M Majjhima Nikaya Mv Mahavagga NP Nissaggiya Pacittiya Pc Pacittiya Pd Patidesaniya Pr Parajika Pv Parivara S Samyutta Nikaya Sg Sanghadisesa Sk Sekhiya Vism Visuddhi Magga
Numbers in the references to Mv, Cv, and Pv denote chapter, section and sub-section; in the references to D and M, discourse (sutta); in the references to S and A, section (samyutta or nipata) and discourse; in the references to Dhp, verse; in the references to Vism, chapter and paragraph.
* * * * * * * *
Dhamma-Vinaya ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dhamma-Vinaya was the Buddha's own name for the religion he founded. Dhamma -- the truth -- is what he discovered and pointed out as advice for all who want to gain release from suffering. Vinaya -- discipline -- is what he formulated as rules, ideals and standards of behavior for those of his followers who went forth from home life to take up the quest for release in greater earnestness. Although this book deals primarily with discipline, we should note at the outset that Dhamma and Vinaya in practice function only together. Neither without the other can attain the desired goal. In theory they may be separate, but in the person who practices them they merge as qualities developed in the mind and character. "Gotami, the qualities of which you may know, 'These qualities lead to dispassion, not to passion; to being unfettered and not to being fettered; to self-effacement and not to self-aggrandizement; to modesty and not to ambition; to contentment and not to discontent; to seclusion, and not to entanglement; to energy and not to idleness; to being unburdensome and not to being burdensome': You may definitely hold, 'This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's instruction.'" (Cv.X.5) Ultimately, the Buddha said, just as the sea has a single taste, that of salt, so too the Dhamma and Vinaya have a single taste: that of release. The connection between discipline and release is spelled out in a passage that recurs at several points in the Canon: "Discipline is for the sake of restraint, restraint for the sake of freedom from remorse, freedom from remorse for the sake of joy, joy for the sake of rapture, rapture for the sake of tranquility, tranquility for the sake of pleasure, pleasure for the sake of concentration, concentration for the sake of knowledge and vision of things as they are, knowledge and vision of things as they are for the sake of disenchantment, disenchantment for the sake of dispassion, dispassion for the sake of release, release for the sake of knowledge and vision of release, knowledge and vision of release for the sake of total unbinding without clinging." (Pv.XII.2) In establishing his religion of release, though, the Buddha did not simply set out a body of recommendations and rules. He also founded a company (//parisa//) of followers. This company falls into four main groups: bhikkhus (monks), bhikkhunis (nuns), lay men, and lay women. Although the Buddha saw no need to organize the laity in any manner, he arranged for the bhikkhus and bhikkhunis -- who had given up the entanglements of the household life to devote themselves more fully to the goal of release -- to develop into communities; and saw that they needed, as all communities do, ideals and standards, rules and customs to ensure their stability. This need is what gave rise to the Vinaya. In the early years of the Buddha's career, the texts tell us, there was no need to formulate disciplinary rules. All of the bhikkhus in his following -- the Community of bhikkhunis had not yet been started -- were men of high personal attainments who had succeeded in subduing many or all of the defilements of their minds. They knew his teachings well and behaved accordingly. The Canon tells of how Ven. Sariputta, one of the Buddha's foremost disciples, asked the Buddha at an early date to formulate a Patimokkha, or code of rules, to ensure that the holy life the Buddha had founded would last long, just as a thread holding together a floral arrangement ensures that the flowers are not scattered by the wind. The Buddha replied that the time for such a code had not yet come, for even the most backward of the men in the Community at that time had already had their first glimpse of the goal. Only when mental effluents (//asava//) made themselves felt in the Community would there be a need for a Patimokkha. As time passed, the conditions that provided an opening for the effluents within the Community eventually began to appear. The Bhaddali Sutta (M.65) presents the Buddha at a later point in his career listing these conditions as five: Ven. Bhaddali: "Why is it, venerable sir, that there used to be fewer training rules and more bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening? And why is it that there are now more training rules and fewer bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening?" [Bhaddali, who has been unwilling to abide by the training rules, seems to be suggesting that the rise in the number of training rules is itself the cause for fewer bhikkhus' attaining Awakening. The Buddha, however, offers a different explanation.] The Buddha: "So it is, Bhaddali. When beings have begun to degenerate, and the true Dhamma has begun to disappear, there are more training rules and fewer bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening. The Teacher does not lay down a training rule for his disciples as long as there are no cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community. But when there //are// cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community, then the Teacher lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions. "There are no cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community as long as the Community has not become large. But when the Community has become large, then there are cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents arise in the Community, and the Teacher then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions....When the Community possesses great material gains...great status...a large body of learning... when the Community is long-standing, then there are cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents in the Community, and the Teacher then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions." Thus the rules themselves were not the cause for degeneracy in the Community, and the conditions that provided a foothold for the effluents were not themselves effluents. Rather, the growing complexity of the Community provided the opportunity for bhikkhus to act on the basis of their defilements in a growing variety of ways, and the rules -- although they could not prevent any of the five conditions -- had to become correspondingly complex to counteract the opportunities those conditions provided for unenlightened behavior. Even when these conditions did arise, though, the Buddha did not set out a full code at once. Instead, he formulated rules one at a time, in response to events. The considerations that went into formulating each rule are best illustrated by the events surrounding the formulation of the first. Ven. Sudinna, the story goes, had strong faith in the Buddha and had ordained after receiving his parents' grudging consent. He was their only child and, though married, was childless. His parents, fearing that the government would confiscate their property at their death if it had no heir, devised various schemes to lure Ven.Sudinna back to the lay life, but to no avail. Finally, his mother realized that he was firm in his intention to stay a bhikkhu and so asked him at least to have intercourse with his former wife so that their property would have an heir. Ven. Sudinna consented, took his wife into the forest, and had intercourse three times. Immediately he felt remorseful and eventually confessed his deed to his fellow bhikkhus. Word reached the Buddha, who called a meeting of the Community, questioned Ven. Sudinna, and gave him a rebuke. The rebuke fell into two major parts. In the first part, the Buddha reminded Ven. Sudinna of his position as a //samana// -- a contemplative -- and that his behavior was unworthy of his position. Also, the Buddha pointed out to him of the aims of the teaching and noted that his behavior ran counter to them. The implication here was that Ven. Sudinna had not only acted inconsistently with the content of the teaching, but had also shown callous disregard for the Buddha's compassionate aims in making the Dhamma known. "'Misguided man, it is unseemly, unbecoming, unsuitable, and unworthy of a contemplative; improper and not to be done....Have I not taught the Dhamma in many ways for the sake of dispassion and not for passion; for unfettering and not for fettering; for letting go and not for clinging? Yet here, while I have taught the Dhamma for dispassion, you set your heart on passion; while I have taught the Dhamma for unfettering, you set your heart on being fettered; while I have taught the Dhamma for letting go, you set your heart on clinging. "'Misguided man, haven't I taught the Dhamma in various ways for the fading of passion, the sobering of pride, the subduing of thirst, the destruction of attachment, the severing of the round, the depletion of craving, dispassion, stopping, unbinding? Haven't I advocated abandoning sensual pleasures, understanding sensual perceptions, subduing sensual thirst, destroying sensual preoccupations, calming sensual fevers?...Misguided man, this neither inspires faith in the faithless nor increases the faithful. Rather, it inspires lack of faith in the faithless and wavering in some of the faithful.'" The second part of the rebuke dealt in terms of personal qualities: those that a bhikkhu practicing discipline is to abandon, and those he is to develop. "Then the Blessed One, having in various ways rebuked Ven. Sudinna, having spoken in dispraise of being burdensome, demanding, arrogant, discontented, entangled, and indolent; in various ways having spoken in praise of being unburdensome, undemanding, modest, content, austere, scrupulous, gracious, self-effacing, and energetic; having given a Dhamma talk on what is seemly and becoming for bhikkhus, addressed the bhikkhus." This was where the Buddha formulated the training rule, after first stating his reasons for doing so. "'In that case, bhikkhus, I will formulate a training rule for the bhikkhus with ten aims in mind: the excellence of the Community, the peace of the Community, the curbing of the shameless, the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus, the restraint of effluents related to the present life, the prevention of effluents related to the next life, the arousing of faith in the faithless, the increase of the faithful, the establishment of the true Dhamma, and the fostering of discipline.'" These reasons fall into three main types. The first two are external: 1) to ensure peace and well-being within the Community itself, and 2) to foster and protect faith among the laity, on whom the bhikkhus depend for their support. (The origin stories of the various rules depict the laity as being very quick to generalize. One bhikkhu misbehaves, and they complain, "How can these bhikkhus do that?") The third type of reason, though, is internal: The rule is to help restrain and prevent mental effluents within the individual bhikkhus. Thus the rules aim not only at the external well-being of the Community, but also at the internal well-being of the individual. This latter point soon becomes apparent to anyone who seriously tries to keep to the rules, for they foster mindfulness and circumspection in one's actions, qualities that carry over into the training of the mind. Over the course of time the Buddha formulated more than 200 major and minor rules, forming the Patimokkha that was recited fortnightly in each Community of bhikkhus. In addition, he formulated many other minor rules that were memorized by those of his followers who specialized in the subject of discipline, but nothing is known for sure of what format they used to organize this body of knowledge during his lifetime. After his total nibbana, though, his followers made a concerted effort to establish a standard canon of Dhamma and Vinaya, and the Pali Canon as we know it began to take shape. The Vinaya was organized into two main parts: 1) the Sutta Vibhanga, the 'Exposition of the Text' (which from here on we will refer to simply as the Vibhanga), containing almost all the material dealing with the Patimokkha rules; and 2) the Khandhakas, or Groupings, which contain the remaining material organized loosely according to subject matter. The Khandhakas themselves are divided into two parts, the Mahavagga, or Greater Chapter, and the Cullavagga, or Lesser Chapter. Historians estimate that the Vibhanga and Khandhakas reached their present form no later than the 2nd century B.C.E., and that the Parivara, or Addenda -- a summary and study guide -- was added a few centuries later, closing the Vinaya Pitaka, the part of the Canon dealing with discipline.
Since the purpose of this book is to translate and explain the Patimokkha, we are most directly concerned with the Vibhanga. It is organized as follows: The rules in the Patimokkha are presented one by one, each rule preceded by an origin story telling the events that led up to its formulation. In some instances a rule went through one or more reformulations, in which case an additional story is provided for each amendment to show what prompted it.
After the final statement of the rule is a word-commentary, which explains in detail most of the important terms in the rule. For many of the rules this commentary includes one or more "wheels," or tables, giving the contingencies connected with the rule, working out all their possible permutations and passing judgment as to what penalty, if any, each permutation entails. For example, the discussion of the first rule contains a wheel that gives all the objects with which a person might have sexual intercourse, lists them against the variables of the sort of intercourse and whether or not the bhikkhu involved gives his consent, and announces the penalty for each possible combination of factors.
Following the word-commentary for each rule is a section of no-offense clauses, listing extenuating circumstances under which a bhikkhu would be exempted from the penalty imposed by the rule.
Finally, for the major rules, there is the Vinita Vatthu, or List of Precedents, which documents various cases related to the rule and gives verdicts as to what penalty, if any, they entail.
The Vibhanga forms the basis for most of the explanations of the training rules given in this book. However, there are occasional questions on which the Vibhanga is unclear or silent. To answer these questions, I have turned either to the Khandhakas or to the commentarial literature that has grown up around the Vinaya over the course of the centuries. The primary works I have consulted are these:
1) The //Samanta-pasadika// -- "The Thoroughly Inspiring" -- (from here on referred to as the Commentary), a commentary on the Vinaya Pitaka compiled in the 5th century C.E. by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa, who based his work on ancient commentaries brought to Sri Lanka from India at an unknown date and translated into Sinhalese. From internal evidence in Buddhaghosa's writings -- he compiled commentaries on a major portion of the Canon -- historians have estimated that the ancient commentaries were collected over a span of several centuries and closed in approximately the 2nd century C.E. Buddhaghosa's work thus contains material much older than his date would indicate.
By Buddhaghosa's time a belief had grown up that the ancient commentaries were the work of the Buddha's immediate disciples and thus indisputably conveyed the true intent of the Canon. However, as we shall see below, the ancient commentaries themselves did not make such exalted claims for themselves.
Still, the existence of this belief in the 5th century placed certain constraints on Buddhaghosa's work. At points where the ancient commentaries conflicted with the Canon, he had to write the discrepancies off as copier's mistakes or else side with the commentaries against the Canon. At a few points, such as his explanation of Pacittiya 9, he provides arguments against the ancient commentaries' interpretation but then backs off, saying that the ancient commentaries must be right because their authors knew the Buddha's intentions. Perhaps pressure from the elder bhikkhus at the Mahavihara in Anuradhapura -- the place where the ancient commentaries had been preserved and where Buddhaghosa was allowed to do his work -- was what made him back off in this way. At any rate, only on points where the different ancient commentaries were silent or gave divergent opinions did he feel free to express his opinions.
2) The //Kankha-vitarani// -- "The Subjugator of Uncertainty" -- (the K/Commentary), a commentary on the Patimokkha also compiled by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa. Although this work is largely a synopsis of material in the Commentary, it contains some independent material, in particular a system of classifying the offenses under each training rule into their component factors. It also contradicts the Commentary from time to time.
3) The //Sarattha-dipani// -- "The Essence-Meaning Illustrator" -- (the Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary on the Commentary, written in Sri Lanka in the 12th century C.E. by a Ven. Sariputta, the first Mahasami, or head of the Sri Lankan Sangha, after that Sangha was reformed and unified under the patronage of King Parakrama Bahu I. This work not only explains the Commentary, but also deals with points in the Canon itself, sometimes indicating passages where the Commentary has deviated from the Canon. It also quotes as authoritative the judgments of three ancient texts, the Ganthipadesa, which are no longer extant, and of Ven. Buddhadatta, a scholar of the 4th century C.E. who wrote two extant Vinaya guides.
4) The //Vimati-vinodani// -- "The Remover of Perplexity" -- (the V/Sub-commentary), another 12th-century sub-commentary, written in southern India by a Ven. Kassapa, who also wrote the //Mohavicchedani//, a synopsis of the Abhidhamma Pitaka and Buddhaghosa's commentaries on it.
5) The //Attha-yojana// -- "The Interpretation of the Meaning" -- (the A/Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary that, unlike the works of Vens. Sariputta and Kassapa, does little more than analyze the language of the Commentary. This was written in the 18th century C.E. by a Burmese scholar named Ven. Nanakitti
From here on "the ancient commentaries" will denote the original commentaries that Buddhaghosa had to work with, and "the commentaries" all five works listed above.
In addition to the Canon and the commentaries, I have referred to the texts listed in the Bibliography. Two of these deserve special mention here.
1) The //Vinaya Mukha//, a guide to the Vinaya written in Thai in the early 20th century by Prince Vajiranana-varorasa, a son of King Rama IV who ordained as a bhikkhu and eventually held the position of Supreme Patriarch of the Thai Sangha for many years. This work he wrote as part of his attempt to unite the two major sects of the Thai Sangha. The attempt failed, but the book is still used as the official textbook on Vinaya for the examinations run by the Thai Ecclesiastical Board. Prince Vajiranana in his interpretations often disagrees openly not only with the commentaries, but also with the Vibhanga itself. Some of his disagreements with the commentaries are well-taken, some not.
I include the book here both for the valuable suggestions it makes for dealing with unclear points in the older texts and because it is taken as authoritative through much of Thailand. It has been translated into English, as //The Entrance to the Vinaya//, but I have chosen to translate anew all the passages I quote from it.
2) //The Book of Discipline//, a translation of the entire Vinaya Pitaka into English by Miss I. B. Horner. Although I have learned much from Miss Horner's work, there are points where my translations and conclusions differ from hers. Since many readers will want to check the information in this book against hers, I have marked these points with a "(%)." Anyone curious as to which interpretation is correct should check the passages in question against the Royal Thai edition of the Pali Canon, my major source throughout this book.
Disagreements among the texts. One of the difficulties in trying to collate all these various texts is that there are points on which the Vibhanga is at variance with the wording of the Patimokkha rules, and the commentaries are at variance with the Canon. This forces us to decide which strata of the texts to take as authoritative. As far as discrepancies between the Vibhanga and the rules are concerned, the following passage in the Cullavagga (X.4) suggests that the Buddha himself gave preference to the way the bhikkhus worked out the rules in the Vibhanga:
"As she was standing at a respectful distance, Maha-pajapati Gotami spoke thus to the Blessed One: 'Lord, those rules of training for the bhikkhunis that are in common with those for the bhikkhus: What line of conduct should we follow in regard to them?'
"'Those rules of training for the bhikkhunis, Gotami, that are in common with those for the bhikkhus: //As the bhikkhus train themselves, so should you train yourselves//'.... (emphasis added).
"'And those rules of training for bhikkhunis that are not in common with those for bhikkhus: What line of conduct should we follow in regard to them?'
"'Those rules of training for the bhikkhunis, Gotami, that are not in common with those for the bhikkhus: Train yourselves in them as they are formulated.'"
This passage implies that already in the time of the Buddha the bhikkhus had begun working out a way to interpret the rules that in some cases was not exactly in line with the way the Buddha had originally formulated them. Some people have read this passage as suggesting that the Buddha, though resigned to this development, was displeased with it, but this would contradict the many passages in the Canon where the Buddha speaks in high praise of Ven. Upali, the foremost of his bhikkhu disciples in terms of his knowledge of Vinaya, who was responsible for teaching the rules to the other bhikkhus and who was largely responsible for the shape of the Vinaya as we now have it. It seems more likely that the Buddha in this passage is simply saying that, to avoid unnecessary controversy, the way the bhikkhus had worked out the implications of the rules was to be accepted as is.
Because this development eventually led to the Vibhanga, we can be confident that in adhering to the Vibhanga we are acting as the Buddha would have us do. And when we check the few places where the Vibhanga deviates from the wording of the rules, we find that almost invariably it has tried to reconcile contradictions among the rules themselves, and between the rules and the Khandhakas, so as to make the Vinaya a more coherent whole. This is particularly true with rules that touch on formal acts of the Community. Apparently many of these rules were formulated before the general patterns for formal acts were finalized in the Khandhakas. Thus, after the patterns were established, the compilers of the Vibhanga were sometimes forced to deviate from the wording of the rules to bring them into line with the patterns.
As for contradictions between the Commentary and the Vibhanga, this is a more controversial area, with two extremes of thought. One is to reject the Commentary entirely, as it is not the Buddha's word, for modern historical scholarship has shown decisively that it contains material dating many hundreds of years after the Buddha's passing away. This position assumes, though, that in the areas where the Canon is vague or unclear we have nothing to learn from the accumulated wisdom and experience of those who have lived the bhikkhu's life before us. The other extreme is to accept the Commentary as superseding the Vibhanga entirely, in line with the traditional belief that grew up around it: that it was composed at the First Council to express the true intent of those who composed the Vibhanga and yet somehow were unable to put what they really meant to say into the Canon itself.
Neither of these extremes is in line with the Great Standards for judging Dhamma and Vinaya that -- as the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (D.16) reports -- the Buddha formulated at Bhoganagara shortly before his passing away:
"There is the case where a bhikkhu says this: 'In the Blessed One's presence have I heard this, in the Blessed One's presence have I received this: This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's instruction.' His statement is neither to be approved nor scorned. Without approval or scorn, take careful note of his words and make them stand against the Suttas and tally them against the Vinaya. If, on making them stand against the Suttas and tallying them against the Vinaya, you find that they don't stand with the Suttas or tally with the Vinaya, you may conclude: 'This is not the word of the Blessed One; this bhikkhu has misunderstood it' -- and you should reject it. But if...they stand with the Suttas and tally with the Vinaya, you may conclude: 'This is the word of the Blessed One; this bhikkhu has understood it rightly.'"
[The same criteria are to be used when the bhikkhu cites as his authority a Community with well-known leading elders; a monastery with many learned elders who know the tradition, who have memorized the Dhamma, the Vinaya, and the Matika (the precursor to the Abhidhamma as we know it); or a single elder who knows the tradition.]
In other words, the question is not one of the authority on whose word a claim is based, but one of consistency: Only if a statement stands up under comparison with the Canon should it be accepted as true Dhamma or Vinaya. The same principle holds for statements that are said to be not the word of the Buddha, but the opinion of respected teachers.
This point is borne out by two important passages in the texts. One is the narrative of the Second Council, during which the bhikkhus of Vesali defended ten practices on the grounds that they had learned them from their teachers. The elders who judged the case, though, insisted on evaluating the practices in terms of whether or not they adhered to the Canon. The primary point of controversy -- the question of whose authority was greater, the Canon's or the teachers' -- was point six:
"'The practice of what is habitual, sir -- is it allowable?'
"'What is the practice of what is habitual, my friend?'
"'To practice (thinking), this is the way my preceptor habitually practiced; this is the way my teacher habitually practiced -- is this allowable?'
"'The practice of what is habitual is sometimes allowable, sometimes not.'" (CV.XII.2.8)
What this means, as the elders showed in the way they conducted the meeting, is that one's teacher's and preceptor's practices are to be followed only when they are in accordance with the Canon.
The second passage is the discussion of the Great Standards in the Commentary to the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, which concludes that the commentaries are to be accepted only where they are in agreement with the Canon. Apparently the teachers who compiled the ancient commentaries took a more modest view of their authority than did the elders of the Mahavihara at the time of Buddhaghosa and did not pretend to supersede the Canon as the final word on what is and is not true Dhamma and Vinaya.
Some may object that to pass judgment on the Commentary is to lack respect for the tradition, but actually it is because of respect for the compilers of the Vibhanga that I make the following assumptions in checking the Commentary against the Vibhanga:
1) The compilers of the Vibhanga were intelligent enough to be consistent within the discussion of each rule. Any explanation based on the premise that they were not consistent should give way to an explanation showing that they were.
2) The compilers were well enough acquainted with the contingencies surrounding each rule that they knew which factors were and were not crucial in determining what is and is not an offense. Any explanation that adds or subtracts factors from those mentioned in the Vibhanga should give way to one that follows the Vibhanga's analysis.
3) The compilers, in reporting the precedents in the Vinita Vatthu -- the cases the Buddha judged against an existing rule -- were careful enough to include all the important factors bearing on the judgment. Any explanation that requires rewriting the precedents, adding extra details extraneous to the Vibhanga to account for the judgment, should give way to an explanation that can make sense out of the precedents as they are reported and in terms of the analyses presented elsewhere in the Vibhanga.
It's not that I take any joy in arguing with the Commentary. In fact, wherever possible, I have been happy to give it the benefit of the doubt, and on many points I am very much in its debt. Still, now that Buddhism is coming to the West, I feel it is time to stop and take stock of the tradition, and to check the later traditions against the earliest sources. This is especially important in a way of thought and life that, from the very beginning, has appealed to reason and investigation rather than to blindly accepted authority. In doing this, I am simply following a pattern that has repeated itself through the history of the Theravadin tradition: that of returning to the original principles whenever the religion reaches an historic turning point.
There is, of course, a danger in being too independent in interpreting the tradition, in that strongly held opinions can lead to disharmony in the Community. Thus in evaluating the Commentary against the Canon, I do not want to imply that my conclusions are the only ones possible. Important points may have slipped my attention or escaped my grasp. For this reason, even in instances where I think that the Commentary does not do justice to the Vibhanga, I have tried to give a faithful account of the important points from the Commentary so that those who wish to take it as their authority may still use this book as a guide. If there are any points on which I am mistaken, I would be pleased if knowledgeable people would correct me.
At the same time, I hope that this book will show that there are many areas on which the Vibhanga is unclear and lends itself to a variety of equally valid interpretations. For proof of this, we need only look at the various traditions that have developed in the different Theravadin countries, and even within each country. For some reason, although people tend to be very tolerant of different interpretations of the Dhamma, they can be very intolerant of different interpretations of the Vinaya and can get into heated arguments over minor issues having very little to do with the training of the mind.
I have tried to make the point throughout this book that any interpretation based on a sound reading of the Canon should be respected: that each bhikkhu should follow the interpretations of the Community in which he is living, as long as they do not conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid conflict over minor matters in daily life; and that he should also show respect for the differing interpretations of other Communities where they too do not conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid the pitfalls of pride and narrow-mindedness.
This is especially true now that monasteries of different nationalities are taking root in close proximity to one another in the West. In the past, Thais, Burmese, and Sri Lankans could look down on one another's traditions without danger of causing friction, as they lived in separate countries and spoke different languages. Now, however, we have become neighbors and have begun to speak common languages, so it is best that we take to heart the writings of the Chinese pilgrims who visited India centuries ago. They reported that even after the early Buddhists had split into 18 schools, each with its own Tripitaka and Patimokkha, and the Mahayanists had added //their// texts to the tradition, bhikkhus belonging to different schools could be found living together in the same monastery, practicing and conducting communal business in peace and harmony. Theirs is a worthy example. We should not let our minor differences become stumbling blocks on our way.
My aim throughout this book has been practical. I have avoided dealing with academic issues concerning the authenticity and reliability of the tradition, and instead have tried simply to report and explain what the tradition has to say. Of course, I have had to be selective. Whatever the unconscious factors that have influenced my choice of material, the conscious considerations shaping this book are briefly as follows:
We are dealing primarily with rules, but rules are not the only way to express disciplinary norms, and the texts we are surveying express their norms in a variety of forms: as rules, principles, models, and virtues. The different forms are best suited for different purposes. Principles, models, and virtues are meant as personal, subjective standards and tend to be loosely defined. Their interpretation and application are left to the judgment of the individual. Rules are meant to serve as more objective standards. To work, they must be precisely defined in a way acceptable to the Community at large. The compilers of the Canon, recognizing this need, provided definitions for most of the terms in the rules, and the authors of the commentaries continued this task, carrying it out with even greater thoroughness. Thus much of this book, in reporting these texts, is concerned with the definition of terms.
This need for precision, though, accounts for the weakness of rules in general as universal guides to behavior. First, there is the question of where to draw the line between what is and is not an infraction of the rule. A clear break-off point is needed because rules -- unlike principles -- deal in two colors: black and white. In some cases, it is difficult to find a clear break-off point that corresponds exactly to one's sense of what is right and wrong, and so it is necessary to include the areas of gray either with the white or the black. In general, but not always, the Vibhanga's position is to include the gray with the white, and to rely on the principles of the Dhamma to encourage the individual bhikkhu to stay away from the gray.
Take, for instance, the rule against masturbation. The Vibhanga limits this rule to forbidding only those forms of masturbation that aim at ejaculation, for if it had drawn the line anywhere else, it would have become an offense for a bhikkhu simply to scratch himself. Thus self-stimulation that does not aim at ejaculation is not an offense, although in many cases it is clearly against the spirit of the Dhamma. The Vinaya Mukha notes, disapprovingly, a number of older Vinaya guides that like to dwell on these areas of gray and seem to delight in figuring out ways to avoid an offense by working around the letter of the rules. In this book I am taking a different tack: Under those rules that include large areas of grey with the white, I have noted a few relevant principles from the Dhamma to spell out a wise policy with regard to the gray areas -- not to reformulate the rule, but simply as a reminder that, as noted above, the Vinaya without the Dhamma does not suffice as a guide to the goal.
Another drawback resulting from the need for precision in rules is that the more precisely a rule is defined to suit a particular time and place, the less well it may fit other times and places. The compilers of the Canon, in order to make up for this weakness, thus provided the origin stories and precedents to show the type of situation the rule was intended to prevent, providing principles and models that indicate the spirit of the rule and aid in applying it to differing contexts. In writing this book I have often made reference to these stories, to give this added dimension.
Admittedly, the stories do not make for inspiring reading. For example, instead of reading about bhikkhus accepting a meal at a donor's house and then uplifting the donor with a talk on Dhamma, we read about Ven. Udayin accepting a meal at the dwelling of a bhikkhuni who was his former wife, and the two of them sitting there exposing their genitals to each other. Still, the stories do remind us that the more inspiring stories we read in the discourses took place in a very real human world, and they also reveal the insight and understated wit of those who framed and interpreted the rules. The element of wit here is especially important, for without it there is no true understanding of human nature, and no intelligent system of discipline.
Finally, in compiling this book, I have tried to include whatever seems most worth knowing for the bhikkhu who aims at fostering the qualities of discipline in his life -- so as to help train his mind and live in peace with his fellow bhikkhus -- and for anyone who wants to support and encourage the bhikkhus in that aim.
* * * * * * * * RULE INDEX
This index lists the summaries of the training rules given in this book, organized by topic. The Sekhiya rules have not been included, because they are short, deal almost exclusively with etiquette, and are already organized by topic in their own chapter. I have included short summaries of the Adhikarana-Samatha rules, even though these summaries do not appear in the chapter discussing those rules.
The rules are divided into five major categories, dealing with Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Communal harmony, and the etiquette of a contemplative. The first three categories -- the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path that make up the training in heightened virtue -- show in particular how the training rules relate to the Buddhist path as a whole.
These five categories are not sharply distinct types. Instead, they are more like the colors in the band of light thrown off by a prism -- discernably different, but shading into one another with no sharp dividing lines. Right Speech, for instance, often shades into Communal harmony, just as Right Livelihood shades into personal etiquette. Thus the placement of a particular rule in one category rather than another has been a somewhat arbitrary process. There are a few cases -- such as Pacittiyas 46 & 85 -- where the reason for the placement of the rule will become clear only after a reading of the detailed discussion of the rule in the text.
Each rule is followed by a two-part code. The first part, before the slash, gives the rule's number in its section of the Patimokkha. The second part gives the page number for the discussion of the rule in this book.
Right Speech ~~~~~~~~~~~~ M.117 defines wrong speech as lying, divisive speech, abusive speech, and idle chatter.
Lying ~~~~~ Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 8/129) Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 9/138) The intentional effort to misrepresent the truth to another individual is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 1/260) Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu -- or getting someone else to make the charge to him -- that he is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 76/448)
Divisive speech ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Tale-bearing among bhikkhus, in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 3/266)
Abusive speech ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ An insult made with malicious intent to another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 2/263)
Idle chatter ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Visiting lay families -- without having informed an available bhikkhu -- before or after a meal to which one has been invited is a pacittiya offense except during the robe season or any time one is making a robe. (Pc 46/ 390) Entering a village, town, or city during the period after noon until the following dawn, without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu -- unless there is an emergency -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 85/467)
Right Action ~~~~~~~~~~~~ M.117 defines wrong action as killing living beings, taking what is not given, and engaging in sexual misconduct.
Killing ~~~~~~~ Intentionally bringing about the untimely death of a human being, even if it is still a fetus, is a parajika offense. (Pr 3/66) Pouring water that one knows to contain living beings -- or having it poured -- on grass or clay is a pacittiya offense. Pouring anything that would kill the beings into such water -- or having it poured -- is also a pacittiya offense. (Pc 20/317) Deliberately killing an animal -- or having it killed -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 61/420) Using water, knowing that it contains living beings that will die from one's use, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 62/423)
Taking what is not given ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a parajika offense. (Pr 2/50) Having given another bhikkhu a robe on a condition and then -- angry and displeased -- snatching it back or having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 25/246) Making use of cloth or a bowl stored under shared ownership -- unless the shared ownership has been rescinded or one is taking the item on trust -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 59/415)
Sexual Misconduct ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Voluntary sexual intercourse -- genital, anal, or oral -- with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a parajika offense. (Pr 1/45) Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or getting someone else to cause one to emit semen -- except during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 1/90) Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 2/100) Making a lustful remark to a woman about her genitals, anus or about performing sexual intercourse is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 3/110) Telling a woman that she would benefit from having sexual intercourse with oneself is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 4/115) Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or beat a robe that has been used at least once is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 4/182) Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or card wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 17/214) Lying down at the same time in the same lodging with a woman is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 6/276) Teaching more than six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, except in response to a question, is a pacittiya offense unless a knowledgeable man is present. (Pc 7/280) Exhorting a bhikkhuni about the eight vows of respect -- except when one has been authorized to do so by the Community -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 21/320) Exhorting a bhikkhuni on any topic at all after sunset -- except when she requests it -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 22/323) Going to the bhikkhunis' quarters and exhorting a bhikkhuni about the eight vows of respect -- except when she is ill or has requested the instruction -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 23/325) Giving robe-cloth to an unrelated bhikkhuni without receiving anything in exchange is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 25/326) Sewing a robe -- or having one sewn -- for an unrelated bhikkhuni is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 26/327) Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhuni from one village to another -- except when the road is risky or there are other dangers -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 27/329) Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhuni upriver or downriver in the same boat -- except when crossing a river -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 28/331) Sitting or lying down alone with a bhikkhuni in a place out of sight and out of hearing with no one else present is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 30/335 & 389) Sitting or lying down with a woman or women in a private, secluded place with no other man present is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 44/385) Sitting or lying down alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place with no one else present is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 45/389) Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 67/432)
Right Livelihood ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ M.117 defines wrong livelihood as scheming, persuading, hinting, belittling, and pursuing gain with gain.
General ~~~~~~~ Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a parajika offense. (Pr 4/79) Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to each other is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 5/117) Engaging in trade with anyone except one's co-religionists is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 20/225) Persuading a donor to give to oneself a gift that he or she had planned to give to the Community -- when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 30/256) Telling an unordained person of one's actual superior human attainments is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 8/285) Persuading a donor to give to another individual a gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community -- when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 82/256 & 461)
Robes ~~~~~ Keeping a piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under dual ownership -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 1/163) Being in a separate zone from any of one's three robes at dawn -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect, or one has received formal authorization from the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 2/172) Keeping out-of-season cloth for more than 30 days when it is not enough to make a requisite and one has expectation for more -- except when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 3/179) Accepting robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhuni without giving her anything in exchange is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. NP 5/184) Asking for and receiving robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person, except when one's robes have been stolen or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 6/186) Asking for and receiving excess robe-cloth from unrelated lay people when one's robes have been stolen or destroyed is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 7/189) When a lay person who is not a relative is planning to get a robe for one, but has yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants: Receiving the robe after making a request that would raise its cost is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 8/193) When two or more lay people who are not one's relatives are planning to get separate robes for one, but have yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants: Receiving a robe from them after asking them to pool their funds to get one robe -- out of a desire for something fine -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 9/195) Making a felt blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 11/206) Making a felt blanket/rug entirely of black wool for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 12/208) Making a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 13/208) Unless one has received authorization to do so from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for one's own use -- or having it made -- less than six years after one's last one was made is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 14/209) Making a felt sitting rug for one's own use -- or having it made -- without incorporating a one-span piece of old felt is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 15/211) Seeking and receiving a rains-bathing cloth before the fourth month of the hot season is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last two weeks of the fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 24/242) Taking thread that one has asked for improperly and getting weavers to weave cloth from it -- when they are unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 26/248) When donors who are not relatives -- and have not invited one to ask -- have arranged for weavers to weave robe-cloth intended for one: Receiving the cloth after getting the weavers to increase the amount of thread used in it is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 27/250) Keeping robe-cloth offered in urgency past the end of the robe season after having accepted it during the last eleven days of the Rains Retreat is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 28/252) When one is living in a dangerous wilderness abode during the month after the fourth Kattika full moon and has left one of one's robes in the village where one normally goes for alms: Being away from the abode and the village for more than six nights at a stretch -- except when authorized by the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 29/253) Wearing an unmarked robe is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 58/413) Acquiring an overly large sitting cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 89/475) Acquiring an overly large skin-eruption covering cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 90/477) Acquiring an overly large rains-bathing cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 91/478) Acquiring an overly large robe after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the robe down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 92/478)
Food ~~~~ Eating any of the five staple foods that a lay person has offered as the result of a bhikkhuni's prompting -- unless the lay person was already planning to offer the food before her prompting -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 29/333) Eating food obtained from the same public alms center two days running, unless one is too ill to leave the center, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 31/340) Eating a meal to which four or more individual bhikkhus have been specifically invited -- except on special occasions -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 32/342)) Eating a meal before going to another meal to which one was invited, or accepting an invitation to one meal and eating elsewhere instead, is a pacittiya offense except when one is ill or at the time of giving cloth or making robes. (Pc 33/348) Accepting more than three bowlfuls of food that the donors prepared for their own use as presents or as provisions for a journey is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 34/352) Eating staple or non-staple food that is not left-over, after having earlier in the day finished a meal during which one turned down an offer to eat further staple food, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 35/355) Eating staple or non-staple food in the period after noon until the next dawn is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 37/362) Eating food that a bhikkhu -- oneself or another -- formally received on a previous day is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 38/364) Eating finer foods, after having asked for them for one's own sake -- except when ill -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 39/367) Eating food that has not been formally given is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 40/370) Eating staple or non-staple food, after having accepted it from the hand of an unrelated bhikkhuni in a village area, is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 1/480) Eating staple food accepted at a meal to which one has been invited and where a bhikkhuni has given directions, based on favoritism, as to which bhikkhu should get which food, and none of the bhikkhus have dismissed her, is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 2/483) Eating staple or non-staple food, after accepting it -- when one is neither ill nor invited -- at the home of a family formally designated as "in training," is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 3/484) Eating an unannounced gift of staple or non-staple food after accepting it in a dangerous wilderness abode when one is not ill is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 4/485)
Lodgings ~~~~~~~~ Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, without having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the standard measurements, is also a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 6/120) Building a hut with a sponsor -- or having it built -- destined for one's own use, without having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 7/128) When a bhikkhu is building or repairing a large dwelling for his own use, using resources donated by another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with more than three layers of roofing material or plaster. To exceed this is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 19/315) Acquiring a bed or bench with legs longer than eight Sugata fingerbreadths after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the legs down before confessing the offense. (Pc 87/471) Acquiring a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one remove the stuffing before confessing the offense. (Pc 88/473)
Medicine ~~~~~~~~ Keeping any of the five tonics -- ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses -- for more than seven days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 23/236) When a supporter has made an offer to supply medicines to the Community: Asking the him/her for medicine outside of the terms of the offer when one is not ill, or for medicine to use for a non-medicinal purpose, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 47/393)
Money ~~~~~ When a fund has been set up with a steward indicated by a bhikkhu: Obtaining an article from the fund as a result of having prompted the steward more than the allowable number of times is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 10/196) Taking gold or money, having someone else take it, or consenting to its being placed down as a gift for oneself, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 18/214) Obtaining gold or money through trade is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 19/220)
Bowls and other requisites ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Carrying wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn for more than three leagues is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 16/212) Keeping an alms bowl for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under dual ownership is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 21/231) Asking for a new alms bowl when one's current bowl is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 22/234) Acquiring a needle box made of bone, ivory, or horn after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one break the box before confessing the offense. (Pc 86/470)
Communal Harmony ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To persist in one's attempts at a schism, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 10/140) To persist in supporting a potential schismatic, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 11/147) To persist in being difficult to admonish, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 12/148) To persist -- after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing an act of banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 13/150) When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika, sanghadisesa, or pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done. (Ay 1/157) When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a sanghadisesa or pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done. (Ay 2/161) Telling an unordained person of another bhikkhu's serious offense -- unless one is authorized by the Community to do so -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 9/288) Persistently replying evasively or keeping silent in order to conceal one's own offenses when being questioned in a meeting of the Community -- after a formal charge of evasiveness or uncooperativeness has been brought against one -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 12/300) If a Community official is innocent of prejudice: Criticizing him within earshot of another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 13/303) When one has set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open: Leaving its immediate vicinity without putting it away or arranging to have it put away is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 14/305) When one has spread bedding out in a dwelling belonging to the Community: Departing from the monastery without putting it away or arranging to have it put away is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 15/307) Encroaching on another bhikkhu's sleeping or sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the Community, with the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing him to leave, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 16/310) Causing a bhikkhu to be evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community -- when one's primary motive is anger -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 17/312) Sitting or lying down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a dwelling belonging to the Community, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 18/314) Saying that a properly authorized bhikkhu exhorts the bhikkhunis for the sake of personal gain -- when in fact that is not the case -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 24/325) Deliberately tricking another bhikkhu into breaking Pacittiya 35, in hopes of finding fault with him, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 36/360) Speaking or acting disrespectfully when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the training rules is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 54/407) Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 63/424) Not informing other bhikkhus of a serious offense that one knows another bhikkhu has committed -- out of a desire to protect him either from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 64/426) Acting as the preceptor in the ordination of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 65/428) Refusing -- after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community -- to give up the wrong view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally transgressing the Buddha's ordinances is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 68/434) Consorting, joining in communion, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been suspended and not been restored -- knowing that such is the case -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 69/437) Supporting, receiving services from, consorting, or lying down under the same roof with an expelled novice -- knowing that he has been expelled -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 70/439) Saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training under a training rule when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 71/442) Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 72/443) Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the Patimokkha, after one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three times, and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought against one, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 73/445) Giving a blow to another bhikkhu, when motivated by anger, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 74/446) Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 75/448) Saying to another bhikkhu that he may have broken a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of causing him anxiety, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 77/449) Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument over an issue -- with the intention of using what they say against them -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 78/451) Complaining about a formal act of the Community to which one gave one's consent -- if one knows that the act was carried out in accordance with the rule -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 79/452) Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid formal act -- without having first given one's consent to the act and with the intention of invalidating it -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 80/455) After participating in a formal act of the Community giving robe-cloth to a Community official: Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 81/458) When the Community is dealing formally with an issue, the full Community must be present, as must all the individuals involved in the issue; the proceedings must follow the patterns set out in the Dhamma and Vinaya. (As 1/511) If the Community unanimously believes that a bhikkhu is innocent of a charge made against him, they may declare him innocent on the basis of his memory of the events. (As 2/512) If the Community unanimously believes that a bhikkhu was insane while committing offenses against the rules, they may absolve him of any responsibility for the offenses. (As 3/513) If a bhikkhu commits an offense, he should willingly undergo the appropriate penalty in line with what he actually did and the actual seriousness of the offense. (As 4/513) If an important dispute cannot be settled by a unanimous decision, it should be submitted to a vote. The opinion of the majority, if in accord with the Dhamma and Vinaya, is then considered decisive. (As 5/513) If a bhikkhu admits to an offense only after being interrogated in a formal meeting, the Community should carry out an act of censure against him, rescinding it only when he has mended his ways. (As 6/514) If, in the course of a dispute, both sides act in ways unworthy of contemplatives, and the sorting out of the penalties would only prolong the dispute, the Community as a whole may make a blanket confession of its light offenses. (As 7/515)
The Etiquette of a Contemplative ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Training a novice or lay person to recite passages of Dhamma by rote is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 4/267) Lying down at the same time, in the same lodging, with a novice or layman for more than three nights running is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 5/271) Digging soil or commanding that it be dug is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 10/292) Intentionally cutting, burning, or killing a living plant is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 11/294) Handing food or medicine to a mendicant ordained outside of Buddhism is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 41/381) When on almsround with another bhikkhu: Sending him back so that he won't witness any misconduct one is planning to indulge in is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 42/383) To sit down intruding on a man and a woman in their private quarters -- when one or both are sexually aroused, and when another bhikkhu is not present -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 43/384) Watching a field army -- or similar large military force -- on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 48/397) Staying more than three consecutive nights with an army on active duty -- even when one has a suitable reason to be there -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 49/399) Going to a battlefield, a roll call, an array of the troops in battle formation, or to see a review of the battle units while one is staying with an army is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 50/400) Taking an intoxicant is a pacittiya offense regardless of whether one is aware or not that it is an intoxicant. (Pc 51/402) Tickling another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 52/405) Jumping and swimming in the water for fun is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 53/406) Attempting to frighten another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 55/409) Lighting a fire to warm oneself -- or having it lit -- when one does not need the warmth for one's health is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 56/409) Bathing more frequently than once a fortnight when residing in the middle Ganges Valley, except on certain occasions, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 57/411) Hiding another bhikkhu's bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case, or belt -- or having it hid -- either as a joke or with the purpose of annoying him, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 60/419) Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village to another -- knowing that they are thieves -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 66/430) Entering a king's sleeping chamber unannounced, when both the king and queen are in the chamber, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 83/461) Picking up a valuable, or having it picked up, with the intent of putting it in safe keeping for the owner -- except when one finds it in a monastery or in a dwelling one is visiting -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 84/463)
* * * * * * * CHAPTER
ONE
Patimokkha ~~~~~~~~~~
The Patimokkha is available to us in several recensions, some in Indic languages, others in Tibetan or Chinese translations. However, of the Indic recensions, only one -- the Pali -- is still a living tradition, recited fortnightly, and put into practice by Theravadin bhikkhus throughout the world. This is the recension translated and explained in this book.
The meaning of the term //patimokkha// is a matter of conjecture. According to the Mahavagga, it means "the beginning, the head (or entrance -- //mukha//), the foremost (//pamukha//) of skillful qualities." (Mv.II.3.4) The term serves as the name not only of the basic code of training rules, but also of a sermon in which the Buddha enumerated the basic principles common to the teachings of all Buddhas: "The non-doing of all evil, the performance of what is skillful, and the purification of one's heart: this is the Buddhas' message." (Dhp.183) Thus whatever the etymology of the term //patimokkha//, it denotes a set of principles basic to the practice of the religion.
The basic code of training rules for bhikkhus, in its Pali recension, contains 227 rules, divided into eight sections in accordance with the penalty assigned by each rule: //parajika//, defeat; //sanghadisesa//, formal meeting; //aniyata//, undetermined; //nissaggiya pacittiya//, forfeiture and confession; //pacittiya//, confession; //patidesaniya//, acknowledgement; //sekhiya//, training; and //adhikarana-samatha//, settlement of issues. The following chapters will discuss the precise meanings of these terms.
Three of these terms, though, do not denote penalties. The aniyata rules give directions for judging uncertain cases; the sekhiya rules simply say, "(This is) a training to be followed," without assigning a particular penalty for not following them; and the adhikarana-samatha rules give procedures to follow in settling issues that may arise in the Community. Thus there are only five types of penalty mentioned in the Patimokkha rules themselves, ranging from permanent expulsion from the Community to simple confession in the presence of another bhikkhu. None of the penalties, we should note, involve physical punishment of any kind. And we should further note that the purpose of undergoing the penalties is not somehow to absolve one from guilt or to erase any bad kamma one may incur by breaking the rules; rather, the purpose is both personal and social: to strengthen one's resolve to refrain from such behavior in the future, and to reassure the other bhikkhus that one is still serious about following the training.
In addition to the penalties directly mentioned in the rules, there are also penalties derived from the rules by the Vibhanga and commentaries. These derived penalties deal with two sorts of cases: 1) A bhikkhu tries to commit an action mentioned in one of the rules, but the action for one reason or another does not reach completion (e.g., he tries to kill a person, but the person doesn't die). 2) A bhikkhu commits an action not directly covered in any rule, but similar to one that is (e.g., he strikes an unordained person, which is not directly covered in a rule, while the act of striking a bhikkhu is).
Penalties of this sort, when derived from the parajika and sanghadisesa rules, include thullaccaya (grave offense) and dukkata (wrong doing); those derived from the nissaggiya pacittiya, pacittiya, and patidesaniya rules -- except for the rule against speaking insults -- include only the dukkata. The penalties derived from the rule against speaking insults include dubbhasita (wrong speech) as well. As for the sekhiya rules, the Vibhanga states that to disobey any of them out of disrespect entails a dukkata. All of these derived penalties may be cleared through confession.
There may, of course, be times when the assigned penalties are not enough to deter an unconscientious bhikkhu from committing an offense repeatedly. In such cases, the Community in which he is living may, if it sees fit, formally impose additional penalties on him as a means of bringing him into line. These formal acts range from stripping him of some of the privileges of seniority, to banishment from that particular Community, and on to suspension from the Bhikkhu Sangha as a whole. In each case the punishment is temporary; if the bhikkhu realizes his errors and mends his ways, the Community is to revoke the act against him and return him to his former status.
Thus, taken as a whole, the Vinaya's system of penalties makes use of three basic principles -- confession, forfeiture, and various degrees of ostracism from the Community -- as means of enforcing the rules. To understand the wisdom of this system, it is important to realize how each of these principles is related to the practice of the Dhamma and the training of the mind.
//Confession//: There are several spots in the discourses (e.g., D.2, M.140) where the Buddha states, 'It is growth in the discipline of a Noble One that a person sees a transgression (of his own) as a transgression, makes amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, and achieves restraint in the future.' From the context each time the Buddha makes this statement, it is clear that "makes amends" means confessing one's mistakes. In another passage (M.61), the Buddha informs his son, Rahula, that if one sees that one's words or deeds have harmed oneself or others, one should confess them to a knowledgeable companion in the Holy Life. All those who have purified their thoughts, words, and deeds in the past, all those who are doing so in the present, and all those who will do so in the future, he adds, have acted, are acting, and will act in just this way. In addition, one of the basic requisites for exerting oneself in the practice is that one not be fraudulent or deceitful, and that one declare oneself to one's knowledgeable companions in the Holy Life in line with one's actual behavior (A.V.53). Thus a willingness to confess one's misdeeds is an essential factor in progress along the path.
//Forfeiture//, in most cases, is simply a symbolic adjunct to confession. One forfeits the object in question, confesses the offense, and then receives the object in return. In a few cases, though -- where the object is improper for a bhikkhu to use or own -- one must break it or forfeit it for good. In these cases, forfeiture serves as a check against greed and as a reminder of two essential principles -- contentment with little and fewness of wants -- that are absolutely basic to the practice.
//Ostracism//: In a famous passage (S.XLV.2), the Buddha tells Ven. Ananda, "Being a friend, a companion, a colleague with admirable people is the entirety of the Holy Life. When a bhikkhu is a friend, a companion, a colleague with admirable people, he can be expected to develop the Noble Eightfold Path and make much of it." Thus one of the few things a bhikkhu serious about the practice would naturally fear would be to be ostracized by the well-behaved members of the Community, for that would be a true barrier to his spiritual progress. This fear would then help deter him from any action that might entail such ostracism.
In this way, the Vinaya's system of penalties provides rehabilitation for offenders and deterrence against offenses -- with confession the means of rehabilitation, and ostracism the deterrent -- growing directly out of principles basic to the practice of the Dhamma.
Offenses. In analyzing offenses for the purpose of determining penalties, the Vibhanga divides an action into five factors: the object, the perception, the intent, the effort, and the result. In some of the rules, all five factors play a role in determining what is and is not a full offense. In others, only two, three or four play a role. For example, under the parajika rule forbidding murder, all five factors have to be present for a full offense: The object has to be a human being, the bhikkhu has to perceive him/her as a living being, he has to have murderous intent, he has to make an effort for the person to die, and the person has to die.
If any of these factors are missing, the penalty changes. For instance, object: If the bhikkhu kills a dog, the penalty is a pacittiya. Perception: If he cremates a friend, thinking that the friend is dead, then even if the friend is actually alive but severely comatose, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. Intent: If he accidentally drops a rock on a person standing below him, he incurs no penalty even if the person dies. Effort: If he sees a person fall into the river, but makes no effort to save the person, he incurs no penalty even if the person drowns. Result: If he tries to kill a person, but only succeeds in injuring him, he incurs a thullaccaya.
There are some rules, though, where the factors of intention, perception, and result do not make any difference in determining offenses. For example, if a bhikkhu is sleeping alone in a room and a woman comes in and lies down in the room with him, he incurs the pacittiya for lying down in the same lodging as a woman even though his intention was to lie down alone and he was unaware of her presence. A bhikkhu who drinks a glass of wine, thinking it to be grape juice, incurs the pacittiya for taking intoxicants all the same. A bhikkhu who tries to frighten another bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya regardless of whether or not the other bhikkhu is actually frightened.
Another variation is that in rules where a bhikkhu may be put into a passive role in committing an act that would fulfill the factor of effort, the factor of intention is changed to consent: mental acquiescence to the act combined with a physical or verbal expression of that acquiescence. Under some rules, such as the rule against sexual intercourse, simply letting the act happen counts as physical acquiescence even if one lies perfectly still, and the question of whether or not one incurs a penalty depends entirely on the state of one's mind. Under other rules, though -- such as the rule against lustful contact with a woman, which includes cases where the woman is the agent making the contact -- simply lying still is not enough to count as a physical sign of acquiescence, and even if one consents mentally, say, to a woman's fondling, one would incur a penalty only if one says something or responds with a physical movement to what she is doing.
The factor of effort is basic to every rule and is also used to determine offenses in cases where a bhikkhu intends to break a rule but does not complete the action. For instance, in the case of stealing, the efforts involved are said to begin when, acting under the intent to steal, a bhikkhu gets dressed and starts walking to the object. With each of these preliminary efforts -- literally, with every step -- he incurs a dukkata. At first glance, this may seem extreme, but when we view his state of mind as having ultimate importance, this system of assigning penalties is appropriate. In cases like this, if the bhikkhu completes the act, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary efforts are nullified, and he is left with only the penalty imposed by the rule.
Thus it is important, when reading about each training rule, to pay attention to what role these five factors play in determining the offenses related to the rule. And, of course, it is important for each bhikkhu to pay attention to all five of these factors in all of his actions to make sure that he does not fall at any time into an offense. This is where training in discipline becomes part of the training of the mind leading to Awakening. A bhikkhu who is mindful to analyze his actions into these five factors, to be aware of them as they arise, and to behave consistently in such a manner that he avoids committing any offenses, is developing three qualities: mindfulness; an analytical attitude towards phenomena in his thoughts, words, and deeds; and persistence in abandoning unskillful qualities and developing skillful ones within himself. These are the first three of the seven factors of Awakening, and form the basis for the remaining four: rapture, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity.
The Parivara (VI.4), in reviewing the Vibhanga's five factors for analyzing offenses, devises a number of categories for classifying offenses, the most important being the distinction between rules carrying a penalty only when broken intentionally through correct perception (//sacittaka//), and those carrying a penalty even when broken unintentionally or through misperception (//acittaka//).
Although it may seem harsh to impose penalties for unintentional actions, we must again reflect on the state of mind that leads to such actions. In some acts, of course, the intention makes all the difference between guilt and innocence. Taking an article with intent to return it, for example, is something else entirely from taking it with intent to steal. There are, however, other acts with damaging consequences that, when performed unintentionally, reveal carelessness and lack of circumspection in areas where a person may reasonably be held responsible. Many of the rules dealing with the proper care of communal property and one's basic requisites fall in this category. Except for one very unlikely situation, though, none of the major rules carry a penalty if broken unintentionally, while the minor rules that do carry such penalties may be regarded as useful lessons in mindfulness.
The Parivara (IV.7.4) also lists six ways in which offenses can be committed:
1) //unconscientiously//, i.e., knowing that an action is contrary to the rules, but going ahead with it anyway;
2) //unknowingly//, i.e., not realizing that the action is contrary to the rules;
3) //absentmindedly//;
4) //assuming something improper to be proper//, e.g., drinking a glass of apple wine perceiving it to be apple juice;
5) //assuming something proper to be improper//, e.g., perceiving a glass of apple juice to be apple wine, and drinking it nonetheless; and
6) //acting out of uncertainty//, i.e., not being sure if an action is proper, but going ahead with it anyway. In this last case, if the action is improper, one is to be treated according to the relevant rule. If it is proper, one incurs a dukkata in any event for having acted irresponsibly.
Another scheme introduced in the ancient commentaries for classifying offenses is the distinction between those that the world criticizes (//loka-vajja//) and those that only the rules criticize (//pannati-vajja//). The Commentary defines this distinction by saying that loka-vajja offenses are committed with an unskillful state of mind (i.e., greed, anger or delusion), whereas pannati-vajja offenses are committed with a skillful state of mind. Thus the concepts would seem to have been developed originally to deal with the exceptional cases in which a bhikkhu would be led by mature consideration to break a rule -- e.g., where another person's life would be at stake. Under such circumstances, the world at large would not criticize his actions, although the rules would impose a penalty.
As these concepts finally took shape in the ancient commentaries, though, they became a way of classifying rules. The compilers apparently felt that some of the rules forbade actions that necessarily were motivated by an unskillful state of mind, whereas others forbade actions that might be motivated by skillful states of mind. Given this use of the distinction, the Vinaya Mukha redefines the terms as follows:
"Some offenses are faults as far as the world is concerned -- wrong and damaging even if committed by ordinary people who are not bhikkhus -- examples being robbery and murder, as well as such lesser faults as assault and verbal abuse. Offenses of this sort are termed loka-vajja. There are also offenses that are faults only as far as the Buddha's ordinances are concerned -- neither wrong nor damaging if committed by ordinary people; wrong only if committed by bhikkhus, on the grounds that they run counter to the Buddha's ordinances. Offenses of this sort are termed pannati-vajja."
Even a cursory glance at the Patimokkha rules will show that many of them deal with the latter sort of offense, and that such offenses concern relatively minor matters. The question often arises, then: Why this concern with minutiae? The answer is that the rules deal with social relationships -- among the bhikkhus themselves and between the bhikkhus and the laity -- and that social relationships are defined by seemingly minor points.
Take, for instance, the rule that a bhikkhu may not eat food unless it is handed to him or to a fellow bhikkhu by an unordained person on that day. This rule has wide-ranging ramifications. It means, among other things, that a bhikkhu may not leave human society to lead a solitary hermit's existence, foraging for food on his own. He must have frequent contact with humanity, however minimal, and in that contact he performs a service to others, even if simply offering them a noble example of conduct and giving them an opportunity to develop the virtue of generosity. Many of the other seemingly trivial rules -- such as those forbidding digging in the soil and damaging plant life -- will reveal, on reflection, implications of a similar scope.
The Great Standards. Although the Vibhanga and Khandhakas cover an enormous number of cases, they do not, of course, cover every possible contingency in the world; and from what we have seen of the way in which the Buddha formulated the rules -- dealing with cases as they arose -- there is reason to doubt that he himself wanted them to form an airtight system. As for cases that did not arise during his lifetime, he established the following four guidelines for judgment -- called the Great Standards (a separate set from those he formulated at Bhoganagara) -- for judging cases not mentioned in the rules:
"Bhikkhus, whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.
"Whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.
"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.
"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you." (Mv.VI.40)
These four Great Standards, when properly applied, are an important tool for extending the principles of discipline into situations unknown in the Buddha's time. We will have occasion to refer to them frequently in the course of this book.
There is evidence in the Canon that the Buddha's own attitude towards discipline was not one of strict legalism. Take, for instance, this discourse:
"At one time the Blessed One was living in Vesali, in the Great Wood. Then a certain Vajjian bhikkhu went to him...and said: 'Lord, more than 150 training rules come up for recitation every fortnight. I cannot train in reference to them.'
"'Bhikkhu, can you train in reference to the three trainings: the training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, the training in heightened discernment?'
"'Yes, Lord, I can....'
"'Then train in reference to those three trainings....When you train in reference to the training in heightened virtue... heightened mind...heightened discernment, passion will be abandoned in you, aversion...delusion will be abandoned in you. Then with the abandoning of passion...aversion... delusion, you will not do anything unskillful or engage in any evil.'
"Later on, that bhikkhu trained in heightened virtue... heightened mind...heightened discernment....Passion... aversion...delusion were abandoned in him....He did not do anything unskillful or engage in any evil." (A.III.85)
Another discourse with a similar point:
"'Bhikkhus, more than 150 training rules come up for recitation every fortnight, in reference to which young men desiring the goal train themselves. There are these three trainings in which they (the training rules) are all contained. What three? The training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, the training in heightened discernment. These are the three trainings in which they are all contained....
"'There is the case, bhikkhus, where a bhikkhu is fully accomplished in virtue, concentration, and discernment (i.e., is an arahant). With reference to the lesser and minor training rules, he falls into offenses and rehabilitates himself. Why is that? Because it is not said to be an impossibility. But as for the training rules that are basic to the holy life and proper to the holy life, his virtue is steadfast and firm. Having undertaken them, he trains in reference to the training rules. Because of the ending of (mental) effluents, he dwells in the release of awareness and release of discernment that are free from effluent, having known and made them manifest for himself right in the present....
"'Those who are partially accomplished attain a part; those who are wholly accomplished, the whole. The training rules, I say, are not in vain.'" (A.III.88)
* * * * * * * * CHAPTER
TWO
Nissaya ~~~~~~~
The Dhamma and Vinaya impinge in such detail on so many areas of one's life that no new bhikkhu can be expected to master them in a short time. For this reason, the Buddha arranged for a period of apprenticeship -- called //nissaya//, or dependence -- in which every newly ordained bhikkhu must train under the guidance of an experienced bhikkhu for at least five years before he can be considered competent to look after himself.
This apprenticeship has formed the human context in which the practice of the Buddha's teachings has been passed down for the past 2,600 years. To overlook it is to miss one of the basic parameters of the life of the Dhamma and Vinaya. Thus we will discuss it here first, before going on to the individual training rules of the Patimokkha.
Dependence is of two sorts: dependence on one's preceptor (//upajjhaya//) and dependence on a teacher (//acariya//). The relationships are similar -- and in many details, identical -- so the following discussion will use the word "mentor" to cover both preceptor and teacher wherever the pattern applies to both, and will distinguish them only where the patterns differ.
//Choosing a mentor//. Before ordination, one must choose a bhikkhu to act as one's preceptor. The Mahavagga (I.36-37) gives a long list of qualifications a bhikkhu must meet before he can act as a preceptor, while the Commentary divides the list into two levels: ideal and minimal qualifications. A bhikkhu who lacks the minimal qualifications incurs a dukkata if he acts as a preceptor; a bhikkhu who meets the minimal but lacks the ideal qualifications is not an ideal person to give guidance, but he incurs no penalty in doing so.
//The ideal qualifications:// The preceptor should have an arahant's virtue, concentration, discernment, release, and knowledge of release; and should be able to train another person to the same level of attainment. He should have faith, a sense of shame, fear of evil, persistence in the practice, and quick mindfulness (according to the Subcommentary, this means that he is constantly mindful of whatever mental object is before the mind). He should be free of heavy and light offenses and be possessed of right view. (This last point, the Commentary says, means that he does not adhere to the extremes of eternalism or annihilationism.) He should be competent to tend to a sick pupil, or to find someone who will tend to him, and to allay dissatisfaction in a pupil who wants to leave the celibate life.
The Mahavagga does not say outright that these are ideal, as opposed to minimal, qualifications, but the Commentary offers as proof the fact that one of a pupil's duties is to try to allay any dissatisfaction that may arise in his preceptor. If all preceptors were arahants, no case of this sort would ever arise, and there would be no need to mention it. Thus the Commentary concludes that arahantship, although ideal in a preceptor, is not necessary.
//The minimal qualifications//: The preceptor must be learned and intelligent. According to the Commentary, this means that he knows enough of the Dhamma and Vinaya to govern a following and is intelligent enough to know what is and is not an offense. He must be competent enough to allay any anxiety a pupil may have over the rules, know what is and is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense, and how an offense may be removed. He must have detailed knowledge of both Patimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the one for the bhikkhunis) and be able to train the pupil in the bhikkhus' customs (Com.: this means that he knows the Khandhakas), in the basic rules of the chaste life (Subcom.: he knows both Vibhangas), the higher Dhamma, and the higher Vinaya. He must be able to dissuade his pupil from adhering to a wrong view, or find someone who will help dissuade him. And -- the most basic requirement -- he must have been ordained as a bhikkhu for ten years or more.
If, for some reason, the new bhikkhu lives in a separate monastery from his preceptor, he must take dependence under a teacher, whose qualifications are precisely the same as those for a preceptor. Since the Mahavagga (I.72.1) gives a dukkata for taking dependence under an unconscientious bhikkhu, the new bhikkhu is allowed four to five days to observe his potential teacher's conduct before taking dependence under him (Mv.I.72.2).
//Taking dependence//. Prior to his ordination -- and usually, as part of the ceremony itself -- the candidate must make a formal request for dependence from his preceptor. The procedure is as follows:
Arranging his upper robe over his left shoulder, leaving his right shoulder bare, he bows down to the preceptor and then, kneeling with his hands palm-to-palm in front of his heart, repeats the following passage three times:
Upajjhayo me bhante hohi,
which means, "Venerable sir, be my preceptor."
If the preceptor responds with any of these words -- //Sahu //(very well), //lahu// (certainly), //opayikam// (all right), //patirupam// (it is proper) or //pasadikena sampadehi// (manage it amiably) -- the dependence has taken hold. The Mahavagga adds that if the preceptor indicates any of these meanings by gesture, that also counts; and according to the Commentary, the same holds true if he makes any equivalent statement. (Mv.I.25.7)
If, after his ordination, the new bhikkhu needs to request dependence from a teacher, the procedure is the same, except that the request he makes three times is this:
Acariyo me bhante hohi; ayasmato nissaya vacchami,
which means, "Venerable sir, be my teacher; I will live in dependence on you." (Mv.I.32.2)
//Duties//. The Mahavagga (I.25.6; 32.1) states that a pupil should regard his mentor as a father; and the mentor, the pupil as his son. It then goes on to delineate this relationship as a set of reciprocal duties.
The pupil's duties to his mentor fall into the following five categories:
1. //Attending to the mentor's personal needs//. The Mahavagga goes into great detail on this topic, giving precise instructions dealing with every conceivable way a pupil can be of service to his mentor. The Vinaya Mukha tries to reduce these duties to a few general principles, but this misses much of what the Mahavagga has to offer, for it is in the details that we can see fine examples of mindfulness in action -- the best way to fold a robe, clean a dwelling, and so forth -- as well as indications of how one can use this aspect of one's training to develop sensitivity to the needs of others. Still, the detailed instructions are so extensive that they would overburden the discussion in this chapter, so I have saved them for Appendix VIII. Here I will simply give them in outline form. The pupil should:
a. Arrange his mentor's toiletries for his morning wash-up.
b. Arrange his seat and food for his morning conjey (if he has any), and clean up after he is finished.
c. Arrange his robes and bowl for his alms round.
d. Follow him on his alms round, if the mentor so desires, and take his robes and bowl when he returns.
e. Arrange his seat and food for his alms meal and clean up afterwards.
f. Prepare his bath. If he goes to the sauna, go with him and attend to his needs.
g. Study the Dhamma and Vinaya from him when he is prepared to teach. (The Mahavagga describes this as "recitation" and "interrogation." Recitation, according to the Commentary, means learning to memorize passages; interrogation, learning to investigate their meaning.)
h. Clean his dwelling and other parts of his dwelling complex, such as the restroom and storage rooms, when they get dirty.
2. //Assisting the mentor in any problems he may have with regard to the Dhamma and Vinaya//. The Mahavagga lists the following examples:
a. If the preceptor begins to feel dissatisfaction with the celibate life, the pupil should try to allay that dissatisfaction or find someone else who can.
b. If the preceptor begins to feel anxiety over his conduct with regard to the rules, the pupil should try to allay that anxiety, or find someone else who can.
c. If the preceptor begins to hold to wrong views, the pupil should try to dissuade him from those views or find someone else who can.
d. If the preceptor has committed a sanghadisesa offense, the pupil should -- to the best of his ability -- help with the arrangements for penance, probation, and rehabilitation, or find someone else who can.
e. If the Community is going to carry out a formal act against the mentor, the pupil should try to dissuade them from it. According to the Commentary, this means that he should go to the various members of the Community individually before the meeting and try to dissuade them from going through with the act. If he can't dissuade them, he should try to get them to lessen its severity (say, from an act of banishment to an act of censure). If they are justified in carrying out the act, though, he should not object while the meeting is in progress. Once they have carried out the act, he should concentrate on helping his mentor behave so that they will rescind the act as quickly as possible.
3. //Washing, making, and dyeing the mentor's robes.//
4. //Showing loyalty and respect for the mentor//.
a. The pupil should neither give or receive gifts, nor give or receive services to/from others without first obtaining the mentor's permission. According to the Commentary, //others // here refers to people who are on bad terms with the mentor.
b. The pupil should obtain his mentor's permission before entering a village, going to a cemetery (to meditate, says, the Commentary), or leaving the district in which they live. The Commentary notes, though, that if the mentor refuses one's request the first time, one should ask up to two more times, presenting one's reasons as best one can. If the mentor still refuses, the pupil should reflect on his situation. If staying with the mentor is not helping his education and meditation, and if the mentor seems to want him to stay simply to have someone to look after his (the mentor's) needs, the pupil is justified in leaving and taking dependence with a new mentor in his new residence.
5. //Caring for the mentor when he falls ill//, not leaving him until he either recovers or passes away (Mv.I.25).
According to the Commentary, a pupil is freed from these duties when he is ill. Otherwise, he should observe all the above duties to his preceptor as long as he is in dependence on him, and the duties in sections 1-3 even after he is released from dependence, as long as both he and the preceptor are alive and still ordained.
As for the duties to one's teacher, the Commentary lists four types of teachers: the going-forth teacher (the one who gives one the ten precepts during one's ordination ceremony); the acceptance teacher (the one who chants the motion and announcements during the ceremony); the Dhamma teacher (the one who teaches one the Pali language and Canon); and the dependence teacher (the one with whom one lives in dependence). With the dependence teacher, one must observe all the above duties only as long as one is living in dependence on him. As for the other three, one should observe sections 1-3 as long as both parties are alive and still ordained.
The Commentary adds that if the mentor already has a pupil who is performing these duties for him, he may inform his remaining pupils that they need not take them on. This exempts them from having to observe them. If he neglects to do this, the pupil who is performing the duties may inform his fellows that he will take responsibility for looking after the mentor. This also exempts them. Otherwise, they incur a dukkata for every duty they neglect to perform.
The mentor's duties to his pupil:
1. //Furthering the pupil's education//, teaching him the Dhamma and Vinaya through recitation, interrogation, exhortation, and instruction.
2. //Providing requisites for the pupil//. If the pupil lacks any of his basic requisites, and the mentor has any to spare, he should make up the lack.
3. //Attending to the pupil's personal needs when he is ill//, performing the services mentioned in section 1 under the pupil's duties to his mentor.
4. //Assisting the pupil in any problems he may have with regard to the Dhamma and Vinaya//, performing the services mentioned in section 2 under the pupil's duties to his mentor.
5. //Teaching the pupil how to wash, make, and dye robes//. If for some reason the pupil is unable to handle these skills, the mentor should find someone who can help the pupil with them.
6. //Caring for the pupil when he falls ill//, not leaving him until he either recovers or passes away (Mv.I.26).
According to the Commentary, the preceptor, going-forth teacher, and acceptance teacher must observe these duties toward the pupil as long as both parties are alive and still ordained. As for the Dhamma and dependence teachers, they must observe these duties only as long as the pupil is living with them.
//Dismissal//. If the pupil does not observe his duties to his mentor, the mentor is empowered to dismiss him. In fact, if the pupil deserves dismissal, the mentor incurs a dukkata if for some reason he does not dismiss him, just as he would for dismissing a pupil who did not deserve it (MV.I.27.5-8). The grounds for dismissal are five:
1. The pupil has no affection for his mentor -- i.e., he shows him no kindness.
2. He has no faith in his mentor -- i.e., he does not regard him as an example to follow.
3. He has no shame in front of his mentor -- i.e., he openly disregards the training rules in his mentor's presence.
4. He has no respect for his mentor -- i.e., he does not listen to what the mentor has to say, and openly disobeys him.
5. He is not developing under his mentor -- the Commentary translates //developing// here as developing a sense of good will for his mentor, but it could also mean developing in his general education and practice of the Dhamma and Vinaya.
The Vinaya Mukha notes that the mentor should reflect on his own conduct before dismissing such a pupil. If he has done anything that would give the pupil valid reason for losing affection, etc., he should first correct his own conduct. Only after reflecting that there is no longer anything in his own conduct that would give the pupil valid reason to disregard him should he go ahead with the dismissal.
The Mahavagga mentions each of the following statements as a valid means of dismissal: "I dismiss you." "Don't come back here." "Take away your robes and bowl." "Don't attend to me." It also states that if the mentor makes any of these meanings known by gesture -- e.g., he evicts the pupil from his quarters and throws his robes and bowl out after him -- that also counts as a valid means of dismissal (Mv.I.27.2). The Commentary adds that any statement conveying the same basic meaning as those above would count as well.
Once a pupil has been dismissed, it is his duty to apologize. If he doesn't, he incurs a dukkata (Mv.I.27.3). Once the pupil has apologized, the mentor's duty is to forgive him (Mv.I.27.4). If, however, he sees that the pupil is still unconscientious, he should not take him back, for a mentor who takes on an unconscientious pupil incurs a dukkata (Mv.I.72.1.). Thus the mentor may, if he sees fit, inflict a non-physical punishment on the pupil before taking him back on the original footing, to make sure that he has actually seen the error of his ways. An example of such punishment, mentioned in the Vinaya Mukha, is simply asking to wait to observe the pupil's behavior for a while to see whether or not his apology is sincere.
The Commentary recommends that if the mentor refuses to forgive the pupil, the latter should try to get other bhikkhus in the monastery to intercede for him. If that doesn't work, he should go stay in another monastery and take dependence under a senior bhikkhu there who is on friendly terms with the mentor, in hopes that the mentor will take this as a sign of the pupil's good intentions and will eventually grant his forgiveness.
//Dependence lapses//. Mv.I.36.1 says that if a pupil is staying in dependence with his preceptor, the dependence lapses if:
1. He leaves. According to the Subcommentary, this means that the preceptor goes to spend the night outside the monastery, regardless of whether or not he plans to return.
2. He disrobes.
3. He dies.
4. He goes over to another side -- according to the Commentary, this means that he joins another religion.
In all of the above cases, the commentaries interpret "he" as referring to the preceptor, although it would seem to refer to the pupil as well. This would fit with the passages from the Mahavagga, to be mentioned below, that refer to a new bhikkhu on a journey as not being in dependence. In such cases, the new bhikkhu is most likely the one who has left the preceptor, and his leaving is what has caused the dependence to lapse.
5. He gives a command. This is the one alternative where "he" clearly refers only to the preceptor. The Commentary interprets //command// here as dismissal, as discussed above, although the Vinaya Mukha would also include cases where the preceptor sees that the pupil qualifies to be released from dependence (see below) and tells him so.
In each of these cases, a pupil who is not yet released from dependence must find someone else to take dependence under on that very day, except in the following instances (taken from the Commentary):
-- The preceptor leaves, saying that he will be away only for a day or two, and that the pupil need not ask anyone else for dependence in the meantime. If it so happens that the preceptor's return is delayed, he should send word to his pupil, saying that he still intends to come back. If, however, the pupil receives word from his preceptor that the latter no longer intends to return, he should immediately look for a teacher to take dependence under.
-- The preceptor leaves, and the only other senior bhikkhu in the monastery is one whom the pupil does not know well. In this case, the pupil is allowed four or five days to observe the senior bhikkhu's behavior (as mentioned above) before requesting dependence from him. If, though, the pupil already knows the senior bhikkhu well enough to feel confident in his conduct, he should take dependence with him on the day of his preceptor's departure.
If the pupil is staying in dependence on a teacher, the dependence can lapse for any of six reasons. The first five are identical with those above, although even the Commentary states that "he leaves," the first reason, applies not only to cases where the teacher leaves but also to cases where the pupil leaves. The sixth reason is:
6. The pupil rejoins his preceptor. The Commentary explains this by saying that, in effect, the pupil's original dependence on his preceptor always overrides his dependence on a teacher. If the pupil happens to see his preceptor and recognize him, or to hear and recognize his voice -- even if they just happen to pass on the street -- his dependence on his teacher automatically lapses, and his dependence on his preceptor is reinstated. If he then returns to live with his teacher, he must ask for dependence from the teacher all over again.
The Vinaya Mukha objects to his judgment, saying that "rejoins the preceptor" should refer to the pupil's actually living with the preceptor, either in another monastery or in the same monastery where the teacher lives. This, however, is an area where different Communities differ in their interpretation, and the wise policy is to follow the interpretation of the Community in which one lives.
//Temporary exemption from dependence//. Normally a junior bhikkhu is required to live in dependence under a mentor at all times. However, Mv.I.73 allows him not to take dependence when living in the following situations if no qualified bhikkhu is available as a mentor:
1) He is on a journey.
2) He is ill.
3) He is caring for an ill person who has requested his help (%).
4) He is living alone in the forest, meditating comfortably, intending to take dependence if a qualified mentor comes along.
The Commentary, in discussing these allowances, makes the following points:
A bhikkhu on a journey is said to have no mentor available if no qualified senior bhikkhu is traveling with him. In other words, the fact that he happens to pass by a monastery with a qualified mentor does not mean that a mentor is available, and he is allowed to continue traveling without taking dependence. If, however, he spends the night in a place where he has taken dependence before, he should take dependence on the day of his arrival. If he reaches a place where he has never been before and plans to spend only two or three days, he need not take dependence; but if he plans to spend a week, he must. If the senior bhikkhu he requests dependence from says, "What's the use of taking dependence for only a week?" that exempts him from this requirement.
As for the bhikkhu living alone in the forest, the Commentary says that "meditating comfortably" means that his tranquility and insight meditation are going smoothly. For some reason, though, it says that this allowance applies only to bhikkhus whose meditation is at a tender stage and might deteriorate if they were to leave the forest; if a bhikkhu has attained any of the Noble Attainments -- beginning with Stream-entry -- he may not make use of this allowance. Why the Commentary limits the allowance in this way, it doesn't say.
At any rate, once the month before the Rains Retreat arrives, and no suitable mentor appears, the junior bhikkhu must leave his forest abode and look for a place where he can take dependence for the Rains.
//Release from dependence//. According to Mv.I.53.4, a bhikkhu may be released from dependence after he has been ordained for five years, on the condition that he be experienced and competent. If he is not yet experienced and competent, he must remain under dependency until he is. If he never becomes experienced and competent, he must remain in dependence for his entire life as a bhikkhu. The Commentary adds that, in the last case, if he cannot find a competent experienced bhikkhu who is senior to him, he must take dependence with a competent, experienced bhikkhu who is his junior.
To be considered competent and experienced enough to deserve release from dependence, a bhikkhu must meet many of the same general qualifications as those for a mentor, except that he need not possess the competence to look after a pupil, and the minimum number of years he needs as a bhikkhu is five. None of the texts divide the qualifications here into ideal and minimal qualifications, as they do for the mentor, but it seems reasonable that the same division would apply here as well. This would give us the following list:
//The ideal qualifications//: The bhikkhu should have an arahant's virtue, concentration, discernment, release, and knowledge of release. He should have faith, a sense of shame, fear of evil, persistence in the practice, and quick mindfulness. He should be free of heavy and light offenses and possess right view.
//The minimal qualifications//: The bhikkhu must be learned and intelligent, knowing both Patimokkhas in detail, understanding what is and is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense, and how an offense may be removed. And -- the most basic requirement -- he must have been ordained as a bhikkhu for at least five years (Mv.I.5-13).
The Commentary expands on the term //learned// here, saying that the bhikkhu must have memorized:
1. Both Patimokkhas.
2. The Four Bhanavaras -- a set of auspicious chants that are still regularly memorized in Sri Lanka.
3. A discourse that is helpful as a guide for sermon-giving. (The Commentary lists as examples the Maha-Rahulovada Sutta [M. 62], the Andhakavinda Sutta, and the Ambattha Sutta [D. 3].)
4. Three kinds of //anumodana //(rejoicing in the merit of others) chants: for meals; for auspicious merit-making ceremonies, such as blessing a house; and for non-auspicious ceremonies, i.e., any relating to a death.
The Commentary adds that he must also know the rules for such official acts of the Community as the Patimokkha recitation and the Invitation Ceremony at the end of the Rains, and be acquainted with themes for tranquility and insight meditation leading to arahantship.
This definition of //learned// is not universally accepted, and some traditions have reworked it. As this is another area where different Communities have different interpretations, the wise policy is to adhere to the practice followed in one's Community, as long as it follows the basic requirements in the Canon, mentioned above.
Once a pupil has been released from dependence, he need no longer perform the duties mentioned in sections 4 and 5 under the pupil's duties to his mentor.
//Return to dependence//. The Cullavagga (I.9-12) states that a bhikkhu released from dependence may be forced, by a formal act of the Community, to return to dependence if his conduct is so bad as to warrant it. The qualifying factors are:
1. He is ignorant and inexperienced.
2. He is full of offenses and has not made amends for them.
3. He lives in unbecoming association with lay people.
If these factors apply to a bhikkhu to the extent that the Community is "fed up with granting him probation, sending him back to the beginning, imposing penance, and rehabilitating him" -- these terms refer to the procedures for dealing with a bhikkhu who has committed repeated sanghadisesa offenses (see Chapter 5) -- then the Community is justified in imposing a formal "act of dependence" on him. This is identical with a formal "act for further misbehavior," to be discussed in Chapter 11, and carries the same penalties, the only difference being that the bhikkhu must live in dependence under a mentor as long as the act of dependence is in effect. If he mends his ways to the Community's satisfaction, they may rescind the act and return his independence.
* * *
At any rate, as we mentioned above, regardless of whether a pupil is under dependence or released from it, he is still expected to observe certain duties to his preceptor -- and his preceptor, certain duties to him -- as long as both are alive and ordained. This is in line with the fact that they are always to regard each other as father and son: The preceptor is to take a continuing interest in his pupil's welfare, and the pupil is to show his continuing gratitude for the initiation his preceptor has given him into the bhikkhu's life.
* * * * * * * * CHAPTER
THREE
Disrobing ~~~~~~~~~
The first rule in the Patimokkha opens with the statement that it -- and, by extension, every other rule in the Patimokkha -- applies to all bhikkhus who have not disrobed by renouncing the training and returning to the lay life. Thus the Vibhanga begins its explanations by discussing what does and does not count as a valid act of disrobing. Because this is, in effect, the escape clause for all the rules, I am discussing it first as a separate chapter, for if a bhikkhu disrobes in an invalid manner, he still counts as a bhikkhu and is subject to the rules whether he realizes it or not. If he then were to break any of the Parajika rules, he would be disqualified from ever becoming a bhikkhu again in this lifetime.
To disrobe, a bhikkhu with firm intent states in the presence of a witness words to the effect that he is renouncing the training. The validity of the act depends on four factors:
1. The bhikkhu's state of mind. 2. His intention. 3. His statement. 4. The witness to his statement.
State of mind. The bhikkhu must be in his right mind. Any statement he makes while insane, crazed with pain, or possessed by spirits does not count.
Intention. He must seriously desire to leave the Community. If, without actually intending to disrobe, he makes any of the statements usually used for disrobing, it does not count as an act of disrobing. For example, if he makes the statement in jest or is telling someone else how to disrobe, the fact that he mentions the words does not mean that he has disrobed. Also, if he says one thing and means something else -- e.g., if he makes a slip of the tongue -- that too does not count.
The statement. The Vibhanga gives a wide variety of statements that one may use to renounce the training. The most basic one follows the form, "I renounce //x//," where //x// may be replaced with the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, the training, the discipline (//vinaya//), the Patimokkha, the chaste life, one's preceptor, one's teacher, one's fellow bhikkhus, or any equivalent terms. Other examples follow similar forms, such as, "I am tired of //x//," "What is //x// to me?" "//X// means nothing to me," or "I am well freed of //x//." A separate form follows the pattern, "I will be //y//," where //y// may be replaced with a householder, a lay follower, a novice, a member of another sect, an adherent of another sect, or any other equivalent term.
The Vibhanga stipulates that the statement may //not// be put in the conditional tense ("Suppose I were to renounce the training"), and the Commentary further stipulates that the "//x//" statements must be in the //present// tense. Thus to say, "I have renounced the training," or "I will renounce the training," would not be a valid statement of disrobing.
The witness must be a human being in his or her right mind, and must understand what the bhikkhu says. This rules out the practice legendary in Thailand of bhikkhus who disrobe by taking a Buddha image as their witness, or who disrobe in front of a Bodhi tree on the assumption that the tree deity counts.
These four factors cover all that is absolutely necessary for an act of disrobing to be valid. However, each of the different national traditions has developed a set of formal ceremonies to surround the act -- such as making a final confession of all one's offenses and reciting the passage for reflection on one's past use of the four requisites -- to give psychological weight to the occasion and to help minimize any sense of remorse one may feel afterwards.
Because disrobing is a serious act with strong consequences for one's mental and spiritual well being, it should be done only after due consideration. Once a bhikkhu decides that he //does// want to disrobe, he would be wise to follow not only the stipulations given in the texts but also any additional customs dictated by the traditions of his particular Community, as a sign to himself and to others that he is acting seriously and with due respect both for the religion and for himself.
* * * * * * * *
CHAPTER
FOUR Parajika ~~~~~~~~
This term, according to the Parivara, derives from a verb meaning to lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in the first place. The irrevocable nature of this defeat is illustrated in the Vibhanga with a number of similes: "as a man with his head cut off...as a withered leaf freed from its stem...as a flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together again...as a palm tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth." A bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from the life of the Sangha and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.
1.Should any bhikkhu -- participating in the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the training, without having declared his weakness -- engage in the sexual act, even with a female animal, he is defeated and no longer in communion.
Effort. In this rule, the term //sexual act refers to all kinds of sexual intercourse. The Vibhanga classifies the various types of intercourse by the organs involved -- the genitals, the mouth, the anus -- and in any of the possible combinations (except for mouth-to-mouth, which is treated separately under Sanghadisesa 2, below), the sexual act has been performed when one organ enters the other even if just to "the extent of a sesame seed." This means that a bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject to this rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of whether there is a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively involved, and whether or not any of the parties involved reaches orgasm.
Object. The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary sexual intercourse with a human being, a "non-human" being (a //yakkha//, //naga//, or //peta//), or a common animal, whether female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.
Performing the sexual act with a dead body -- even a decapitated head -- also entails the full penalty if the remains of the body are intact enough for the act to be accomplished.
The Vinita Vatthu also lists two examples of "self-intercourse": A bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus. Both cases carry the full penalty, which shows that one's own anal and oral orifices can fulfill the factor of object here.
Knowledge & consent. For the sexual act to count as an offense, the bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent. Thus if he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise unconscious and remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during the assault or was conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs a penalty depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the act.
Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of passing that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From the examples in the Vinita Vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a //mental// state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but without consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense; but there is some question as to whether a bhikkhu who consents mentally to letting the sexual act happen would incur the penalty if he simply lies still and lets it happen, or if he would have to indicate his consent with a verbal act or physical motion.
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the rules contains two patterns concerning what does and does not count as a physical expression of consent when one is forced into a situation that would break a rule. In two of the Vinita Vatthu cases mentioned under this rule, bhikkhus are approached by women who volunteer to fondle them to the point where they emit semen (%). Both bhikkhus let them go ahead, and both incur the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 1. In such cases, simply letting the act happen counts as physical acquiescence. Under Sanghadisesa 2, however, if a bhikkhu is approached by a woman who fondles his body, and he consents mentally to what she is doing, he incurs a penalty if he says something or makes a physical move to indicate that consent, but no penalty if he remains perfectly still.
None of the texts explain why there are these two patterns, but two possibilities suggest themselves: (1) It is physically impossible to emit semen and to enjoy the emission without the body's moving in one way or another. (2) One is not necessarily responsible if a woman simply makes contact with one's body, even if one enjoys the contact; but if one is happy to let her get to the point where she has one ejaculating, one cannot deny responsibility for what is happening. In either case, this rule would seem to follow the pattern for Sanghadisesa 1: If one is sexually assaulted, one is completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not give one's mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does feel mental consent during at least part of the act but puts up a struggle so as not to express that consent physically or verbally in any way. If one puts up no struggle and feels mental consent, even if only fleetingly during the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out, one incurs the full penalty.
This would seems to be the basis for the Commentary's warning in its discussion of the Vinita Vatthu case in which a bhikkhu wakes up to find himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is how a bhikkhu still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to protect his state of mind.
Derived offenses. The only thullaccaya directly related to this rule is for the unlikely case of a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse. (!) To attempt intercourse with any other part of a dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable doll or mannikin, incurs a dukkata.
The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being's body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either Sanghadisesa 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful bodily contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a sanghadisesa; if a //pandaka// (see Sanghadisesa 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common animal, a dukkata. We can infer from the Vibhanga's ruling here that if a bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any other part of a dead body, or with any part of an insentient object, the case comes under Sanghadisesa 1.
The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhanga on these points, however, saying that the derived offenses under this rule can include only dukkata and thullaccaya penalties. In its explanation of Sanghadisesa 1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the pleasure of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that must be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming at intercourse takes hold of a woman's body, it is simply a preliminary to intercourse and thus entails only a dukkata, rather than a sanghadisesa for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has a premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no offense at all.
These are fine academic distinctions and are clearly motivated by a desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to practical problems. As the Commentary itself points out, if a bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the borderline between these rules, but cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is no basis in the Canon for the Commentary's system, and in fact it contradicts not only the Vibhanga's ruling mentioned above, but also its definition of "lustful" under Sanghadisesas 2, 3, & 4, which is exactly the same for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary's neat system is invalid, and that the Vibhanga's judgment holds: If a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being's body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either Sanghadisesa 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful bodily contact -- rather than here.
Blanket exemptions. In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, the Vibhanga states that there are four special categories of bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this rule: any bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first offender (in this case, Ven. Sudinna) whose actions prompted the Buddha to formulate the rule in the first place. The Commentary notes that anyone who "goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged perceptions, having cast away all sense of conscience and shame, not knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules," counts as insane here. It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it blames on the bile. As for spirit possession, it says that this can happen either when spirits frighten one or when, by distracting one with sensory images, they insert their hands into one's heart by way of one's mouth. (!) At any rate, it notes, insane and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only when their perceptions are deranged ("when their mindfulness is entirely forgotten, and they don't know what fire, gold, excrement, and sandalwood are") and not from any they incur during their lucid moments. As for a bhikkhu overcome with pain, he is exempt from penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that he does not know what he is doing.
These four categories are exempted from penalties under //all// of the rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted only for the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the Buddha into formulating the rule. I will not mention these categories again, but the reader should bear them in mind as being exempt in every case.
Lastly, the Vinita Vatthu to this rule includes an interesting case that formed the basis for an additional rule:
"At that time a certain monk had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood at Vesali to pass the day and was sleeping, having left the door open. His various limbs were stiff with the 'wind forces' (i.e., he had an erection). Now at that time a large company of women bearing garlands and scents came to the park, headed for the vihara. Seeing the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ and, having taken their pleasure and remarking, 'What a bull of a man!' they went on their way, taking up their garlands and scents."
The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission to close the door when resting during the day.
Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse -- genital, anal, or oral -- with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a parajika offense.
* * *
2. Should any bhikkhu, in the manner of stealing, take what is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness -- just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying, "You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief" -- a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given is defeated and no longer in communion.
This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Patimokkha and requires the most explanation -- not that stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, simply that it can take so many forms.
The Vibhanga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors:
1) //Object//: anything belonging to another person, a group of persons, or a location (such as the offerings made to a sacred place).
2) //Perception//: One perceives that the object belongs to another person, etc.
3) //Intention//: One decides to steal it.
4) //Effort//: One takes possession of it.
Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is --
5) //The value of the object//.
Object. For an object to qualify as //what is not given// -- the rule's term for anything that may be the object of a theft -- it must belong to another person or be guarded as common property of a group or of a location, such as the offerings to a Buddha image, chedi, or other sacred place, as mentioned above. A further stipulation is that the owner or person responsible for guarding the object has neither given nor thrown it away. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object, such as rags from a pile of refuse; unclaimed things from a wilderness; or things unclaimed by any human being but in the possession of an animal or ghost. The Vinita Vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus committed no offense.
The question of property belonging to the Sangha logically fits here, but since the topic is fairly complex, I will treat it as a special case below
Perception. For the act of taking "what is not given" to count as theft, one must also //perceive //the object as being something not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is "not given," if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense. Or again, a bhikkhu who takes things from the Community's common stores, on the assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption proves false.
Intention. The act of taking "what is not given," even when one perceives it as "not given," counts as theft only if one's intention is to steal it. Thus if a bhikkhu takes an object on loan or on trust, he commits no offense. According to the Commentary, to take something on loan means that one has the intention that, "I'll return it," or "I'll make compensation."
As for taking an object on trust, Mv.VIII.1.19 lists five conditions that must be met if a bhikkhu is rightly to take an object on trust:
a. The owner is a friend. b. He/she is an intimate. c. He/she has given one permission to take from his/her things. d. He/she is still alive. e. One is confident that he/she will not mind.
If any of these factors is lacking -- for example, the owner is a good friend but has never given explicit permission to take from his/her things -- one has no right to take the things on trust. However, the Vinita Vatthu gives the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a "misconception as to trust" and did not impose a penalty.
The most common problem that arises in this area is when one sincerely assumes that the owner will not mind, but it turns out that he/she does. In cases of this sort there is no offense, and the matter is left to the bhikkhu and the owner to settle on their own as amicably as possible.
A bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.
Effort. Assuming that all of the above conditions are met -- the object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it -- if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely what acts constitute //taking//. To summarize the Vibhanga's treatment of this question, we can classify objects into two broad types: moveable and immovable.
Moveable items are said to be taken when they are moved entirely from their "base(s)," i.e., the spot(s) on which they rest. An object such as a box or a trunk lying flat along the ground or touching its support at a single area has a single base and counts as "taken" if it has been moved entirely from its base. An object such as a table or chair touching its support at a number of separate places has that number of bases. For instance, a stool with three legs touches the floor at three points and so has three bases. An object with more than one base is "taken" when it has been moved from all of its bases. Thus a television set standing on four legs is taken when all four of its legs have been lifted or slid away from the four spots on which they were standing.
If a moveable object is placed on another moveable object, such as a television set placed on a cart, there are two ways to count it as taken -- either when it is removed from its base on the cart or when the wheels of the cart have been moved from all of their bases on the floor -- whichever occurs first.
If person A is carrying an object, and person B tries to take it from him, it is counted as taken even if B succeeds only in moving it from one spot on A's body to another.
According to the Vibhanga, if a person holding an object with the owner's permission then decides to abscond with it, it counts as taken when he shifts it to another part of his person (e.g., into his pocket) or places it elsewhere. The Vinaya Mukha, however, takes issue with this point, saying that cases of this sort should be treated under the terms of a breach of trust, which is discussed below.
Animals are reckoned to have one base (e.g., snakes, any reclining animal) or more (e.g., chickens or dogs on their feet) in the same way as inanimate objects, and are said to be taken when they are pulled, chased, etc., completely from their base(s).
When a bhikkhu takes a moveable object in theft, the question of whether he makes off with it is irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned. For example, if he tries to steal a radio and succeeds in moving it completely from its base, but then hears the owner coming and so returns it to its original place, the owner would not even know that the object was in danger of being taken, and the civil law would regard the act at most as an attempted theft. As far as the Vinaya is concerned, though, the theft occurred when the bhikkhu first moved the object, and the fact that he returned it would not erase the theft. He would still be guilty of an offense.
As for immovable objects -- land or things such as buildings or trees affixed to the land -- these are taken when the rightful owner unwillingly abandons his claim to them of his own accord (through fear of intimidation or reluctance to incur the expense and bother of a court battle) or when he is forced to do so by a court of law and cannot, or does not, make a further appeal. In the Buddha's time, a court dispute involving land was considered fully settled when the winner of the case staked out his claim with the permission of the court. Thus the Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu who unfairly wins a court case of this sort has "taken" the land when he formally stakes out his claim after winning the case. At present we would say that he has taken the land when he receives the deed.
Immovable objects in the secondary sense -- trees, buildings, etc. -- are treated in the same light as ordinary moveable objects if a bhikkhu cuts them down or dismantles them: They count as taken when removed from their bases.
These are the general considerations for determining when an object is taken. The Vibhanga, though, cites a number of additional cases involving special contingencies, as follows:
a. //Fraudulence//: Objects are being distributed by lot to the Community. A bhikkhu desiring the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu exchanges his ticket for the other bhikkhu's ticket. The "taking" is accomplished when the tickets have been exchanged.
b. //Breach of trust//: A person places goods in trust with a bhikkhu. When the owner comes to ask for their return, the bhikkhu claims that he does not have them. The taking is accomplished when the owner stops pressing his claim. If the case goes to court, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses the case in the final court to which he appeals.
c. //Embezzlement//: A bhikkhu responsible for items kept in a storeroom removes one of the items from the storeroom. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the storeroom's boundary.
d. //Smuggling//: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area. If, however, the bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item subject to customs duty, and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. And there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to import duties among his effects.
Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:
a. //False dealing//: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted.
b. //Extortion//: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished when the owner complies.
The value of the object. As stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the rule reading, "just as when there is the taking of what is not given, kings...would banish him, saying... 'You are a thief.'" In other words, for theft to entail a parajika, it must be a case of grand larceny, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved were worth at least five //masakas//, a unit of money used at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one masaka but less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one masaka or less are grounds for a dukkata, the worth of the articles being determined by the price they would have fetched at the time of the theft.
This leaves us with the question of how a masaka would translate into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the masaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Subcommentary, which sets one masaka as equal to 4 rice grains' weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains' (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more would be a parajika offense.
One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu as being grounds for a parajika when stolen -- e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a robe, a handful of rice during a famine -- would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold, but we must remember that many items regarded as commonplace now might have been viewed as expensive luxuries at the time.
In spite of this objection, there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the V/Subcommentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft would result in a parajika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt -- and when there is any doubt concerning a parajika, the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: He is not compelled to disrobe. A basic principle operating throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.
There is a second advantage to the V/Subcommentary's method of calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself -- that if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would constitute a parajika -- but this standard creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only one among many taken into account when determining the penalty. This opens a whole Pandora's box of issues, many of which have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken -- the judge's mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth -- issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.
Thus the V/Subcommentary's method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and -- as noted above -- it draws the line at a value above which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a parajika.
If a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added together to determine the severity of the offense //only if they were stolen as part of a single plan or intention//. If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with examples:
In a case given in the Vinita Vatthu, a bhikkhu decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs several dukkatas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.
If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of all the lumber stolen, since he took all the pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.
Derived offenses. If a bhikkhu tries to steal an article that would be grounds for a parajika but does not succeed -- e.g., he is going to steal a book from a shelf, but before he can remove it from its place on the shelf he hears someone approaching and so walks off without taking it -- he commits a lighter offense in accordance with the effort made. Offenses of this sort are called offenses committed in the //pubbayoga// or preliminary steps. In the case of stealing, they are determined as follows:
//Inanimate moveable objects:// If the article is made to budge slightly, but is not moved completely from its base, or from some but not all of its bases -- thullaccaya. All actions prior to this, beginning with the act of walking toward the object with intent to steal it -- dukkata.
//Animals:// If in driving the animal along the bhikkhu gets it to move its front feet -- thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata.
//Immovable objects and articles placed in trust//: If the bhikkhu creates doubt in the mind of the owner as to whether he will deprive him/her of the property in question -- thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata.
//Immovable objects in the secondary sense (e.g., a tree):// If with one more blow of the ax the tree will fall -- thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata, unless (according to the Vinaya Mukha) there is a training rule imposing a higher penalty, such as the pacittiya rule concerning injury to plant life.
For ease of remembrance, if the bhikkhu is one step away from taking the object, he incurs a thullaccaya; if he does not go that far, he incurs one or more dukkatas.
In offenses of this sort, when a heavier penalty is incurred, only that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are nullified. For example, in the case mentioned above, if the bhikkhu trying to steal the book simply touches it, he incurs a string of dukkatas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it completely from its spot, the dukkatas are nullified and replaced with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the thullaccaya and replaces it with a parajika.
Shared responsibility. A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the crime are as follows:
If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to steal an object that would be grounds for a parajika, he incurs a dukkata. If the accomplice agrees, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as instructed -- whether or not he gets away with it, and whether or not he shares it with the instigator -- the instigator incurs a parajika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a parajika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkata, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkatas.
If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions -- e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the book specified by the instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning -- the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.
According to the Commentary, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out, but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.
If there is a chain of command -- Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft -- then once D takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command -- e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly -- neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself.
If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft, but only one of them does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five masakas but which when divided among them yield shares worth less than five masakas each, all incur a parajika.
Special cases. As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a wide variety of actions. The texts mention a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of them not.
//Belongings of the Sangha//. According to the Commentary to Nissaggiya Pacittiya 30, an item belongs to the Sangha when donors, intending for it to be Sangha property, offer it to one or more bhikkhus representing the Sangha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Sangha property thus counts as "what is not given" as far as individual bhikkhus are concerned, for it has an owner -- the Sangha of all times and places -- and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.
Sangha property is divided into two sorts: light (//lahu-bhanda//) and heavy (//garu-bhanda//). Light property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food. Heavy property includes such things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings. The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to appoint certain of their members to be officials responsible for the proper use of Sangha property. The officials responsible for light property are to distribute it among the members of the Community, following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair. Once an individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own and use it as he sees fit.
In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the Community, //but the individual bhikkhus who are allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property//. This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged -- with the approval of the Community -- for other heavy property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone -- ordained or not -- perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya, no matter what the value of the object. Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.
The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Sangha. In the origin story to Parajika 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Sangha's heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.
A bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Sangha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkata. If he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.
//Receiving stolen goods//. Accepting a gift of goods, or purchasing them very cheaply knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinita Vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. Thus the implication is that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe. (In Thailand, the civil law empowers the police to force a bhikkhu to disrobe if he is charged with a criminal case.)
//Compensation owed//. The Commentary introduces the concept of //bhandadeyya//, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person's property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if he abandons his responsibility to the owner, he incurs a parajika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.
To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person's jar of oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu who is charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a parajika.
In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhandadeyya, and some of its judgments would seem to contradict the Commentary's. For instance, the Vinita Vatthu mentions a case in which a bhikkhu knowingly sets fire to a field of grass (which in those days would have been worth more than five masakas), and yet it assigns only a dukkata to the action. When it discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense at all. Thus it seems strange for an action that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkata or no penalty whatsoever to become grounds for a parajika. Of course, in all cases of this sort it would be a wise policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal to do so. The Canon places only one responsibility on him: to apologize to the owner (see Cv.I.18-20). If he doesn't apologize, the Community, if it sees fit, can force him to. Beyond that, though, the Canon does not require that he make any material compensation at all. Thus, as the Commentary's concept of bhandadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.
//Court actions//. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a parajika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhuni's Sanghadisesa 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone -- defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc. -- and then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs a parajika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya Mukha points out, its assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or material things.
There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the others involved.
//Deceit//. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case of stealing -- since, after all, the item is given to him -- but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under Parajika 4. If not, it is treated under Pacittiya 1. The Vinita Vatthu gives two examples:
During a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu.
A bhikkhu approaches his teacher's lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be for his teacher, although he actually plans to use them himself instead.
In both of these cases, the penalty is a pacittiya for lying.
//Compassion//. The Vinita Vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter's snare. He incurs no penalty.
In another case, a bhikkhu with psychic powers uses them to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya Mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha's statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort. If a bhikkhu happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation themselves.
//Taking articles from undecomposed corpses//. In the early days of the Sangha, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth from undecomposed bodies, and this was for a reason.
"At one time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. The spirit of the dead one was dwelling in the body. It said to the bhikkhu, 'Honored sir, don't take hold of my cloak.' The bhikkhu, ignoring it, went off (with the cloak). The body, arising, followed closely on the heels of the bhikkhu until the bhikkhu, entering the vihara, closed the door, and the body fell down right there."
The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu's state of mind while being chased by the body and his friends' reaction to the event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhanga, the more outrageous the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the understatement.
At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkata penalty for taking cloth from an undecomposed body -- which, according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.
Modern cases. The modern world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.
//Breach of copyright.// The international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that breach of copyright is tantamount to theft. They go on to state, however, that if one duplicates articles, books, cassette tapes, or video tapes for private use, for study, or for non-profit distribution, one may copy as much as one likes. In some countries, though, one is allowed to copy only small portions of copyrighted material for such purposes, although exactly how small is only vaguely defined. Thus, as local copyright laws do not always adopt the UNESCO standard, a bhikkhu should check with the law before copying anything. In particular, the agreements covering the copying of commercial computer software usually do not permit the owner to give copies of the software to anyone for any reason, and limit the number of copies one may make for one's own use. One should follow such agreements to the letter.
//Credit cards//. The theft of a credit card would of course be an offense. The seriousness of the offense would be determined by how much the owner would have to pay to replace the stolen card. Nissaggiya Pacittiya 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it. At any rate, each use of a stolen card would also count as a theft, the seriousness of which would be calculated in line with the principle of the "prior plan" mentioned above.
//Long distance telephone calls//. Unauthorized use of a telephone to place long distance calls would also count as a theft, and again the seriousness of the offense would be calculated in light of the principle of the prior plan.
//Tax evasion//. If a bhikkhu intentionally does not pay a tax to which he is subject -- say, on an inheritance he receives -- he is guilty of a theft, which would occur on the deadline for payment of the tax. Of course, a bhikkhu who fails to pay a tax out of ignorance would not be guilty of an offense.
Exchanging currency on the black market is also a form of tax evasion in countries where there is a tax on currency exchange, so a bhikkhu in such a country who directs his steward to change money on the black market would be guilty of a theft. If, however, the steward on his own initiative exchanges money on the black market for use in the bhikkhu's account, the bhikkhu commits no offense.
Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a parajika offense.
* * *
3. Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (thus): "My good man, what use is this wretched, miserable life to you? Death would be better for you than life," or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is defeated and no longer in communion.
This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be a parajika offense.
1) //Object//: a human being, which according to the Vibhanga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after conception up to the time of death.
2) //Intention//: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person's death. "Knowingly" also includes the factor of --
3) //Perception//: perceiving the person as a living being.
4) //Effort//: whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person to die.
5) //Result//: The person dies as the result of one's act.
Object. The Vibhanga defines a human being as a person "from the time consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother's womb, up to its death-time." (The concept of //death-time//, since it relates most directly to questions that arise in treating the terminally ill, will be discussed in the section dealing with that topic, below.) It follows from this that a bhikkhu who intentionally causes an abortion -- by arranging for the operation, supplying the medicines, or giving advice that results in an abortion -- incurs a parajika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of contraception that works after the point of conception would be guilty of a parajika if she were to follow his advice.
There is a series of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which bhikkhus provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who wants to become barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone die, but in both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata. From this, the Commentary infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an inference supported by the Vibhanga to Sanghadisesa 13. (The Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. See the discussion under that rule.)
The parajika offense is for killing a human being aside from oneself. A bhikkhu who attempts suicide incurs a dukkata.
A bhikkhu who kills a "non-human being" -- a yakkha, naga, or peta -- or a devata (this is in the Commentary) incurs a thullaccaya. According to the Commentary, when a spirit possesses a human being or an animal, it can be exorcised in either of two ways. The first is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to the spirit and results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of flour paste or clay and then cut off various of its parts. If one cuts off the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts off the head, the spirit dies, and this is grounds for a thullaccaya.
A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal is treated under Pacittiya 72.
Intention & perception. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as "having made the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to the Commentary, //having made the decision// refers to the moment when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. //Knowingly// means being aware that, "This is a living being." //Consciously// means being aware that one's action is depriving the living being of life. //Purposefully// means that one's purpose is murderous. Whether one is motivated by compassion, hatred, or indifference is irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned.
All of the above sub-factors must be present for the factors of intention and perception to be fulfilled here. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who causes a death --
//accidentally// -- e.g., accidentally dropping a rock that kills a person standing below; or toying with a gun, trying to decide whether or not to kill the person, and the gun accidentally goes off before he can make up his mind;
//not knowing that a living being was there// -- e.g., placing a heavy load on a pile of cloth without realizing that a person was lying underneath it;
//not conscious that his action is causing death// -- e.g., by unwittingly giving poisoned food to another bhikkhu who eats it and dies;
or when his actions are //motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death// -- e.g., giving medicine to a fellow bhikkhu, sincerely trying to help cure him, but the sick bhikkhu chokes on the medicine and dies.
One aspect of the Commentary's definition of //knowingly// is worth noting here: One does not need to know that the living being is a human being for the factor of perception to be fulfilled. Thus if a bhikkhu hears a noise in the dark and, thinking it to be a wild animal, stabs it with intent to kill, he incurs a parajika if the "animal" turns out to be a human being who dies from the wound.
Although this judgment may seem strange, it is supported by a passage in the Canon: A man digs a pitfall with the thought that whatever living beings fall into it will perish. The penalty, if an animal dies as a result, is a pacittiya; if a human being, a parajika. This shows that the intention/ perception of killing a living being of any kind fulfills the relevant factors here.
The Vinita Vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a friend as a guinea pig for testing poison. The friend dies, and the bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The Commentary explains this by distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular person is strong enough to survive the poison. In either of these cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya whether or not the victim dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the desire that it cause that person's death, he incurs a parajika if the victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.
Effort. This factor covers four types of action: taking life, assisting a murderer or suicide, describing the advantages of dying, and inciting a person to die.
a) //Taking life//. The Vibhanga defines //taking life// as "cutting off the life faculty," and the Commentary's discussion of this point shows clearly that this means interrupting the continuity of life before it would reach its "timely" end through the exhaustion of the victim's merit or life potential The Commentary lists six means by which one might make such an effort:
-- //One's own person//. This includes using not only one's hands or feet, but also such weapons as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.
-- //Throwing//: hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun, etc.
-- //Stationary devices//: setting a trap, poisoning food, etc.
-- //Magical formulae//: calling on malevolent spirits to bring about a person's death, using voodoo, etc.
-- //Psychic powers//. using the "evil eye" or other similar powers.
-- //Commanding//: inciting another person to commit a murder. This category includes recommendations as well as express commands. A few examples:
Telling A to kill B. The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for getting another person to commit a murder can be inferred from the discussion of //shared responsibility// under the preceding rule. The Commentary to this rule goes into great detail concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object [the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g. "Stab him in the neck"], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, lying down] when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies any of these things, and yet the person following his orders does not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur the penalty for the actual murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his student to kill B while B is sitting in meditation at midnight. The student gets into B's room at midnight, only to find B asleep in bed, which is where he kills him. Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.
Inciting A to kill B. The Commentary includes a case of a socially active bhikkhu who tells people, "In such-and-such a place a bandit is staying. Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from the King." If any of the bhikkhu's listeners kills the bandit as a result of his instigation, the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
Recommending means of euthanasia. The Vinita Vatthu includes a case of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the man's relatives, "Do you want him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk." The relatives follow the bhikkhu's recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
Recommending means of capital punishment. Again from the Vinita Vatthu: A bhikkhu advises an executioner to kill his victims mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them. The executioner follows his advice, and the bhikkhu incurs a parajika. This judgment indicates that a bhikkhu should not involve himself in matters of this sort, no matter how humane his intentions. According to the Vinita Vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not follow the bhikkhu's advice and then kills his victims as he pleases, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if the executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu's advice and yet needs more than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya. As we have mentioned, though, the best course is to leave matters of this sort to the laity.
b) //Assisting a murderer or suicide.// A bhikkhu may commit an offense not only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of taking life, but also by intentionally assisting a person who uses any of them to commit a murder or a suicide. This is how the Vibhanga explains the phrase, "search for an assassin" in the rule. The act of assisting includes not only finding an assassin, but also procuring weapons for the would-be murderer or suicide.
c) //Describing the advantages of dying//. This, the third type of act covered by this rule, can include berating a sick person ("Why do you keep hanging on to life like this? Don't you realize what a burden you are to others?") or simply telling a person of the miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven in such a way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply pine away to death. The Vibhanga notes that these statements fulfill this factor whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by means of a messenger
d) //Inciting a person to die//, the fourth type of act, covers:
-- Recommending suicide. This includes not only telling a person to commit suicide, but also giving advice -- whether requested or not -- to a would-be suicide on the best ways to commit the act.
-- Telling a person to go to a dangerous place where he/she might die of the dangers.
-- Arranging a terrible sight, sound, etc. to frighten a person to death, or a beautiful, "heart-stirring" one to attract a person who will then pine away to death when it fades.
//Command//. Giving a command or recommendation to get another person to perform any of these last three types of action -- assisting a murder or suicide, describing the advantages of dying, or inciting another person to die -- would also fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.
//Expressing a wish//. According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who expresses an idle wish that so-and-so be murdered would incur a dukkata, whether or not he was overheard. If, however, the bhikkhu's purpose in expressing the wish is that his listener take him up on it and commit the murder, his action would come under the category of "command," mentioned above.
//Inaction// does not fulfill the factor of effort here. Thus if a bhikkhu sits idle when seeing a flood sweep a person down-stream, he commits no offense -- regardless of his feelings about the person's death -- even if the person then drowns. Recommending that another person sit idle as well would also not fulfill this factor, because the category of "command" here covers only the act of inciting the listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.
Result. If a bhikkhu fulfills the factor of effort with the intention of causing a person's death, and the person dies as a result, he incurs a parajika. This holds even if the person does not die immediately, but succumbs later, say, to complications arising from a wound caused by the bhikkhu. If the person does not die, but experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu's efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu's efforts result in neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkata for each separate action leading up to them.
If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu's actions, the case is treated under Pacittiya 74.
There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinita Vatthu concerning the penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up killing another instead. In one passage, it says that a bhikkhu who means to kill X but kills Y instead incurs a parajika. In another passage, it tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who wants to commit an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy. The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the fetus' aborting, the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the infant.
The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush him. He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots him dead on the spot. Since his intention was to kill the person he was aiming at, he incurs a parajika. We can call this a case of mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the "right" or the "wrong" person dies is of no consequence to the offense.
If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him, and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a parajika, for he did not intend to kill C during any part of his action. His only penalties are the dukkatas he incurs while preparing for B's murder.
If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of any member of a group, then when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, he incurs a parajika.
Caring for the terminally ill. Some of the most highly charged issues involving this training rule concern the duties of a bhikkhu acting as nurse, and his accountability in the event that his patient dies. Not a few controversies have arisen in the past when highly respected teachers have died after an illness, for there is a tendency to blame the nurse either for the teacher's death or for being so intrusive in his care that he does not let the teacher die in peace. Recent developments in modern medicine -- such as professionally mandated care, life-support machines, and organ transplants -- have further complicated the issue of exactly how far the nurse's accountability goes. Fortunately, the texts are quite clear on these issues -- applying rules where rules are called for, and guidelines where rules would be inappropriate -- but to understand their rationale it is necessary to have some historical perspective on the subject.
Medical care in the time of the Buddha was primarily the responsibility of the ill person's family. Subsidized health care did not exist, and so families had a very real sense of the exigencies -- their time, their resources, the wishes of the patient, and the likelihood of his recovery -- that might force them to provide less than state-of-the-art care, even for a loved one. At the same time, the current Western system whereby one style of medical care can establish itself as "standard" -- and can enlist the help of the law to discredit alternative styles of treatment as bogus -- also did not exist. Patients and their families had a wide assortment of treatments to choose from and, given the means to make a choice, might select a particular style for any number of reasons: belief in the theory that lay behind it, trust in a particular doctor, rapport with the means of treatment, etc.
As a result, there was none of the belief, current in some circles, that outside professionals have the right to monopolize medical care or to impose their standards of treatment on an unwilling patient or his family. The choice of treatment was an in-family matter. If a patient balked at a particular doctor's treatment, the family was free to decide whether to honor his wishes and forego the treatment, or to force the treatment on him for his own good. On the other hand, if the patient's condition reached the point where the family felt that the doctor's treatment was futile, unaffordable, or otherwise no longer appropriate, it could dismiss the doctor and attempt treatment on its own, doing whatever was within its ability to offer moral support to the patient and alleviate his pain and discomfort while waiting for factors beyond its control -- such as the patient's present and past kamma -- to decide the outcome of the disease.
The principal ethical constraints on this arrangement, ancient medical textbooks show, were that doctors should not use their knowledge to aggravate or prolong illness -- to do so would count as malpractice -- and that no one should subject a patient to treatment designed to bring on death faster than it would if the disease were simply allowed to run its course: To defy this principle would count as murder.
This, in brief, was the accepted pattern for medical care in the Buddha's time. The only change the Buddha introduced to the pattern was to point out to the bhikkhus that, as they had no family to care for them, they were to take on the role of family for one another. If a bhikkhu falls ill, it is automatically the duty of his mentor, his students (if he has any), or fellow students of his mentor to care for him. These people are to stay with the patient until he either recovers or dies -- although the Commentary to Mv.I.25.24 points out that they may leave him if they put him into the care of another. If a bhikkhu happens to fall ill in a place where none of these people are available, it is the duty of the Community in that location to care for him. If it doesn't care for him, all the members of that Community incur a dukkata (MV.VIII.26.3-4).
The Mahavagga contains guidelines for the ill bhikkhu and his nurses to follow, so that the ill bhikkhu will be easy to care for, and the nurses will be chosen from among those best suited to the task. The ill bhikkhu ideally avoids any food, medicine, or activity that would aggravate his disease; he knows moderation in the things that will be conducive to his recovery; he takes his medicine; he reports to the nurse his condition as it actually is; and does his best to endure his pain (Mv.VIII.26.5).
The nurse ideally is one who knows how to prepare the proper medicines; knows what is conducive and unconducive to the patient's recovery; provides the patient with what is conducive and removes what is not; tends the patient out of kindness, and not from hope of gain; is not squeamish about cleaning up urine, excrement, sweat, or vomit; and is competent at encouraging the patient at the appropriate times with a talk on Dhamma (Mv.VIII.26.5).
There is no offense for a patient who does not live up to the ideal guidelines for his behavior; and none for a bhikkhu who, though lacking any of the ideal qualities of nurse, is pressed into a position where he must care for the sick. The only penalties mentioned in the Khandhakas are the dukkatas for those who neglect to care for the ill when they are duty-bound to do so or who abandon an ill person they are caring for before he recovers or dies.
The Vinita Vatthu to this rule contains only two basic cases in which a bhikkhu acting as a nurse for an ill friend incurs a parajika: one in which the friend dies after the bhikkhu gives him a specific treatment with the purpose of killing him off; and one in which the bhikkhu, feeling pity for a friend in severe pain, praises the pleasures that await him after death so that he will give up the will to live and speed up his death: The friend does so and dies as a result of the nurse's instigation.
Aside from the parajikas for such cases of out-and-out murderous action and intent, and the dukkatas for leaving the patient helpless, the Canon imposes no penalties on a bhikkhu acting as nurse who provides his patient with less than ideal care. Instead, within the parameters of those penalties, it offers guidelines for ideal behavior, together with the encouragement of the Buddha's remark that, "He who would tend to me should tend to the sick." (Mv.VIII.26.3) From there it leaves it up to the bhikkhu to exercise his best judgment, in light of the Dhamma, as to what is most fitting in his individual case.
A moment's reflection will suggest some obvious reasons for this. If a particular standard of care were mandated, it would give rise to countless questions stemming from the many uncontrollable variables that can surround an illness, questions that rules are ill-suited to answer: How much must one's resources be depleted before one can say that a particular type of care is unaffordable? How should limited resources be allocated when several bhikkhus fall sick at the same time? What should one do if the patient says that he does not want to undergo a treatment that a doctor is trying to press on him? If one follows the patient's request is he assisting a suicide? Should one follow the doctor's orders and thus risk damaging the patient's psychological state? The list of questions could go on, but it is obvious from even these examples that this is an area less suited for rules than for guidelines that can be adapted to suit particular circumstances. Decisions here should be based on a reasoned and compassionate assessment of the particular situation, rather than on fear of hard and fast penalties and rules.
The commentaries' treatment of the issue of a nurse's accountability follows the same general pattern as the Canon's, but we find Buddhaghosa's works -- probably following the ancient commentaries -- bringing a little more precision to the discussion by introducing a distinction between //timely// and //untimely// death that the Commentary applies to the Vinita Vatthu cases. The distinction comes from Ayurveda -- ancient Indian medical science -- although Buddhaghosa expresses it in purely Buddhist terms, most fully in the Visuddhi Magga:
"//Timely death// comes about with the exhaustion of merit, with the exhaustion of life potential (//ayu//), or with both. //Untimely death// comes about through kamma that interrupts [other, life-producing,] kamma.
"//Death through exhaustion of merit//, here, refers to the death that comes about entirely through the finished ripening of [former] rebirth-producing kamma even when favorable conditions for prolonging the continuity of the life potential may still be present. //Death through exhaustion of life potential// refers to the death that comes about through the exhaustion of the natural life potential of human beings, which amounts to only 100 years....
"//Untimely death// refers to the death of those whose continuity is interrupted by kamma capable of causing them to fall from their place [on a particular level of being] at that very moment...or for the death of those whose continuity is interrupted by attacks with weapons, etc., due to previous kamma. All these are included under the [term] //interruption of the life faculty....//" (VIII.2-3)
As we saw above, the Commentary's discussion of //cutting off the life faculty// refers specifically to instances where one is bringing about an untimely death. When it applies this point to the case of the bhikkhu inciting his patient to give up the will to live, it notes that the bhikkhu incurs a parajika if his act causes the patient to cut short his/her life even by a moment through such things as refusing to eat, etc. However, if the patient, not acting on the bhikkhu's comments, simply dies in line with his/her natural life potential and continuity, there is no offense.
It is important to note that the Commentary does not at any point use the distinction of timely and untimely death to make a case that mere negligence could be the cause of an untimely demise. Instead, it restricts its use of "untimely death" to cases where the nurse's care causes the patient to die earlier than he would have in the absence of care.
From this point of view it is easy to see that the decision not to have the patient undergo a particular death-delaying treatment would not count as an offense, for such a decision would do nothing to speed up the approach of a timely death. In terms of the factor of effort under this rule, it would count as inaction and thus not fulfill the factor. Thus if a bhikkhu sees that his patient is dying and -- for reasons of the expense, the trauma, or the patient's own wishes -- opts against having him undergo an operation that would merely delay death, there is no grounds for offense.
In situations where the choice is not between action and inaction, but between different courses of action, the Commentary's distinction is helpful in gauging one's //perceptions// and //intentions// when choosing among treatments. If a bhikkhu caring for a terminally ill patient opts for an alternative, such as a strong pain-killer, in hopes that it will weaken the patient's system and make him die faster than he would otherwise, his aim would fulfill the factor of intention under this rule. But if he is presented with a number of alternatives and believes that none of them would make the patient die before he would without any treatment, he may choose any of them because neither the perception nor the intention of bringing on an untimely death would enter into his decision. Even if it turns out later that the treatment was instrumental in bringing on the patient's death, the nurse would still be without blame.
It may seem that the Vinaya is leaving the patient in an unprotected position here, but we must remember that this is an area where the Dhamma takes precedence over the Vinaya in providing the nurse with guidance. Even a nodding acquaintance with the principle of kamma should be enough to prevent the nurse from being callous in his decisions. Even a modicum of maturity will make him realize that the role of nurse provides an excellent opportunity to gain insight into illness as a natural part of life, as well as training in such valuable qualities as compassion, patience, mindfulness, strength, sacrifice, and sensitivity to the needs of others.
As we noted in the Introduction, rules and standards serve different purposes and are suited to different situations. The authors of the texts, after using rules against murderous malpractice and abandonment to delimit this area, were wise to sketch in the remaining territory with standards aimed at inspiring the best behavior in the nurse and his patient by appealing to their higher side.
Special cases. The Vinita Vatthu includes three special cases that touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate rules to deal specifically with them:
A bhikkhu, for the fun of it, throws a stone from a precipice and accidentally kills a person standing below -- no penalty for the death, but a dukkata for throwing a stone from a precipice in fun.
A bhikkhu, hoping to commit suicide, throws himself over a cliff. Instead of dying, he lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker standing at the foot of the cliff -- again, no offense for the death, but a dukkata for throwing oneself from a high place.
A bhikkhu, sitting down hard on a chair without first checking it carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a blanket -- again, no penalty for the death, but a dukkata for sitting down without first checking carefully.
Summary: Intentionally bringing about the untimely death of a human being, even if it is still a fetus, is a parajika offense. * * *
4. Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, boast of a superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision as present in himself, saying, "Thus do I know; thus do I see," such that regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he -- being remorseful and desirous of purification -- might say, "Friends, not knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see -- vainly, falsely, idly," unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no longer in communion.
All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pacittiya rule, but knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is the most heinous lie a bhikkhu can tell, and so here it receives its own rule and the heaviest possible penalty.
The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this training rule is indicated by his statements to the original instigators:
"You misguided men, how can you for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another's superior human states to householders? It would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a sharp butcher's knife than that you should for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another's superior human states to householders. Why is that? For //that// reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad bourn, the abyss, purgatory. But for //this// reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad bourn, the abyss, purgatory....Bhikkhus, in this world with its gods, maras, and brahmas, its generations with priests and contemplatives, princes and men, this is the ultimate great thief: he who claims an unfactual, non-existent superior human state. Why is that? You have consumed the nation's almsfood through theft."
Superior human states. The Vibhanga lists a large number of superior human states that the Commentary classifies into two broad categories: //mahaggata dhamma//, those related to the practice of meditative absorption; and //lokuttara dhamma//, those related to the absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth.
a. Meditative absorption -- the Pali term is //jhana// -- is of two major sorts: absorption in a physical object or sensation (//rupa jhana//) and absorption in a non-physical object or sensation (//arupa jhana//). Both contain four levels and are described in the discourses as follows:
"The bhikkhu -- quite withdrawn from sensual pleasure, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- enters and remains in the //first jhana//: rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born from withdrawal....
"And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thought and evaluation, he enters and remains in the //second jhana//: rapture and pleasure born of composure, unity of awareness free from directed thought and evaluation -- internal assurance. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of composure....
"And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains in equanimity, mindful and fully aware, and physically sensitive of pleasure. He enters and remains in the //third jhana//, and of him the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous and mindful, he has a pleasurable abiding.' He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture....
"And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain -- as with the earlier disappearance of elation and distress -- he enters and remains in the //fourth jhana//: purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. He sits permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness, so that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure, bright awareness." (D.2; M.119)
The four levels of arupa jhana are based on the fourth level of rupa jhana.
"With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, and the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite space,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of space....
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness....
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in the sphere of nothingness....
"With the complete transcending of the sphere of nothingness, one enters and remains in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception." (D.15)
The Vibhanga mentions only the four rupa jhanas in its list of superior human states, but as the four arupa jhanas are based on the fourth rupa jhana, the Commentary includes them in the list as well.
In addition to these states of absorption themselves, the category of mahaggata dhamma also includes the intuitive powers (//abhinna//) that can arise from them:
//iddhividhi// -- the ability to manifest one or more images of oneself, to appear in a different bodily form, to create a "mind-made" (astral) body, to pass through solid matter, walk on water, levitate, etc.
//dibba-sota// -- clairaudience, enabling one to hear sounds both celestial and human, far and near.
//cetopariya-nana// -- the ability to read the minds of other living beings.
//dibba-cakkhu// -- clairvoyance, the ability to see beings in other realms of existence, and in particular to see them pass from death in one level to rebirth in another.
//pubbe-nivasanussati-nana// -- the ability to remember previous lives.
There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhana and for this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma: such things as divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc. The discourses list these and other similar activities as //tiracchana-vijja//, bestial knowledge, which -- as the name implies -- is far removed from superior human states.
b. //Lokuttara dhamma//, in its fullest sense, refers to the series of mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are eradicated; and to the ultimate state of //nibbana//, or liberation.
The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs. In the first pair, the path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are abandoned: self-identity views (//sakkaya-ditthi//), uncertainty (//vicikiccha//), and attachment to precepts and practices (//silabbata-paramasa//). In the second pair, the path to and fruition of once-returning, two additional fetters -- sensual passion (//kama-raga//) and irritation (//patigha//) are weakened, only to be abandoned fully in the third pair, the path to and fruition of non-returning. In the fourth pair, the path to and fruition of arahantship, a final set of five additional fetters is abandoned: //rupa-raga// -- passion for physical phenomena (e.g., the objects of rupa jhana); //arupa-raga// -- passion for non-physical phenomena (e.g., the objects of arupa jhana); //mana// -- conceit; //uddhacca// -- restlessness; and //avijja// -- unawareness. With the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds with the cycle of rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains nibbana.
The term //nibbana// literally means extinguishing, like a fire. The commentarial literature (Vism.VIII,247), derives the word etymologically from //nir//, a negative prefix, and //vana//, binding. Thus it means unbinding or liberation. In the physics of the Buddha's time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of agitation, dependence, attachment, and entrapment -- both clinging to and being trapped by its sustenance. Extinguished, it was said to become calm, independent, and unattached. It let go of its sustenance and was released. In the mind's extinguishing, or unbinding, a parallel change occurs.
Nibbana is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight. Thus there are nine lokuttara dhammas.
Aside from jhana, the other states mentioned in the Vibhanga -- such as the destruction of the mental effluents (//asava//), the signless emancipation, the desireless emancipation, the emptiness emancipation, and so forth -- are either synonymous with these transcendent states or -- as in the case of the "wings" to Awakening (//bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma//) -- conjoined with them.
The full offense under this rule has five factors:
1) //Effort//: One makes a direct claim 2) //Object//: to a superior human state 3) //Perception//: that one perceives as not present in oneself. 4) //Intention//: One's intention is to misrepresent the truth. 5) //Result//: One's listener understands what one is saying.
Effort. To make a direct claim means to say outright that one has attained a superior human state, saying such things as, "I have attained the first jhana," "I have seen the heavenly realms," "I know my previous lifetimes," etc. Outright claims, here, include not only spoken statements, but also written statements and physical gestures. An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhanga: A group of bhikkhus make an agreement that the first to set out from their dwelling would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as an arahant. One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to be regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and was soon known to the rest as an ex-bhikkhu from having committed a parajika.
//Indirect claims//. An indirect claim to a superior human state is not grounds for a parajika. If it is a deliberate lie, it is at most grounds for a thullaccaya. Such claims, which contain an uncertainty in their wording even though the listener may feel no uncertainty in understanding their import, may be uncertain in one of two ways: uncertain as to the person and uncertain as to the attainment.
The Vinita Vatthu contains several examples of the first sort: a bhikkhu states that whoever lives in a particular dwelling is an arahant, the dwelling being the one where he lives; a bhikkhu saying that all the disciples of his teacher are arahants, and so forth.
There is only one example in the Vinita Vatthu of a bhikkhu who makes a claim "uncertain as to the attainment": a sick bhikkhu, meaning to deceive the fellow bhikkhus nursing him, says to them, "There is no way that this sickness could be endured by an ordinary person (//puthujjana//)."
According to the Commentary, if the person to whom such indirect remarks are directed understands them, the penalty for the speaker is a thullaccaya. If he/she does not understand them, the penalty is a dukkata. The factor of understanding is covered in the section on "Result," below.
//Claims about other people//. The original instigators of this rule, instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made false claims about one another's attainments. This case is not mentioned in the Vibhanga or the commentaries and so is not an offense under this rule, but it would come under Pacittiya 1.
Perception. Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pacittiya 8. The same holds for a claim that is actually true.
If, however, a bhikkhu has attained a superior human state without realizing it and then claims to have attained the state, thinking his statement to be a lie, he commits the full offense under this rule.
Intention. To fall under this rule, a claim to have attained any of these superior human states must be a deliberate lie. "Deliberate lying," according to the Commentary, requires the arising of the intention to misrepresent the truth just prior to, and motivating, the actual statement. When the intention to misrepresent the truth is absent, the statement does not come under this rule. Examples would include --
meaning to say one thing, but accidentally saying another that comes out as a claim to a superior human state; and
innocently making a statement that someone else misconstrues to be a claim to a superior human state.
Neither of these cases would involve an offense.
//Equivocation//. It is not uncommon for a bhikkhu to be put on the spot by lay people asking him point-blank about his attainments, and for him to respond by equivocating. The Vinita Vatthu contains a number of examples of this sort. In one of them, the bhikkhu responds by saying, "I have attained a state attainable through the exertion of effort," which of course could mean almost anything. Because his purpose was simply to avoid the question, he incurred no penalty. Had he meant the statement as an indirect claim, he would have incurred a thullaccaya.
Result. The Vibhanga, in discussing an obscure case, states that when the listener understands a deliberate lie directly claiming a superior human state, the bhikkhu making the claim incurs a parajika. If the listener does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya. The Vibhanga mentions this condition only in the context of a peculiar lie -- one in which the speaker intends to lie saying one thing but actually states another lie -- but the Commentary generalizes from this case to say that this condition applies to //all// cases covered by this rule. Its explanations run as follows:
//Understanding//, here, means simply that the listener hears the statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim. Whether he/she understands the names for the states claimed -- jhana, clairvoyance, clairaudience, or whatever -- is not an issue here. The same is true of whether he/she believes the statement to be true or false. If the listener to whom the remarks are directed does not understand them, but a passer-by does, the penalty is still a parajika.
If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch all he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the listener at first has some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said, but later realizes that it was a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a thullaccaya. If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the offense is a dukkata.
As stated above, if a bhikkhu states a deliberate lie in the form of an indirect claim to a superior human state, he incurs a thullaccaya if his listener understands that it is a claim, and a dukkata if not.
According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata for a bhikkhu sitting in solitude who states a deliberate lie directly claiming a superior human state, and another dukkata if he is overheard by a devata. The Commentary adds that the same penalty applies if he is overheard by a non-human being or a common animal.
//Thus, to entail a parajika, the claim to a superior human state must be a direct claim, a deliberate lie, and must be heard and quickly understood by another human being//.
Special cases in the Vibhanga:
A bhikkhu, intending to make a false claim for one superior human state, muddles his words and claims another: a parajika. The Commentary explains this by noting that all the factors necessary for a parajika offense are present: The bhikkhu makes a claim based on the intention to tell a deliberate lie, and the listener understands the claim. The fact that the intended claim and actual claim are both superior human states is crucial; the fact that they are different states is not.
In a series of cases, a person speaking with exaggerated faith or politeness addresses bhikkhus of no particular attainments as if they were arahants ("May the arahants come....May the arahants be seated"). This puts them in a quandary, and so they ask the Buddha how to behave in such a situation. His response: There is no offense in accepting invitations such as these from a "speaker with faith" -- the point being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, etc., as long as the intention is just to accept the invitation and not to imply a claim.
A bhikkhu, hoping that people will esteem him, engages in special practices -- the example given in the Vinita Vatthu is living in the jungle, but from it we can extrapolate to other practices such as long periods of sitting, any of the ascetic (//dhutanga//) practices, vegetarianism, etc., followed so as to impress other people. The penalty: a dukkata.
Summary: Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a parajika offense.
* * *
A bhikkhu who violates any of these four parajika rules is automatically no longer a bhikkhu. There is no need for him to go through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of violating the rule is an act of disrobing in and of itself. Even if he continues to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count as one; as soon as the facts are known he must be expelled from the Sangha. He can never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life. If he tries to ordain in a Community that does not know of his offense, his ordination does not count, and he must be expelled as soon as the truth is found out.
The Commentary, however, states that such an offender may "go forth" as a novice if he wants to, although it is up to the individual Community to consider the circumstances of his offense to decide whether or not it wants to accept him.
Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the penalty, which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each new bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.77). Because the rules cover a number of cases that are legal in presentday society (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple one has become through yoga by inserting one's penis in one's mouth) or that are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with flirting with the edges of the law (e.g., copying computer software for a friend, hiding an article subject to customs duties when entering a country), it is especially important to inform each new bhikkhu of the rules' full implications right from the very start.
If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a parajika, he should immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well-versed in the rules. The way the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is well-illustrated by a incident reported in the Commentary to Parajika 2: Once a king together with an enormous crowd came to worship the Great Stupa at a certain monastery. One of the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu from the South who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth. The commotion of the event was so great that the bhikkhu dropped the cloth, was unable to retrieve it and soon gave it up for lost. One of the resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to steal it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it. Eventually, of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the resident Vinaya expert to admit a parajika and disrobe.
The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn't let him disrobe until he had found the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully. Eventually, after a long search, he was able to track down the original owner at a monastery in the distant South, who told him that at the time of the theft he had given the cloth up for lost and had abandoned all mental attachment for it. Thus, as the cloth was ownerless, the resident bhikkhu had incurred not a parajika, but simply some dukkatas for the preliminary efforts with intention to steal.
This example shows several things: the great thoroughness with which a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible parajika, the compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible: He is innocent until the facts prove him guilty.
Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the parajikas by noticing that there are altogether 24, actual and virtual, in the Vinaya. They are:
The four for bhikkhus.
The four additional parajikas for bhikkhunis.
The eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained in the first place. If they happen to be ordained, their ordination does not count, and once they are found out they must be expelled for life (Mv.I.61-68). Thus they are virtual parajikas. They are --
a pandaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter -- see Sanghadisesa 2), a "non-human" being, such as a naga or yakkha, that can assume human form, a hermaphrodite, a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained, a bhikkhu who has ordained in another sect or religion without first giving up his status as a bhikkhu; a person who has murdered his father, a person who has murdered his mother, a person who has murdered an arahant, a person who has sexually violated a bhikkhuni, a person who has injured a Buddha to the point of causing him to bleed, a person who has caused a schism in the Sangha.
In addition to the above actual and virtual parajikas, the Commentary gives separate listing to the four //anulomika// (derived) parajikas, which refer to four cases included under Parajika 1: the bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in his mouth, the bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his anus, the bhikkhu who performs oral intercourse with someone else, and the bhikkhu who receives anal intercourse. The 24th Parajika refers to the case of a bhikkhuni who, taking up the role of a housewife, goes to live in a lay person's household.
CHAPTER
FIVE
Sanghadisesa ~~~~~~~~~~~~
This term means "involving the Community in the initial (//adi//) and subsequent (//sesa//) acts." It refers to the fact that the Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of //manatta//, penance, and //parivasa//, probation), subsequently reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training rules here, the first nine entailing a sanghadisesa immediately on transgression, the last four only after the offender has been rebuked three times as a formal act of the Community.
1.Intentional discharge of semen, except while dreaming, entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
The origin story to this rule is as follows:
"Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka was leading the celibate life dissatisfied. Because of this, he was thin, wretched, unattractive, and jaundiced, his body covered with veins. Ven. Udayin saw that Ven. Seyyasaka was thin...his body covered with veins; and seeing him, said to him, 'Seyyasaka, my friend, why are you thin...your body covered with veins? Could it be that you're leading the celibate life dissatisfied?'
"'Yes, friend.'
"'In that case, eat as you like and sleep as you like and bathe as you like; and having eaten, slept, and bathed as you like, when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails the mind, emit semen making do with your hand.'
"'But is it okay to do that?'
"'Of course. I do it myself.'
"So then Ven. Seyyasaka ate as he liked and slept as he liked...and when dissatisfaction arose and lust assailed his mind, he would emit semen making do with his hand. Then it wasn't long before he became attractive, with rounded features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. So the bhikkhus who were his friends said to him, 'Before, friend Seyyasaka, you were thin...your body covered with veins. But now you are attractive, with rounded features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. Could it be that you're taking medicine?'
"'No, I'm not taking medicine, my friends. I just eat as like and sleep as I like...and when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails my mind, I emit semen making do with my hand.'
"'But do you emit semen making do with the same hand you use to eat the gifts of the faithful?'
"'Yes, my friends.'
"So the bhikkhus...were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can this Ven. Seyyasaka emit semen making do with the same hand he uses to eat the gifts of the faithful?'"
This rule, in its outline form, is one of the simplest to explain. In its details, though, it is one of the most complex, not only because the subject is a sensitive matter, but also because the Commentary deviates somewhat from the Vibhanga in its explanations of two of the three factors that constitute the full offense.
The three factors are result, intention, and effort: Emission of semen caused by an intentional effort. When all three factors are present, the offense is a sanghadisesa. If the last two -- intention and effort -- are present, the offense is a thullaccaya. Any single factor or any other combination of two factors -- i.e., intention and result without making a physical effort, or effort and result without intention -- is not grounds for an offense.
It may seem strange to list the factor of result first, but I want to explain it first partly because, in understanding the types of intention and effort covered by this rule, it is necessary to know what they are aimed at, and also because result is the one factor where the Vibhanga and Commentary are in basic agreement.
Result. The Commentary discusses the physiology of semen as it was understood at the time, and in passing touches on the question of whether the word //semen// refers to the clear liquid produced in small quantities by the prostrate and Cooper's glands prior to ejaculation, or to the seminal fluid released at orgasm (in its words, "having made the whole body shake, it is released and descends into the urinary tract.") It concludes that the latter is what is meant here.
As for the Vibhanga, it devotes long passages to the various colors and qualities that semen can come in, only to conclude that the color and quality are irrelevant to the offense. This suggests that a bhikkhu who has had a vasectomy can still commit an offense under this rule, since he can still discharge the various components that go into seminal fluid -- minus only the sperm -- at orgasm.
//Discharge//, according to the Vibhanga, refers to the point in time when the semen "falls from its base." The Commentary explains this as the point when the semen enters the urinary tract, because from that point on the process is irreversible. Thus if the process of sexual stimulation has reached this point, the factor of result has been fulfilled, even if one tries to prevent the semen from leaving the body by pinching the end of one's penis.
Intention. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as "having made the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. (These are the same terms it uses to explain the same phrase under Parajika 3 and several other rules. The meaning is that one has definitely made up one's mind to start with the act and is not simply toying with the idea.) //Knowingly// means that one knows that, "I am making an exertion." //Consciously// means that one is aware that one's efforts are bringing about an emission of semen. //Purposefully// means that one's purpose is to enjoy the bringing about of an emission.
This last point is where the Commentary deviates from the Vibhanga's discussion of the factor of intention. The Vibhanga, throughout its analysis, expresses the factor of purpose simply as "aiming at causing an emission," and it lists ten possible reasons for wanting to bring the emission about:
for the sake of health, for the sake of pleasure, for the sake of a medicine, for the sake of a gift (to insects, says the Commentary), for the sake of merit, for the sake of sacrifice, for the sake of heaven, for the sake of seed (to produce a child -- a bhikkhu who gave semen to be used in artificial insemination would fit in this category), for the sake of investigating (to see what color it will be -- ancient medicine sometimes used this as a way of diagnosing disease), or for the sake of fun.
Each of these reasons, the Vibhanga says, fulfills the factor of intention here. Thus for the Commentary to limit the question of "purpose" strictly to the enjoyment of the act of bringing about an emission (numbers 2 and 10 in the Vibhanga's list) has no basis in the Canon. And so the factor of intention under this rule is fulfilled when one wants to cause an emission of semen, for no matter what reason.
Given the way //intention// is defined, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who brings on an emission of semen --
//accidentally// -- e.g., toying with his penis simply for the pleasure of the contact, when it suddenly and unexpectedly goes off;
//not knowing that he is making an effort// -- e.g., when he is dreaming or in a semi-conscious state before fully waking up from sleep;
//not conscious that his efforts are bringing about an emission of semen// -- e.g., when he is so engrossed in applying medicine to a sore on his penis that he doesn't realize that he is bringing on an ejaculation;
or when his efforts are //motivated by a purpose other than that of causing an emission// -- e.g., when he wakes up, finds that he is about to have a spontaneous ejaculation, and grabs hold of his penis to keep the semen from soiling his robes or bedding.
Effort. The Vibhanga defines four types of effort that fulfill this factor: A bhikkhu causes an emission making an effort (1) at an internal object, (2) at an external object, (3) at both an internal and an external object, or (4) by shaking his pelvis in the air. It then goes on to explain these terms: The internal object is one's own living body. External objects can either be animate or inanimate objects. The third type of effort involves a combination of the first two, and the fourth covers cases when one makes one's penis erect ("workable") by making an effort in the air.
The extremely general nature of these definitions gives the impression that the compilers of the Vibhanga wanted them to cover every imaginable type of bodily effort aimed at arousing oneself sexually, and this impression is borne out by the wide variety of cases covered in the Vinita Vatthu. They include, among others, a bhikkhu who squeezes his penis with his fist, one who rubs his penis with his thumb, one who rubs his penis against his bed, one who inserts his penis into sand, one who bathes against the current in a stream, one who rubs his preceptor's back in the bathing room, one who gets an erection from the friction of his thighs and robes while walking along, one who has his belly heated in the bathing room, and one who stretches his body. In each of these cases, if the bhikkhu aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, he incurs a sanghadisesa.
The Vinita Vatthu also includes a case in which a bhikkhu, desiring to cause an emission, orders a novice to take hold of his (the bhikkhu's) penis. He gets his emission and a sanghadisesa to boot, which shows that getting someone else to make the effort for one fulfills the factor of effort here.
In discussing the factor of effort, though, the Commentary makes a slight change in the Vibhanga's definition -- that one makes an effort //with// or //upon// one's own body, etc., rather than //at// one's own body, etc. -- and adds an additional factor: that the effort must be directed at one's own penis. If this is so, then a bhikkhu who succeeds in causing an emission by stimulating any of the erogenous zones of his body aside from his penis would incur no penalty. The Commentary itself actually makes this point, and the Sub-commentary seconds it, although the V/Sub-commentary says that such a bhikkhu would incur a dukkata -- what it bases this opinion on, it doesn't say: perhaps a misreading of the Case of the Sleeping Novice, which we will discuss below.
At any rate, the Commentary in adding this last factor runs up against a number of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which the effort does not involve the penis: the bhikkhu warming his belly, the bhikkhu rubbing his preceptor's back, a bhikkhu having his thighs massaged, and others. The Commentary deals with these cases by rewriting them, stating in most cases that the effort somehow had to involve the penis. This in itself is questionable, but when the Commentary actually contradicts the Vinita Vatthu in the case of the bhikkhu who warms his belly, saying that this sort of effort could not involve an offense at all, even if one aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, the commentators have moved beyond the realm of commenting into the realm of rewriting the rule.
As stated in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption that the compilers of the Vibhanga knew the crucial factors well enough to know what is and is not an offense, and were careful enough to include all the relevant facts when describing the precedents in the Vinita Vatthu in order to show how the Buddha arrived at his judgments. Since the Commentary's position -- adding the extra factor that the physical effort has to involve one's own penis -- directly contradicts the Vibhanga on this point, the extra factor cannot stand.
The question then is why the commentators added the extra factor in the first place. An answer may be found in one of the cases in the Vinita Vatthu: the Case of the Sleeping Novice.
"On that occasion a certain bhikkhu grabbed hold of the penis of a sleeping novice. His semen was emitted. He felt remorseful....'Bhikkhu, there is no sanghadisesa offense. There is a dukkata offense.'"
The issue here is whose semen was emitted. Pali syntax, unlike English, doesn't give us a clue, for there is no rule that the pronoun in one sentence should refer to the subject of the preceding sentence. There are many cases under Parajika 3 that follow the form, "A stone badly held by the bhikkhu standing above hit the bhikkhu standing below on the head. The bhikkhu died. He felt remorseful." In these cases it is obvious from the context within the story which bhikkhu died and which one felt remorseful, while with the sleeping novice we have to look for the context in terms of the other parts of the Vibhanga.
If the bhikkhu was the one who emitted semen, then perhaps there is a contradiction in the Vibhanga, and the Commentary is justified in saying that the effort must involve one's penis, for otherwise the case would seem to fulfill the Vibhanga's general definition for the factor of effort: The bhikkhu is making an effort at an outside body and has an emission. Following the general pattern of the rule, he would incur a sanghadisesa if he intended emission, and no penalty at all if he didn't. Yet the question of intention is not mentioned at all, and the bhikkhu is given a dukkata, which suggests an inconsistency.
If, however, the novice was the one who emitted, there is no inconsistency at all: The bhikkhu gets his dukkata for making lustful bodily contact with another man (see the discussion under Sanghadisesa 2, below), and the case is included here to show that the full offense under this rule concerns instances where one makes //oneself// emit semen, and not where one makes others emit. (Other than this case, there is nothing in the rule or the Vibhanga that expressly makes this point. The rule simply mentions bringing about the emission of semen, without explicitly mentioning whose. This would explain the bhikkhu's uncertainty as to whether or not he had committed a sanghadisesa.) And the reason there is no mention of whether or not the bhikkhu intended to emit semen is because -- as it comes under another rule -- it is irrelevant to the case.
Thus, since the second reading -- the novice was the one who had an emission -- does no violence to the rest of the Vibhanga, it seems to be the preferable one. So if this was the case that led the commentators to add their extra factor, we can see that they misread it, and that the Vibhanga's original definition for the factor of effort still stands: Any bodily effort made at one's own body, at another body or physical object, at both, or any effort made in the air -- like shaking one's pelvis or stretching one's body -- fulfills the factor of effort here.
One case that does //not// fulfill the factor of effort is when one is filled with lust and stares at the private parts of a woman or girl. In the case dealing with this contingency, the bhikkhu emits semen, but again no mention is made of whether he intended to. In any event, the Buddha lays down a separate rule, imposing a dukkata for staring lustfully at a women's private parts. This suggests that efforts with one's eyes do not count as bodily efforts under this sanghadisesa, for otherwise the penalty would have been a sanghadisesa if the bhikkhu had intended emission, and no offense if he hadn't. And this also suggests that the dukkata under this separate rule holds regardless of intention or result. The Commentary adds that this dukkata applies also to staring lustfully at the genitals of a female animal or at the area of a fully-clothed woman's body where her sexual organ is, thinking, "Her sexual organ is there." At present we would impose the penalty on a bhikkhu who stares lustfully at a woman's private parts in a pornographic photograph.
Consent. A special contingency covered by this rule is mentioned twice in the Vinita Vatthu for Parajika 1: A woman approaches a bhikkhu and offers to make him emit semen by making do with her hand (%). The bhikkhu lets her go ahead, and the Buddha says that he incurs a sanghadisesa in doing so. The commentaries treat the case as self-evident and offer no extra details. Thus, given the facts as we have them, it would seem that consent under this rule can be expressed physically simply by letting the act happen. A bhikkhu who acquiesces mentally when someone tries and succeeds in making him emit semen is not absolved from the full offense here even if he otherwise lies perfectly still throughout the event.
Derived offenses. As stated above, a bhikkhu who fulfills all three factors -- result, intention, and effort -- incurs a sanghadisesa. One who fulfills only the last two -- intention and effort -- incurs a thullaccaya.
People have sometimes asked how much of an effort is necessary to incur a thullaccaya and, in particular, whether the thullaccaya is only for cases where a bhikkhu tries to go all the way to an emission but cannot have one for physical reasons beyond his control -- e.g., he is unable to have an erection or to produce semen -- or whether it also covers cases where a bhikkhu starts out trying to cause an emission but stops short and changes his mind before the emission can come.
The Vibhanga suggests indirectly that the penalty covers both cases when it says simply that the thullaccaya is for one who intends, makes the effort, but does not emit. If it had meant to limit the penalty to those who //cannot// emit, it would have said so and would have set some kind of standard for determining when the bhikkhu passed the threshold from //does not// to //cannot// so that there would be no doubt as to where the realm of non-offense ends and thullaccaya begins. But it doesn't.
The Commentary is even clearer on this topic when it discusses the case of a bhikkhu who, filled with his lust, grabs his penis with the purpose of causing an emission but drifts off to sleep before an emission occurs. The emission does occur while he is asleep, though, and he incurs a sanghadisesa. Since efforts made during sleep do not count (see below), this shows that the factor of effort does not need to go all the way to ejaculation in order to count.
In discussing the case of a bhikkhu with fat thighs who develops an erection simply by walking along, the Commentary mentions that if one finds sensual "fever" arising in such a case, one must immediately stop walking and start contemplating the foulness of the body so as to purify the mind before continuing on one's way. Otherwise, one would incur a thullaccaya simply for moving one's legs. //Sensual fever//, here, probably refers to the desire to cause an emission, for there are several spots where the Commentary discusses bhikkhus who stimulate an erection simply for the enjoyment of the contact rather than to cause an emission, and the judgment is that they incur no penalty, even if an emission does inadvertently result.
Aside from the thullaccaya, there are no other derived offenses under this rule. A bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while thinking sensual thoughts but without making any physical effort to cause it, incurs no penalty regardless of whether or not the idea crosses his mind that he would like to have an emission, and whether or not he enjoys it when it occurs. However, the Commentary notes here that even though there is no offense involved, one should not let oneself be overcome by sensual thoughts in this way. This point is borne out by the famous simile that occurred to Prince Siddhattha before his Awakening and that later, as Buddha, he related to a number of listeners:
"'Suppose there were a wet sappy piece of timber lying on dry ground far from water, and a man were to come along with an upper fire-stick, thinking, "I'll light a fire. I'll produce heat." Now what do you think? Would he be able to light a fire and produce heat by rubbing the upper fire-stick in the wet sappy timber...?'
"'No, Master Gotama. And why not? Because the wood is wet and sappy, even though it is lying on dry ground far from water. The man would reap nothing but weariness and disappointment.'
"'So it is with any priest or contemplative who lives withdrawn from sensuality only in body, but whose desire, infatuation, urge, thirst, and fever for sensuality is not relinquished and stilled within him: Whether or not he feels painful, racking, piercing feelings due to his striving (for Awakening), he is incapable of knowledge, vision, and unexcelled self-awakening.'" (M.36)
Non-offenses. In addition to the cases already mentioned -- the bhikkhus who bring about emissions accidentally, not knowing that they are making an effort, not conscious that their efforts are bringing about an emission, whose efforts are motivated by a purpose other than that of causing an emission, or who without making any physical effort have an ejaculation while overcome by sensual thoughts -- there is no offense for a bhikkhu who has an ejaculation during a dream.
In the wording of the rule, the phrase "except while dreaming" is expressed by an idiom that could also mean "at the end of a dream." This second possibility, though, is ruled out by the Commentary, which states that what happens in the mind while one is sleeping falls in the bounds of the Abhidhamma, but what happens after one awakens falls within the bounds of the Vinaya; and that there is no such thing as a misdeed performed when one is in a "non-negligible" state of mind that does not count as an offense. ("Non-negligible," according to the Sub-commentary, means "normal.")
In making the exception for what happens while asleep, the Buddha states that even though there may be the intention to cause an emission, it doesn't count. The Commentary goes on to say, however, that if a bhikkhu fully awakens in the course of a wet dream, he should lie still and be extremely careful not to make a move that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. If the process has reached the point where it is irreversible, and the ejaculation occurs spontaneously, he incurs no penalty regardless of whether or not he enjoys it. And as the Commentary quotes from the Kurundi, one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which it is based, if he wakes up in the course of a wet dream and grabs hold of his penis so that the ejaculation will not soil his robes or bedding, there is no offense.
However, the case from the Commentary mentioned above -- the bhikkhu who had the desire and made the effort towards an emission before falling off to sleep -- suggests that the exemption for emissions during a dream does not extend to cases where both the intention and the effort occur while one is fully conscious, for all three factors under this rule are fully present: One makes the conscious decision to cause an emission, makes a conscious effort aimed at causing the emission, and the emission occurs. Whether or not one is conscious that it is occurring is of no account.
Summary: Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or getting someone else to cause one to emit semen -- except during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
2.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, engage in bodily contact with a woman, or in holding her hand, holding a lock of her hair, or caressing any of her limbs, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
This rule has sometimes been viewed as a sign of prejudice against women. But, as the origin story makes clear, the Buddha formulated the rule not because women are bad, but because bhikkhus sometimes can be.
"Now at that time, Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. His dwelling was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. The inner chamber was in the middle, entirely surrounded by the outer rooms. The bed and chair, the pillows and bolsters were well arranged, the water for washing and drinking well placed, the surrounding area well swept. Many people came to admire it. Even a certain Brahmin together with his wife went to where Ven. Udayin was staying and on arrival said, 'We would like to admire your dwelling.'
"'Very well then, Brahmin, have a look.' Taking the key, unfastening the lock, and opening the door, he entered the dwelling. The Brahmin entered after Ven. Udayin; the Brahmin lady after the Brahmin. Then Ven. Udayin, opening some of the windows and closing others, walking around the inner room and coming up from behind, rubbed up against the Brahmin lady limb by limb.
"After a while the Brahmin exchanged pleasantries with Ven. Udayin and left. Delighted, he burst out with an exclamation of joy: 'How splendid are are these Sakyan contemplatives who live in the forest like this! And how splendid is Ven. Udayin who lives in the forest like this!'
"When he had said this, his wife said to him, 'What's so splendid about him? He rubbed up against me limb by limb just the way you do!'
"So the Brahmin was offended and annoyed and spread it about: 'How shameless these bhikkhus are, how immoral and hypocritical!...How can this contemplative Udayin rub up against my wife limb by limb? It isn't possible to go with your women-folk to a monastery or dwelling. If you go to a monastery or dwelling with your womenfolk, the Sakyan contemplatives will molest them!'"
There are two ways in which a bhikkhu can come into contact with a woman: either actively (the bhikkhu makes the contact) or passively (the woman does). Since the Vibhanga uses different terms to analyse these two possibilities, we will discuss them separately.
//Active contact//. The full offense for active contact here is composed of four factors:
1) //Object//: a living woman -- "even one born on that very day, all the more an older one." Whether or not she is awake to realize what is going on is irrelevant to the offense.
2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu correctly perceives her to be a woman.
3) //Intention//: He is acting under the influence of lust.
4) //Effort//: He comes into physical contact with her.
Since the system of derived offenses based on the various permutations of these factors is one of the most complex in the Vibhanga, we will limit our discussion first to the full offense before going into the permutations.
Of the four factors listed above, only two -- intention and effort -- require detailed explanation.
Intention. The Vibhanga explains the term //overcome with lust// as meaning "impassioned, desiring, a mind bound by attraction." //Altered//, it says, can refer in general to one of three states of mind -- passion, aversion, or delusion -- but here it refers specifically to passion.
The Commentary adds a piece of Abhidhamma analysis at this point, saying that //altered// refers to the moment when the mind leaves its state of pure neutrality in the //bhavanga// under the influence of desire. Thus the factor of intention here can be fulfilled not only by a prolonged or intense feeling of desire, but also by a momentary infatuation.
The Commentary also tries to limit the range of passion to which this rule applies, saying that it covers only desire for the enjoyment of contact. As we noted under Parajika 1, the ancient commentators formulated a list of eleven types of lust, each mutually exclusive, and the question of which rule applies to a particular case depends on which type of lust provokes the bhikkhu's actions. Thus if a bhikkhu lusting for intercourse touches a woman, it says, he incurs only a dukkata as a preliminary to sexual intercourse under Parajika 1. If he touches her from his lust for an ejaculation, he incurs a thullaccaya as a preliminary to causing an emission under Sanghadisesa 1. Only if he touches her with the simple desire to enjoy the sensation of contact does he incur a sanghadisesa under this rule.
This system, though very neat and orderly, flies in the face of common sense and, as we noted under Parajika 1, contradicts the Vibhanga as well, so there is no need to adopt it. We can stick with the Vibhanga to this rule and say that //any// state of passion fulfills the factor of intention here. The Commentary's discussion, though, is useful in showing that the passion needn't be full-scale sexual lust. Even a momentary desire to enjoy the sensation of physical contact -- overwhelming enough that one acts on it -- is enough to fulfill this factor.
Effort. The Vibhanga illustrates the effort of making physical contact with a list of activities: rubbing, rubbing up against, rubbing downwards, rubbing upwards, bending down, pulling up, drawing to, pushing away, seizing hold (or pinning down -- //abhinigganhana//), squeezing, grasping, or touching. The Vinita Vatthu includes a case of a bhikkhu giving a woman a blow with his shoulder: He too incurs a sanghadisesa, which shows that the Vibhanga's list is meant to cover all similar actions as well. If a bhikkhu with lustful mind does anything of this sort to a living woman's body, perceiving that she is a woman, he incurs the full penalty under this rule.
Derived offenses. Each of the factors of an offense allows a number of permutations that admit for different classes of offenses. Taken together, they form a complex system. Here we will consider each factor in turn.
//Object//. Assuming that the bhikkhu is acting with lustful intentions and is perceiving his object correctly, he incurs a thullaccaya for making bodily contact with a //pandaka//, a female yakkha, or a dead woman; and a dukkata for bodily contact with a man (or boy), a wooden doll, or a female animal.
//Pandaka //is usually translated as eunuch, but eunuchs are only one of five types of pandakas recognized by the Commentary:
(1) An //asitta// (literally, a "sprinkled one") -- a man who finds sexual fulfillment in performing fellatio on another man and bringing him to climax. (For some reason, other homosexual acts, even though they were known in ancient India, are not included under this type nor under any of the types in this list.)
(2) A voyeur -- a man who finds sexual fulfillment in watching other people have sex.
(3) A eunuch -- one who has been castrated.
(4) A half-time pandaka -- one who is a pandaka only during the waning moon. (! -- The Sub-commentary's discussion of this point shows that its author and his contemporaries were as unfamiliar with this type as we are today. Perhaps this was how bisexuals were understood in ancient times.)
(5) A neuter -- a person born without sexual organs.
According to the Commentary, the Mahavagga's statement (I.61) that pandakas cannot receive ordination refers only to the last three types, and to the half-time pandaka only during the waning moon.
As for female yakkhas, the Commentary says that this also includes female deities. There is an ancient story in Chieng Mai of a bhikkhu who was visited by a dazzling heavenly maiden late one night while he was meditating alone in a cave at Wat Umong. He couldn't resist touching her and, as soon as he did, went immediately out of his mind. The moral: This is one thullaccaya not to be taken lightly.
Also from the Commentary:
(1) The thullaccaya for lustfully touching female corpses applies only to those that would be grounds for a full offense under Parajika 1, i.e., those with an anal, oral, or genital orifice intact enough for one to perform the sexual act. Female corpses decomposed beyond that point are grounds for a dukkata here.
(2) The dukkata for lustfully touching wooden dolls (mannikins) applies also to any female form made out of other materials, and even to any picture of a woman.
(3) Female animals include female nagas and other half-animal, half-woman species as well.
According to the Sub-commentary, the dukkata for lustfully touching female animals also applies to male animals.
For some reason, male yakkhas and deities slipped out of the list. Perhaps they should come under "men."
//Perception//. Misperception affects the severity of the offense only in the cases of women and pandakas. A bhikkhu who makes lustful bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is something else -- a pandaka, a man, or an animal -- incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes lustful bodily contact with a pandaka while under the impression that the pandaka is a woman, a man, or an animal, the penalty is a dukkata. In the cases of men and animals, misperception has no effect on the severity of the case: Lustful bodily contact -- e.g., with a male transvestite whom one thinks to be a woman -- still results in a dukkata.
//Intention//. The Vinita Vatthu contains cases of a bhikkhu who caresses his mother out of filial affection, one who caresses his daughter out of fatherly affection, and one who caresses his sister out of brotherly affection. In each case the penalty is a dukkata.
The Vibhanga does not discuss the issue of bhikkhus who intentionally make active contact with women for purposes other than lust or affection -- e.g., helping a woman who has fallen into a raging river -- but the Commentary does. It introduces the concept of //anamasa//, things carrying a dukkata penalty when touched; women and clothing belonging to a woman top the list. It then goes into great detail to tell how one should behave when one's mother falls into a raging river. Under no circumstances, it says, should one grab hold of her, although one may extend a rope, a board, etc., in her direction. If she happens to grab hold of her son the bhikkhu, he should not shake her off, but should simply let her hold on as he swims back to shore.
Where the Commentary gets the concepts of //anamasa// is hard to say. Perhaps it came from the practices of the Brahmin caste, who are very careful not to touch certain things and people of certain lower castes. At any rate, there is no direct basis for it in the Canon. Although the concept has received universal acceptance in Theravadin Communities, many highly-respected Vinaya experts have made an exception right here, saying that there is nothing wrong in touching a woman when one's action is based not on lust but on a desire to save her from danger. Even if there is an offense in doing so, there are other places where Buddhaghosa recommends that one be willing to incur a minor penalty for the sake of compassion (e.g., digging a person out of a hole into which he has fallen), and the same principle surely holds here.
There is no offense in touching a being other than a woman if one's intentions are not lustful, although tickling is an offense under Pacittiya 52.
//Effort//. Acts of lustful but indirect bodily contact with a woman one perceives to be a woman and a pandaka one perceives to be a woman carry the following penalties:
For the woman: Using one's body to make contact with an article connected to her body -- e.g., using one's hand to touch the hem of her dress, a rope, or stick she is holding: a thullaccaya.
Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with her body -- e.g., using the edge of one's robe or a flower one is holding to brush along her arm: a thullaccaya.
Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with an item connected with her body: a dukkata.
Taking an object -- such as a flower -- and tossing it against her body, an object connected with her body, or an object she has tossed: a dukkata.
Taking hold of something she is standing or sitting on -- a bridge, a tree, a boat, etc. -- and giving it a shake: a dukkata.
For the pandaka one assumes to be a woman, the penalty in all the above cases is a dukkata.
These penalties for indirect contact have inspired the Commentary to say that if a bhikkhu makes contact with a clothed portion of a woman's body or uses a clothed portion of his body to make contact with hers, and the cloth is so thick that neither his body hairs nor hers can penetrate it, the penalty is only a thullaccaya, since he is not making direct contact. Only if the contact is skin-to-skin, skin-to-hair, or hair-to-hair (as might be possible through thin cloth) does he commit the full offense. Thus a bhikkhu who fondles the breasts or buttocks of a fully-clothed woman would incur only a thullaccaya since the contact was indirect.
While this contention might be true in a technical sense, two points from the Vibhanga indicate that its compilers did not have this sort of thing in mind when they mentioned indirect contact.
(1) In its discussion of passive contact, the Vibhanga divides the factor of effort into two parts: effort and result. The result necessary for a full offense is that the bhikkhu detects contact. The important word here is "detect" (//pativijanati//): The Canon uses it to refer to cases where one perceives something that may not be readily apparent, and here it seems specifically designed to cover instances where the contact may not be skin-to-skin, but still can be felt as bodily contact. Thus if the contact is such that the bhikkhu could feel the presence of the woman's body through his or under her clothing, direct contact has been made. If this much contact is enough for a full offense under passive contact, there is good reason to assume that it should also be enough under active contact as well.
(2) The Vinita Vatthu contains the following case:
"Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu, seeing a woman he encountered coming in the opposite direction, was infatuated and gave her a blow with his shoulder. He was remorseful....'Bhikkhu, you have committed a sanghadisesa offense.'"
As mentioned in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption that the Vibhanga compilers were careful enough to include all of the relevant facts in describing the cases in the Vinita Vatthu. Now if the Commentary's assertion were true -- that the amount of cloth between the bodies of the bhikkhu and the woman is important in determining an offense -- the compilers would have mentioned this factor at least indirectly, saying, for instance, that the encounter took place in the monastery, where he might have had his shoulder uncovered, rather than outside of the monastery, where he should have had it covered; or that he had neglected to cover his shoulders when leaving the monastery; or that he was wearing a very fine robe that allowed his hair to pass through. But they say nothing of the sort, and their silence here suggests that such questions are irrelevant.
The only cases of indirect contact mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu refer to contact of a much more remote sort: a bhikkhu pulls a cord of which a woman is holding another end, pulls a stick of which she is holding the other end, or gives her a playful push with his bowl.
Thus in the context of this rule the Vibhanga defines "object connected to the body," through which indirect contact is made, with examples: things that the person is //holding//. The Vinaya Mukha adds things that are //hanging// from the person, like the hem of a robe or a dress. In this context, contact made through cloth that the person is wearing, if the contact can be detected, would be classed as direct. This would parallel Parajika 1, in which the question of whether there is anything covering either of the organs involved in intercourse is completely irrelevant to the offense. Thus the concept of direct and indirect contact here would seem to follow general linguistic usage: If a woman is wearing a long-sleeved shirt, for instance, grabbing her by the arm and grabbing her by the shirt-sleeve are two different things, and would receive different penalties under this rule.
According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu feels desire for contact with a woman and makes an effort but does not achieve even indirect contact, the penalty is a dukkata.
//Passive contact//. The Vibhanga's analysis of passive contact -- when the bhikkhu is the object rather than the agent making the contact -- deals with only a limited number of variables.
Agent: either a woman the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, or a pandaka he perceives to be a woman.
The agent's effort: any of the actions that fulfill the factor of act for the full offense under active contact -- rubbing, pulling, pushing, squeezing, etc.
The bhikkhu's aim. The Vibhanga lists only two here: the desire to come together and the desire to escape (%). The Sub-commentary explains the first as desiring the pleasurable feeling of contact.
Effort. The bhikkhu either makes a physical effort or he doesn't. The Commentary includes under this factor even the slightest physical movements, such as winking, raising one's eyebrows, or rolling one's eyes. At present we would include such things as inviting a woman to caress one, or deliberately placing oneself in a crowded entrance to a store so that women would have to make contact with one as they walked past.
Result. The bhikkhu either detects the contact or he doesn't.
The most important factor here is the bhikkhu's aim: If he desires to escape from the contact, then no matter who the person making the contact is, whether or not the bhikkhu makes an effort, or whether or not he detects the contact, there is no offense. The Vinita Vatthu gives an example:
"Now at that time, many women, pressing up to a certain bhikkhu, led him about arm-in-arm. He felt conscience-stricken.... 'Did you consent, bhikkhu?' (the Buddha) asked.
'No, Lord, I did not.'
'Then there was no offense, bhikkhu, as you did not consent.'"
The Commentary mentions another example, in which a bhikkhu, not desiring the contact, is molested by a lustful woman. He remains perfectly still, with the thought, "When she realizes I am not interested, she will go away." He too commits no offense.
However, if the bhikkhu desires the contact, then the offenses are as follows:
The agent is a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a sanghadisesa. He makes an effort but detects no contact: a dukkata. He makes no effort (e.g., he remains perfectly still as she grasps, squeezes, and rubs his body): no offense regardless of whether or not he detects contact. One exception here, though, would be the special case mentioned under "Consent" in the preceding rule, in which a bhikkhu lets a woman -- or anyone at all, for that matter -- make him have an emission and he incurs a sanghadisesa under that rule as a result.
The agent is a pandaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a dukkata. All other possibilities -- effort but no detected contact, detected contact but no effort, no effort and no detected contact: no offense.
Counting offenses. According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu has lustful bodily contact with //x// number of people in any of the ways that constitute an offense here, he commits //x// number of offenses. For example, if he lustfully rubs up against two women in a bus, he incurs two sanghadisesas. If, out of fatherly affection, he hugs his two daughters and three sons, he incurs two dukkatas for hugging his daughters and no penalty for hugging his sons.
The Commentary adds that if he makes lustful contact with a person //x// number of times, he commits //x// number of offenses. For instance, he hugs a woman from behind, she fights him off, and he strikes her out of lust: two sanghadisesas.
The question of counting sanghadisesas, though, is somewhat academic, since the penalty for multiple offenses is almost identical with the penalty for one. The only difference is in the formal announcements that accompany the penalty -- e.g., when the Sangha places the offender under probation, when he informs others bhikkhus of why he is under probation, etc. For more on this point, see the concluding section of this chapter.
Non-offenses. There is no offense for a bhikkhu who makes contact with a woman --
//unintentionally// -- as when inadvertently running into a woman in a crowded place; //unthinkingly// -- as when a woman runs into him and, startled, he pushes her away; //unknowingly// -- as when, without lustful intent, he touches a young tomboy he thinks to be a boy; or //when he doesn't give his consent// -- as in the case of the bhikkhu led around arm-in-arm by a crowd of women.
Summary: Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
3.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, address lewd words to a woman in the manner of young men to a young woman alluding to sexual intercourse, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
"Now at that time Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. One day many women came to the monastery to admire his dwelling. They went to where he was staying and on arrival said to him, 'Ven. Sir, we would like to admire your dwelling.' Then Ven. Udayin, showing the dwelling to the women and referring to their genital and anal orifices, praised and criticized and begged and implored and asked and quizzed and advised and instructed and ridiculed them. Those of the women who were brazen, shameless, and sly giggled at Ven. Udayin, exclaimed to him, laughed aloud, and teased him; while those of the women who had a sense of decency complained to the bhikkhus as they left: 'It is improper, Ven. sirs, and unbecoming! Even from our husbands we wouldn't like to hear this sort of thing, much less from Master Udayin.'"
The K/Commentary lists five factors for a full breach of this rule:
1) //Object//: a woman, i.e., any female human being experienced enough to know what words are and are not lewd. 2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman. 3) //Intention//: He is lustful. As in the preceding rule, we can take the Commentary's definition of lust here as the //minimum// amount of lust to fulfill this factor: He wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper. 4) //Effort//: He makes remarks referring to her genitals, anus, or to her performing sexual intercourse. 5) //Result//: The woman immediately understands.
The only factors requiring detailed explanation here are intention and effort.
Intention. The minimum level of desire required to fulfill this factor means that this rule covers cases where a bhikkhu simply gets a charge out of referring to a woman's genitals, etc., in her presence, without necessarily having any desire actually to have sex with her.
The Vibhanga makes clear that this rule does not cover statements made in anger. Thus any insults a bhikkhu may direct at a woman out of anger rather than playfully in desire -- even if they refer to her genitals, etc. -- would come under Pacittiya 2, rather than here.
Effort. The Vibhanga states that to incur a sanghadisesa under this rule when one is speaking to a woman, one must refer to //her// genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse (%).
The Commentary goes further and says that to incur the full penalty one must make direct mention of one of these three things, or accuse her of being sexually deformed in a way that refers directly to her genitals. Otherwise, if one refers lustfully to these matters without directly mentioning them, there is no sanghadisesa, although the Sub-commentary quotes ancient texts called the Ganthipadas as assigning a dukkata for such an act.
All of this contradicts the Vibhanga, which lists the ways of referring to the woman's anus, genitals, and sexual intercourse that would entail the full penalty under this rule -- one speaks praise, speaks criticism, begs, implores, asks, quizzes, advises, exhorts, or ridicules -- and many of the examples it gives, although referring to the woman's private parts or to her performing sexual intercourse, do not actually mention those words: "How do you give to your husband?" "How do you give to your lover?" "When will your mother be reconciled?" "When will you have a good opportunity?" Although all of these statements refer to sexual intercourse, and people in those days would have understood them in that light, none of them actually mentions it.
Thus the Vibhanga's examples seem to indicate that if a bhikkhu is referring lustfully to the woman's private parts or to her performing sexual intercourse, then whether or not he directly names those things, he fulfills this factor.
None of the texts mention the case in which a bhikkhu talks to one person about another person's private parts, etc.
Derived offenses. The factors of effort, object, perception, and result permit a number of permutations that result in lesser offenses. As for the permutations of intention, see the section on non-offenses, below.
//Effort//. A bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman and refers lustfully to parts of her body -- aside from her private parts -- below her collarbone and above her knees, such as her breasts or her thighs: a thullaccaya. If he refers to parts of her body outside of that area, such as her face or hair, or to clothing or jewelry she is wearing: a dukkata.
//Object//. A bhikkhu speaks to a pandaka (in this and the following cases we are assuming that he perceives his object correctly) and refers lustfully to his private parts or to his performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya. He refers lustfully to other parts of the pandaka's body, his clothing, etc.: a dukkata.
A bhikkhu speaks to a man (or boy) and refers lustfully to any part of his listener's body, clothing, etc.: a dukkata. The same penalty holds for speaking lustfully to a common animal about its body, ornaments, etc. (%). (This is a point with interesting implications, but unfortunately the Commentary is silent. Perhaps nagas would be included here, or perhaps the Vibhanga compilers had in mind cases where one mentions such things to an animal within earshot of a human or celestial being.)
The texts make no mention of speaking lustfully to a woman/girl too young to understand what is and is not lewd. We might argue from the cases included in the Vinita Vatthu, though -- where bhikkhus make punning references to women's private parts, and the women do not understand -- that a bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for referring directly to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse in her presence, and a dukkata for referring indirectly in her presence to such things.
//Perception//. A bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to be something else -- a pandaka, a man, an animal -- incurs a thullaccaya if he refers lustfully to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse. If he is speaking to a pandaka, a man, or an animal he misperceives -- e.g., he thinks the pandaka is a woman, the man is a pandaka, the animal is a man -- he incurs a dukkata if he refers lustfully to those topics.
//Result//. As mentioned above, the Vinita Vatthu contains a number cases of bhikkhus speaking to women and making punning references to the women's genitals that the women do not understand. In one case the penalty is a thullaccaya, in the others a dukkata. The thullaccaya case is the only one in which the bhikkhu uses a word synonymous with genitals (//magga//, which also means road, the meaning the woman understood). Thus we might argue that if a bhikkhu makes direct reference to the genitals, anus, or sexual intercourse -- and this includes slang expressions and euphemisms -- and the woman doesn't immediately understand that he is referring to those things, he incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes indirect mention of those things, and she doesn't immediately understand what he is referring to, he incurs a dukkata. If it so happens that she understands later, the penalty remains the same.
Counting offenses. A bhikkhu making remarks of the sort covered by this rule to //x// number of people commits //x// number of offenses, the type of offense being determined by the factors discussed above. Thus for lustful remarks to two women referring to their breasts, he would incur two thullaccayas; for lustful remarks to three men concerning their bodies, three dukkatas; for teasing a group of twenty old ladies about how their time for sexual performance is past, twenty sanghadisesas.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who speaks aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming at Dhamma, or aiming at teaching. Thus, for example, if one is talking in front of women and has no lustful intent, one may recite or explain the training rules that deal with these matters or go into detail on the topic of the loathsomeness of the body as a topic of meditation, all without incurring a penalty. The Commentary here adds an example of a bhikkhu addressing a sexually deformed woman, telling her to be heedful in her practice so as not to be born that way again. If, however, one were to broach any of these topics out of a desire to enjoy saying something lewd to one's listeners, one would not be immune from an offense.
A bhikkhu who, without intending to be lewd, makes innocent remarks that his listener takes to be lewd, commits no offense.
Summary: Making a lustful remark to a woman about her genitals, anus, or about performing sexual intercourse is a sanghadisesa offense.
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4. Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to his own sensuality thus: "This, sister, is the highest ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous, fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself with this act" -- alluding to sexual intercourse -- it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
"Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. So Ven. Udayin, arising early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her residence. On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat. Then the woman, approaching him, paying him homage, sat down to one side. As she sat there, Ven. Udayin instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma. Then the woman, instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with a talk on Dhamma...said to him, 'Tell me, Ven. sir, what would be in my power to give you for your welfare: Robe-cloth? Alms-food? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?'
"'Those things aren't hard for us to come by sister....Give just what is hard for us to come by.'
"'What, Ven. sir?'
"'Sexual intercourse.'
"'For your welfare, Ven. sir?'
"'For my welfare, sister.'
"'Then come, Ven. sir.' Entering into an inner room, taking off her cloak, she lay back on a couch. Then Ven. Udayin approached the woman and, on approaching, said, 'Who would touch this foul-smelling wretch?' And he departed, spitting.
"Then the woman was offended and annoyed and spread it about...'How can this contemplative Udayin, when he himself begged me for sexual intercourse, say, "Who would touch this foul-smelling wretch?" and depart spitting? What's wretched about me? What's foul-smelling about me? In what am I inferior to whom?'"
At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising, begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse. However, some facts about language and belief in the Buddha's time might have led some people to feel that this was a special case not covered by the previous rule; so -- to prevent this misunderstanding -- it gets separate treatment here.
"Giving," in the Buddha's time, was a common term for having sex. If a woman gave to a man, that meant that she was willing to have sexual intercourse with him. Now, Buddhism was not the only religion of the time to teach that gifts -- of a more innocent sort -- given to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the bright idea that since sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would produce the highest reward. Whether this idea was first formulated by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say. There are several cases in the Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 1 telling of bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief, which shows that it had some currency: that sex was somehow seen as a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma.
Since the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking "aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming at Dhamma," some misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha's teachings on sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under the exemption. Even today, although the rationale might be different, there are people who believe that having sex with spiritual teachers is beneficial for one's spiritual well-being. Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not exempt from an offense.
The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here.
Object: a woman experienced enough to know what words are and are not lewd.
Perception. The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.
Intention. He is lustful. According to the Sub-commentary, this means that he wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper. This point is borne out by the origin story, where Ven. Udayin addressed his remarks to the young widow apparently just to test her reaction. As in the preceding rules, we can take the Sub-commentary's definition to stand for the //minimum// amount of lust needed to fulfill this factor.
Effort. The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her ministering to his sensual needs, making reference to sexual intercourse. The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the example in the rule itself would seem to contradict its assertion.
Result. The woman immediately understands.
Derived offenses. The only factors having permutations leading to lesser offenses are object and perception.
//Object//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks to a pandaka: a thullaccaya. To a man or animal: a dukkata.
//Perception//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks to a woman he perceives to be something else -- a pandaka, man, or animal: a thullaccaya. To a pandaka he perceives to be something else: a dukkata.
Counting offenses. Offenses are counted by the number of people one makes such remarks to.
Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga, in addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1, read simply: "There is no offense if he speaks saying, 'Support us with the requisites of robe-cloth, alms-food, lodgings, or medicines for the sick.'" Thus there is apparently no way that a bhikkhu in his right mind may speak in the presence of another person in praise of that person's ministering to his (the bhikkhu's) own sexual desires, without committing an offense.
Summary: Telling a woman that she would benefit from having sexual intercourse with oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.
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5. Should any bhikkhu engage in conveying a man's intentions to a woman or a woman's intentions to a man, proposing marriage or paramourage -- even if only for a momentary liaison -- it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
There are essentially two factors for a full offense under this rule: effort and object.
Effort. The Commentary says that to "engage in conveying" means to take on the role of a go-between. This includes helping to arrange not only marriages and affairs, but also "momentary associations" that, from the way it describes them, could include anything from appointments with a prostitute to arrangements for X to be Y's date.
The Vibhanga sets the component factors of a go-between's role at three:
1) //accepting// the request of one party to convey a proposal; 2) //inquiring//, i.e., informing the second party and learning his/her/their reaction; and 3) //reporting// what one has learned to the first party.
The penalties for these actions are: a dukkata for performing any one of them, a thullaccaya for any two, and a sanghadisesa for the full set of three. Thus a bhikkhu acting on his own initiative to sound out the possibility of a date between a man and a woman would incur a thullaccaya for inquiring and reporting. A bhikkhu planning to disrobe who asks a woman if she would be interested in marrying him after his return to lay life would incur a dukkata for inquiring.
The penalties are the same if the bhikkhu, instead of acting as a go-between himself, gets someone else to act for him. Thus a bhikkhu who agrees to convey such a proposal but then gets a lay follower or another bhikkhu to do the inquiring and reporting, would incur a sanghadisesa all the same.
If a group of bhikkhus are asked to act as go-betweens and they all accept, then even if only one of them takes the message, all incur the penalty for his actions.
"Result" is not a factor here, and so the Commentary mentions that whether or not the arrangements succeed has no bearing on the offense.
"Intention" is also not a factor, which leads the Sub-commentary to raise the issue of a man who writes his proposal in a letter and then, without disclosing the contents, gets a bhikkhu to deliver it. Its conclusion, though, is that this case would not qualify as an offense under this rule, in that both the Vibhanga and the Commentary define the action of conveying as "telling": Only if the bhikkhu himself tells the proposal -- whether repeating it orally, making a gesture or writing a letter -- does he commit an offense here.
Object. The full offense is for acting as a go-between between a man and a woman who are not married to each other. If, instead of dealing directly with the man and woman, one deals with people speaking on their behalf (their parents, a pimp), one incurs the full penalty all the same.
There is no offense for a bhikkhu who tries to effect a reconciliation between an estranged couple who are not divorced; but a full offense for one who tries to effect a reconciliation between a couple who are. "Perception" is also not a factor here, which inspires the Commentary to note that even an arahant could commit an offense under this rule if he tried to effect a reconciliation between his parents whom he assumed to be separated when they actually were divorced.
A bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for acting as a go-between for a pandaka; and, according to the Commentary, the same penalty for acting as a go-between for a female yakkha or peta. (!)
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that, in addition to the usual exemptions, there is no offense if a bhikkhu conveys a message from a man to a woman or vice versa dealing with "business of the Community, of a shrine, or of a sick person." The Commentary illustrates the first two instances with cases of a bhikkhu conveying a message dealing with construction work for the Community or a shrine; and the third with a case where a bhikkhu, acting on behalf of a fellow bhikkhu who is sick, is sent by a male lay follower to a female lay follower for medicine.
The Sub-commentary adds that any similar errand is also exempt from penalty as long as it is not a form of subservience to lay people (see Sanghadisesa 13, below).
Summary: Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to each other is a sanghadisesa offense.
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6.When a bhikkhu is building a hut from (gains acquired by) his own begging -- having no sponsor, destined for himself -- he is to build it to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: twelve spans, using the sugata span, in length (measuring outside); seven in width, (measuring) inside. Bhikkhus are to be assembled to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus designate should be without disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should build a hut from his own begging on a site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, or if he should exceed the standard, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
"At that time the bhikkhus of Alavi were having huts built from their own begging -- having no sponsors, destined for themselves, not to any standard measurement -- that did not come to completion. They were continually begging, continually hinting: 'Give a man, give labor, give an ox, give a wagon, give a knife, give an ax, give an adze, give a spade, give a chisel, give rushes, give reeds, give grass, give clay.' People, harassed with the begging, harassed with the hinting, on seeing bhikkhus would feel apprehensive, alarmed, would run away; would take another route, face another direction, close the door. Even on seeing cows, they would run away, imagining them to be bhikkhus."
This rule and the following one concern the procedures a bhikkhu should follow when he wants to build a dwelling for his own use. The following rule deals with cases where he has a sponsor to provide him with funds and materials. This rule deals with cases where he doesn't. The Vibhanga and Commentary define the words //hut// and //dwelling// in these rules in such a way that they apply only to a limited range of structures, but the Commentary's discussion of what a bhikkhu may and may not beg for when building anything at all, guarantees that even in cases not covered by these rules he is not allowed to be burdensome to the people he asks for help. In discussing this rule, we will first cover what kinds of begging are proper and improper in connection with //any// kind of construction work, and then go on to treat the particular case coming under this rule.
Begging. A bhikkhu may ask for people to give labor in any situation. Thus he may ask stone masons to carry stone posts to his construction, or carpenters to carry boards there. If, after he has asked them to help with the labor, they volunteer to donate the materials as well, he may accept them without penalty. Otherwise, he has to reimburse them for the materials.
As for tools, vehicles, and other things he will use in the process of construction, he may ask only to borrow them from other people and may not ask for them outright. If the tools get damaged, he is responsible for getting them repaired before returning them to the owner. The only things he needn't return to the owner are light articles (//lahubhanda//), which the Sub-commentary identifies as things like reeds, rushes, grass, and clay -- i.e., things having little or no monetary value at all.
In effect, this means that unless a bhikkhu is going to build his dwelling out of reeds, etc., or out of thrown-away scraps, he may not ask for any of the materials that will actually go into the dwelling. Keep in mind that these rules were made during a period when wilderness was still plentiful, and solid building materials such as timber and stones were free for the taking. At present, unless a bhikkhu has access to unclaimed wilderness of this sort, to unclaimed garbage, or has enough funds on deposit with his steward (see NP 10) to cover the cost of materials, his only recourse if he wants a solid structure is either to rammed earth or to hinting.
The Commentary notes that while hinting is not allowed with regard to food or cloth, it is allowed with regard to construction materials. One example it gives is asking, "Do you think this is a good place to build a hut? An ordination hall?" Another example is staking out a construction site in hope that someone will ask, "What are you planning to do here?" If people get the hint and offer the materials, the bhikkhu may accept them. If they don't, he may not ask directly for any materials except the "light articles" mentioned above.
From this it should be obvious that even in cases not covered by this rule -- i.e., the dwelling he is building doesn't qualify as a "hut," or he is building something for other people to use -- a bhikkhu engaged in construction work is not allowed to be burdensome to the laity. This is an important point, as the Buddha illustrated in a story he told to the bhikkhus at Alavi. A certain bhikkhu had once come to him with a complaint, and he reports the conversation as follows:
"'Lord, there is a large forest on the slopes of the Himalayas, and not far from it is a broad, low-lying marsh. A great flock of birds, after feeding all day in the marsh, goes to roost in the forest at nightfall. That is why I have come to see the Blessed One -- because I am annoyed by the noise of that flock of birds.'
"'Bhikkhu, you want those birds to go away for good?'
"'Yes, Lord, I want them to go away for good.'
"'Then go back there, enter the forest, and in the first watch of the night make this announcement three times: "Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather." In the second watch...In the third watch of the night make this announcement three times: "Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather"....(The bhikkhu did as he was told.) Then the flock of birds, thinking, 'The bhikkhu asks for a feather, the bhikkhu wants a feather,' left the forest. And after they were gone, they never again returned. Bhikkhus, begging is unpleasant, hinting is unpleasant even to these common animals -- how much more so to human beings?"
The hut. Now we turn to the particular case covered by this rule. The Vibhanga defines a hut as "plastered inside, outside, or both." It also states that this rule does not apply to a //lena//, a //guha//, or to a grass hut. A lena, according to the Commentary, is a cave. A guha it doesn't define, except to say that guhas may be built out of wood, stone, or earth. And as for a grass hut, it says that this refers to any building with a grass //roof//, which means that even a dwelling with plastered walls but a grass roof would not count as a hut under this rule (although a hut whose roof has been plastered and then covered with grass //would// count as a hut here).
The Commentary goes on to stipulate that the plastering mentioned in the Vibhanga refers to a plastered //roof//, that the plaster must be either clay or white lime (plastering with cow dung or mud doesn't count, although cement would probably come under "white lime" here), and that the plastering on the inside or outside of the roof must be contiguous with the plastering on the inside or outside of the walls. Thus if the builder leaves a gap in the plastering around the top of the wall so that the plastering of the roof and the plastering of the walls don't touch at any point, the building doesn't qualify as a hut and so doesn't come under the rule.
The Commentary's stipulations on these point may seem like attempts to create gaping loopholes in the rule, but there is nothing in the Vibhanga to prove them wrong. Perhaps in those days only fully plastered buildings were considered to be finished, permanent structures, while everything else was considered makeshift and temporary and thus not worth the fuss and bother of the procedures we will discuss below.
At another point in its discussions, the Commentary adds that any building three sugata spans wide or less is not big enough to move a bed around in and so does not count as a hut under this rule. The Commentary itself defines a sugata span as three times the span of a normal person, which would put it at approximately 75 cm. More recent calculations, based on the fact that the Buddha was not abnormally tall, set the sugata span at 25 cm.
The procedures. If, for his own use, a bhikkhu is planning to build a hut as defined in this rule, he must chose a site, clear it, and ask for the local Community to inspect and approve it before he can go ahead with the actual construction.
//The site//. The site must be free of disturbances and have adequate space.
"Free of disturbances" means that the site is not the abode of such creatures as termites, ants, or rats who might do harm to the building, or of those such as snakes, scorpions, tigers, lions, elephants, or bears who might do harm to its inhabitant. The Commentary states that the Vibhanga's purpose in forbidding a bhikkhu from building on a site where termites and other small animals have their home is to show compassion to these and other small creatures like them by not destroying their nests. As for the stipulation against building where snakes and other dangerous animals live, this also extends, it says, to the areas where they regularly forage for food.
In addition, the Vibhanga says that a site without disturbances is one that is not near any places that will disturb the bhikkhu's peace and quiet. Examples it gives are: fields, orchards, places of execution, cemeteries, pleasure groves, royal property, elephant stables, horse stables, prisons, taverns, slaughterhouses, highways, crossroads, public rest-houses, and meeting places.
"Adequate space" means that there is enough room on the site for a yoked wagon to go around, or for a man to carry a ladder around, the proposed hut. The question arises as to whether this means that all trees within that radius of the hut must be cut down, or whether it simply means that there must be enough land around the hut so that if the trees were not there, it would be possible to go around the hut in the ways mentioned. The Sub-commentary states that the stipulation for adequate space is so that the hut will not be built on the edge of a precipice or next to a cliff wall, and the Vinaya Mukha notes that the Vibhanga here is following the Laws of Manu (an ancient Indian legal text) in ensuring that the dwelling not be built right against someone else's property. Both of these statements suggest that there is no need to cut the trees down.
The Vinaya Mukha maintains further that the procedures for getting the site approved are concerned basically with laying claim to unclaimed land, and this has led many Communities in Thailand to say that the need to have the Community approve the site does not apply to places where the Community already owns the land, such as in a monastery. If a bhikkhu in such Communities wishes to build a hut for his own use on monastery land, he need only get the approval of the abbot. The ancient texts say nothing on this point, so it is an area where the wise policy is to follow the views of the Community to which one belongs.
//Clearing the site//. Before notifying the local Community, the bhikkhu must get the site cleared -- so says the Vibhanga, and the Commentary adds that he should get it leveled as well. In both cases, he should arrange to have this done in such a way that does not violate Pacittiyas 10 & 11. Again, the question arises as to whether clearing the site means cutting down the trees on the spot where one proposes building the hut. In the origin story to the following rule, Ven. Channa caused an uproar by cutting down a venerated tree on a site where he planned to build, which led the Buddha to formulate the rule that the Community must inspect and approve the site to prevent uproars of this sort. This suggests that clearing the site here means clearing the underbrush. Only after the Community has approved the site should the necessary trees be cut down.
//Getting the site inspected//. The bhikkhu then goes to the local Community and formally asks them to inspect the site. (The Pali passages for this and the remaining formal requests and announcements are in the Vibhanga.) Either the entire Community will go to inspect the site or it will select two or three of its members to go and inspect the site in its stead. The Vibhanga says that these inspectors should know what does and does not constitute a disturbance and adequate space, and requires that they be chosen by a formal motion with one announcement. The Commentary, for some reason, says that they may also be chosen by a simple declaration (//apalokana//).
The inspectors then visit the site. If they find any disturbances or see that the site has inadequate space, they should tell the bhikkhu not to build there. If the site passes inspection, though, the bhikkhu may go on to the next step.
//Getting the site approved//. The bhikkhu returns to the Community and formally asks them to approve the site. The formal act involves a motion and one announcement. Once this has passed, the bhikkhu may start construction.
The size of the hut. As the rule states, the hut may be no more than twelve spans long and seven spans wide, or approximately 3 x 1.75 meters. For some reason the Vibhanga states that the length of the hut is measured from the outside (excluding the plastering, says the Commentary), while the width is measured from the inside. The Commentary adds that neither of these measurements may be exceeded. Thus a hut ten by eight spans wide, even though it has less floor area than a twelve by seven span hut, would exceed the standard width and so would be a violation of this rule.
Offenses. The Vibhanga allots the penalties for building a hut without a sponsor, for one's own use, without regard for the stipulations in this rule, as follows:
an oversized hut -- a sanghadisesa; a hut on an unapproved site -- a sanghadisesa; a hut on a site without adequate space -- a dukkata; a hut on a site with disturbances -- a dukkata.
These penalties are additive. Thus, for example, an oversized hut on an unapproved site would entail a double sanghadisesa.
The wording of the training rule, though, suggests that building a hut without a sponsor, for one's own use, on a site with disturbances and without adequate space would entail a sanghadisesa; but the Sub-commentary says -- without offering explanation -- that to read the rule in this way is to misinterpret it. Since the penalty for a multiple sanghadisesa is the same as that for a single one, there is only one case where this would make an appreciable difference: a hut of the proper size, built on a designated site that has disturbances or does not have adequate space. This is a case of a formal act of the Community improperly performed: Either the bhikkhus inspecting the site were incompetent, or the disturbances were not immediately apparent. Since the usual penalty for improperly performing an act of the Community is a dukkata (Mv.II.16.4), this may be why the Vibhanga allots penalties as it does.
As we noted in the Introduction, in cases where the Vibhanga is explaining the training rules that deal with formal acts of the Community, it sometimes has to deviate from the wording of the rules so as to bring them in line in with the general pattern for such acts, a pattern that was probably formulated after the rules and came to take precedence over them.
Getting others to build the hut. If, instead of building the hut himself, a bhikkhu gets others to build it for him, he must inform them of the four stipulations mentioned in this rule. If he neglects to inform them, and they build the hut in such a way that it does not meet any or all of the stipulations, he must either have it torn down (to the ground, says the Commentary) and have it rebuilt in line with the stipulations, give it to another, or face the full penalty for each of the stipulations they violated that he neglected to mention to them.
For example: He tells them to build a hut of the right size, but neglects to tell them to have the site approved. They build it to the right size, the site is without disturbances and has adequate space but is not approved. Unless he has it torn down or gives it to another, he incurs a sanghadisesa.
If the bhikkhu mentions the proper stipulations, but learns that the builders are ignoring them, he must go himself or send a messenger to reiterate the stipulations. Not to do so incurs a dukkata. If, having been reminded of the stipulations, the builders still ignore them, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty; but they -- if they are bhikkhus -- incur a dukkata for each of the three criteria regarding the site that they disobey. As for the standard measurement, they are not bound by it as they are building the hut for another's use.
If a bhikkhu, intending it for his own use, completes a hut that others have started, or gets others to complete a hut he has started, he is still bound by the stipulations given in this rule.
Preliminary offenses. The penalties in the preliminary steps are as follows: If the hut is such that when finished it will entail a sanghadisesa or two, each act in its construction entails a dukkata, until the next to the last act, which entails a thullaccaya. Once the hut is completed, and the bhikkhu incurs the sanghadisesa(s), the dukkatas and thullaccaya are nullified.
Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses mention, in addition to the usual exemptions, that there is no offense "in a lena, in a guha, in a grass hut, in (a dwelling) for another's use, or in anything other than a dwelling." The Commentary explains that no offense here means that these cases are not subject to any of the four stipulations given in this rule. As for the last case, if a bhikkhu is building, e.g., a meeting hall for the Community, he is not bound by this rule, but if he plans to live there as well, he is. This last case suggests that if a bhikkhu is building a dwelling, planning to donate it formally to the Community but also planning to live there himself, he is not exempt from this rule.
Summary: Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, without having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the standard measurements, is also a sanghadisesa offense.
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7. When a bhikkhu is building a large dwelling -- having a sponsor and destined for himself -- he is to assemble bhikkhus to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus designate should be without disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should build a large dwelling on a site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
The Vibhanga defines //dwelling// here with the same terms it uses for //hut// in the preceding rule. All explanations for this rule may be inferred from those above, the only difference being that, as the dwelling here has a sponsor, no begging is involved in its construction, and so there is no need to limit its size.
If a sponsor is building a dwelling for a bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu is not involved in any way in building it or getting it built, this rule does not apply.
Summary: Building a hut with a sponsor -- or having it built -- destined for one's own use, without having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense.
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8.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, charge a (fellow) bhikkhu with an unfounded case involving defeat, (thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
"Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus every day. (One day) he happened to go on some business to the monastery. He went to where Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was staying and on arrival bowed to him and sat down to one side....Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused... him with a Dhamma talk. Then the householder with fine food...said to Dabba Mallaputta, 'To whom, sir, is tomorrow's meal in our house assigned?'
"'To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, householder.' [Mettiya and Bhummajaka were among the leaders of the group-of-six, a faction notorious for its shameless behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.]
"This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, 'How can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?' he returned home and ordered his female slave: 'Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.'
"'As you say, master,' the female slave answered....
"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one another, 'Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his wife and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice, some will offer curry, some oil, and some dainties.' Because of their joy, they didn't sleep as much that night as they had hoped.
"Early the next morning...they went to the home of the householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming from afar. Preparing them a seat in the storeroom, she said to them, 'Have a seat, honored sirs.'
"The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, 'No doubt the food isn't ready yet, which is why we are being made to sit in the storeroom.'
"Then the female slave brought them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine and said, 'Eat, honored sirs.'
"'Sister, we've come for the regular meal.'
"'I know you've come for the regular meal. But yesterday the householder ordered me, "Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine." So eat, honored sirs.'
"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one another, 'Yesterday the householder with fine food went to the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba Mallaputta turned him against us.' Because of their disappointment, they didn't eat as much as they had hoped.
"Then they returned to the monastery and, putting away their robes and bowls, went to the storeroom outside the gate and sat on their outer cloaks, their arms around their knees, silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down, brooding, at a loss for words.
"Then Mettiya Bhikkhuni came along and said to them, 'I salute you, masters.' But when she had said this, they didn't respond. A second time...A third time she said, 'I salute you, masters.' And a third time they didn't respond.
"'Have I offended you, masters? Why don't you respond to me?'
"'Because you stand by doing nothing, sister, when Dabba Mallaputta treats us like dirt.'
"'What can I do?'
"'If you like, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba Mallaputta right this very day.'
"'What can I do? How could I do that?'
"'Come, sister. Go to where the Blessed One is and say this: "It is unfitting, Lord, and improper. The quarter without dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter with dread, with harm, with danger. Where there is calm, there is a windstorm. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta."'
"'As you say, masters.' (And she went to carry out their bidding.)"
This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya. After Mettiya Bhikkhuni made her charge, the Buddha convened a meeting of the Sangha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter, who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha then told the Sangha to expel Mettiya Bhikkhuni and returned to his quarters.
According to the Commentary, the expulsion of Mettiya Bhikkhuni was one of the controversial points in the split between the Mahayanist bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihara and the Theravadin bhikkhus of the Mahavihara in the old Sri Lankan capital of Anuradhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha's treatment of Mettiya Bhikkhuni and interpret this passage as a "monkish gloss," as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the entire Canon were not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka would never have volunteered the information that they had put her up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would never have come out. This would have led some people to remain secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta's guilt and -- because he was an arahant -- would have been for their long-term detriment.
At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Sangha in charge of judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to follow in order to ensure that their judgments would be accurate and fair. Because the Vibhanga and Commentary to this rule are based on this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with the special case -- unfounded charges -- covered by this rule.
Admonition. As the Buddha states in Sanghadisesa 12, one of the ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an offense, the responsibility is his to inform his fellow bhikkhus so that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may entail. Now of course, human nature being what it is, there are bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case the responsibility falls to the offender's fellow bhikkhus who know of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or -- if he is stubborn -- to make a formal charge in a meeting of the Community.
The pattern here is this: Before speaking to the bhikkhu, one must first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to Cv.IX.1-2, this means one knows:
1) One is pure in bodily conduct. 2) One is pure in verbal conduct. 3) One is motivated by kindness, not vengeance. 4) One is learned in the Dhamma. 5) One knows both Patimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the one for the bhikkhunis) in detail.
Furthermore, one determines that:
1) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time. 2) I will speak the truth and not untruths. 3) I will speak gently and not harshly. 4) I will speak what is connected with the goal and not what is unconnected with the goal. 5) I will speak out of kindness and not out of inner anger.
The Parivara (XV.5.3) adds that one should keep five qualities in mind: compassion, solicitude for the other's welfare, sympathy, desire to see him rehabilitated, and a desire to keep the Vinaya foremost.
If one feels that one is unqualified, yet believes that another bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends, one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this -- if the case involves a parajika or sanghadisesa offense -- is to violate Pacittiya 64, except in the extenuating circumstances discussed under that rule.
The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look for a proper time and place to talk with the other party -- e.g., when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset -- and then to ask his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: "Let the Ven. One give me leave. I want to speak with you." To accuse him of an offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkata (Mv.II.16.1).
As for the other party, the Buddha recommends that he should give leave only after assessing the person asking for leave, for it is possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds, simply to be abusive. (A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds -- i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to suspect anything to that effect -- incurs a dukkata (Mv.II.16.3).) The Parivara (XV.4.7) suggests that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:
1) is unconscientious, 2) is ignorant, 3) is not a bhikkhu in regular standing, 4) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or 5) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.
In another passage (XV.5.4), it suggests further that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:
1) is not pure in bodily conduct, 2) is not pure in verbal conduct, 3) is not pure in his livelihood, 4) is foolish, childish, and unintelligent, or 5) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when questioned.
If the bhikkhu, is not unqualified in any of these ways, though, one should willingly give him leave to speak. The Cullavagga (IX.5.7) says that, when being admonished or accused, one should keep two qualities in mind: truth, and lack of anger. The Patimokkha also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally: Sanghadisesa 12 for being difficult to admonish in general, Pacittiya 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being formally questioned, Pacittiya 54 for being disrespectful to one's accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and Pacittiya 71 for finding excuses for not listening to a particular training rule.
If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If they can't be settled informally, they should be taken to a meeting of the Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under the Aniyata and Adhikarana-Samatha rules, below.
Abuse of the system. As the origin story to this rule shows, it can easily be the case that a bhikkhu making a charge against another bhikkhu is acting out of a grudge and has simply made up the charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a parajika. Pacittiya 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has broken a less serious rule.
The full offense under this rule involves four factors:
1) //Object//: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.
2) //Perception//: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense one is charging him with.
3) //Intention//: One wants to see him expelled from the Sangha.
4) //Effort//: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that he is guilty of a parajika offense.
Object. The definition of this factor -- the other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained -- may sound strange, but it comes from the K/Commentary and is phrased that way with a reason: In normal cases the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a parajika offense that no one knows about; yet instead of disrobing, he acts as if he were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is. Yet even a "bhikkhu" of this sort would fulfill this factor as far as this rule is concerned.
For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu. Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this factor.
Perception. If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a parajika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or suspicion that the accused is //not// innocent entails no offense.
Intention. If, in making an unfounded charge of a parajika offense against another bhikkhu, one's purpose is to see him expelled from the Sangha, that fulfills this factor. If one's purpose is simply to insult him, one's actions would come under Pacittiya 2. If one's purpose is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs both a sanghadisesa and a pacittiya. If one has a strange sense of humor and is making the charge as some sort of joke, the penalty is either a pacittiya under Pacittiya 1 or a dubbhasita under Pacittiya 2: The texts are not clear on this point, but in either case this sort of thing is no joking matter.
According to the Vibhanga, "confessing one's anger" can simply mean admitting that one made the charge idly. Thus the amount of malice motivating one's desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled can be minimal indeed: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.
Effort. The act covered by this rule is that of making an unfounded charge of a parajika in the accused's presence. Whether one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the penalty is the same. If that "someone else" is a bhikkhu and knows the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty.
The Vibhanga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in the accused's behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion.
"Seeing" and "hearing," according to the Commentary, also include the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a parajika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly, this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing the charge is based on.
If there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g., saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in actuality one saw it indistinctly.
An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same time -- which could count as grounds for suspicion -- but one then accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can't be sure. Still, one firms up one's accusation by saying that one definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an unfounded charge.
The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a parajika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused is no longer a bhikkhu -- e.g., refusing to show him respect in line with his seniority -- that does not yet count as a charge.
The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed a virtual parajika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense here.
All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhanga are expressed directly to the accused -- "I saw you have sexual intercourse," "I heard you lay false claims to a superior human state" -- and the Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only when one makes the charge in the accused's presence, in line with the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded charge behind the accused's back, it states, incurs a dukkata.
Some people have objected to this point, saying that this gives a very light penalty for backhanded character assassination, but there is nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong here. Remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing him of having committed a parajika, he should be asked whether he has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn't, he should be told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he says that he doesn't feel qualified or that he fears the accused will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn't be listened to.
For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture -- e.g., pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the parajika -- does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too cowardly to take seriously.
The rule seems to require that the accused confess that he was acting out of anger, although the Vibhanga states that this means simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of a sanghadisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the charge.
The Commentary adds "result" as a further factor to the offense under this rule, saying that the accused must understand the charge in a reasonable amount of time -- but nothing in the Vibhanga supports this added factor.
Whether or not anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor here.
Non-offenses. If one understands the accused to be guilty of a parajika and accuses him accurately on the basis of what one has seen, heard, or suspected, then -- regardless of whether he is guilty or not -- one has not committed an offense. Even in a case such as this, though, one incurs a dukkata if one makes the charge without asking leave of the accused, and a pacittiya if one makes the charge so as to insult him.
Summary: Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.
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9.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, using as a mere ploy an aspect of an issue that pertains otherwise, charge a bhikkhu with a case involving defeat, (thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue pertains otherwise, an aspect used as a mere ploy, and the bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
"At that time the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, descending from Vulture Peak Mountain, saw a billy-goat copulating with a nanny-goat. Seeing them, they said, 'Look here, friends, let's name this billy-goat Dabba Mallaputta, and this nanny-goat Mettiya Bhikkhuni. Then we'll phrase it like this: "Before, my friends, we accused Dabba Mallaputta on the basis of what we had heard, but now we have seen him with our very own eyes fornicating with Mettiya Bhikkhuni!"'"
Some grudges die hard. This rule is almost identical with the preceding one and involves the same factors except for one of the sub-factors under "Effort": "Unfounded charge" here becomes "a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise." The phrase sounds strange, but the origin story gives a perfect example of what it means.
The precise difference between the two rules is this: With an unfounded charge, one has neither seen, heard, nor suspected that an offense has been committed; or if one has, one changes the status of the evidence -- e.g., one states something one has suspected as if one has heard it, or something one has heard as if one has seen it. In a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise, one has seen an offense being committed and one does not change the status of the evidence, but one distorts the facts of the case.
To summarize the Vibhanga, there are two basic ways in which this can be done:
1) X, who may or may not be a bhikkhu, has something in common with Bhikkhu Y -- they are both tall, short, dark, fair, have the same name, or whatever. One sees X committing an action that would amount to an offense and then, on the basis of the similarity between the two, claims that one has seen Bhikkhu Y committing a parajika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall. Late at night one sees X -- knowing that it is X -- stealing tools from the monastery storeroom. One has a grudge against Y and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, "I saw this big tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must have been you."
2) One sees Bhikkhu Y actually committing an offense. Although one perceives that it is a lesser offense, one magnifies the charge to a parajika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument with Bhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z goes unconscious, falls to the floor and suffers a severe concussion resulting in death. Since Y's intention was simply to hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pacittiya. If one realizes the nature of Y's intention and the fact that the penalty is a pacittiya, and yet accuses him of having committed a parajika, one would incur a sanghadisesa under this rule.
If one sees Y committing an action that one knows does not violate the rules, but that bears some resemblance to an offense, and then accuses him of having committed a parajika, it would not fit under this category. For instance, Y is teaching Vinaya to some new bhikkhus and quotes a few of the statements that would count as claims of superior human states. One overhears him and, although realizing the context, later accuses him of having violated Parajika 4. Since one knows that Y committed no offense, this would count as an unfounded charge and so would come under the preceding rule.
The other explanations here are exactly the same as those for the preceding rule, except that in the no-offense clauses the Vibhanga states that if one makes a charge against the accused based on what one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issue turns out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already given: One sees X stealing tools in the dark and, because of his resemblance to Y, actually thinks Y is the thief. One sees Y give a fatal blow to Z and actually thinks that Y's intention was to kill Z. In either of these cases, if one then accuses Y of a parajika offense, one incurs no penalty regardless of how the case comes out, although -- as in the preceding rule -- one should be careful to ask Y's leave before making the charge and to have no intention of insulting him.
Summary: Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.
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10.Should any bhikkhu agitate for a schism in a Community in concord, or should he persist in taking up an issue conducive to schism, the bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Do not, Ven. sir, agitate for a schism in a Community in concord or persist in taking up an issue conducive to schism. Let the venerable one be reconciled with the Community, for a Community in concord, on complimentary terms, free from dispute, having a common recitation, dwells in peace."
And should that bhikkhu, admonished thus by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
This rule dates from Devadatta's attempt to create a schism in the Sangha during the Buddha's life and is designed to help prevent such an attempt from ever happening again.
Disputes. Schisms arise from disputes over what the Buddha did and did not teach or, in the words of the Cullavagga, "when bhikkhus dispute, saying:
'It is Dhamma,' or 'It is not Dhamma;' 'It is Vinaya,' or 'It is not Vinaya;' 'It was spoken by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not spoken by the Tathagata;' 'It was regularly practiced by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not regularly practiced by the Tathagata;' 'It was formulated by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not formulated by the Tathagata;' 'It is an offense,' or 'It is not an offense;' 'It is a light offense,' or 'It is a heavy offense;' 'It is a curable offense,' or 'It is an incurable offense;' 'It is a serious offense,' or 'It is not a serious offense.'
Whatever strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing opinions, opposing opinions, heated words, abusiveness based on this, is an issue arising from disputes." (Cv.IV.14.2)
Thus not all disagreements on these matters are classed as issues. Friendly disagreements or differences of interpretation aren't; heated and abusive disagreements are.
The Buddha advises that a bhikkhu who wants to bring up such questions for discussion should first consider five points: 1) whether it is the right time for such a discussion; 2) whether it concerns something true; 3) whether it is connected with the goal; 4) whether he will be able to get on his side bhikkhus who value the Dhamma and Vinaya; and 5) whether the question will give rise to strife, quarreling, disputes, cracks, and splits in the Community. If the answer to the first four questions is yes, and to the fifth question no (i.e., it is the right time for the discussion, it concerns something true, it is connected with the goal, bhikkhus who value the Dhamma and Vinaya will be willing to join his side, and the discussion is not likely to lead to strife), he may go ahead and start the discussion. Otherwise, he should let the matter rest for the time being (Cv.IX.4).
The Cullavagga quotes the Buddha as saying that two sorts of mental states -- skillful and unskillful -- can turn disputes into issues. The unskillful states he lists are covetous, corrupt, or confused states of mind; the skillful ones are states of mind that are not covetous, corrupt, or confused. He adds, however, that six character traits can lead to issues arising from disputes that will tend toward the detriment of many people. They are when a bhikkhu --
is easily angered and bears ill will, is mean and spiteful, is jealous and possessive, is scheming and deceitful, has evil desires and wrong views, is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.
Such a bhikkhu, he says, lives without deference or respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, or the Sangha, and does not complete the training. If one should see any of these traits within oneself or others, one should strive for their abandonment. If there are no such traits present, one should make sure that they don't arise in the future (Cv.IV.14.3).
Not all disputes, even when prolonged, will lead to schism. An example is the dispute that led to the Second Council. Even though it was bitterly fought, there was never a point when either faction thought of splitting off and conducting communal business separately. In fact, even after the early Buddhists had formed into 18 separate schools, and the Mahayana movement added //its// schools of interpretation, Chinese visitors to India reported that bhikkhus belonging to the different schools of thought could be found living together harmoniously in the same monastery, performing communal business together in peace. (Many scholars have misunderstood this point, thinking that the various schools were schismatic, but in fact they weren't.)
Thus there are two sets of procedures to follow when a dispute becomes an issue: For a dispute in which none of the partisans is aiming at a schism, there are the procedures listed in Cv.IV.14.16-26. For one that is heading towards a schism (and //only// for one in which at least one side is aiming at schism, the Commentary implies and the Sub-commentary states explicitly), we have this rule and the following one.
Schism. The Cullavagga (VII.5.1), states that schism occurs when the leader of a schism puts the matter to a vote in a Community of at least nine bhikkhus with at least four on either side of the split. It further adds that all the bhikkhus involved must be bhikkhus of regular standing in communion with the group as a whole (i.e., they haven't been suspended from the Community), living in the same boundary.
If one or the other of these qualifications is lacking -- the issue goes to a vote in a Community of less than nine bhikkhus, one side or the other gets less than four adherents, or the bhikkhus involved are not on regular standing or do not belong to the same boundary -- the efforts at schism count as a crack (//raji//) in the Community, but not as a full split (//bheda//).
However, the Parivara (XV.10.9), drawing on material in A.X.35 & 37, lists five ways in which a schism can take place: discussion, announcement, vote, act, and recitation. The Commentary, trying to reconcile the Cullavagga and Parivara on this point, interprets the five ways as four steps in a single process (the last two ways counting as alternative forms of a single step):
1) //Discussion//. A bhikkhu aiming at schism begins a dispute over the Buddha's teachings, explaining Dhamma as not-Dhamma; not-Dhamma as Dhamma; Vinaya as not-Vinaya; not-Vinaya as Vinaya; what was not spoken by the Buddha as having been spoken by him; what was spoken by the Buddha as not; what was not regularly practiced by him as having been regularly practiced by him; what was regularly practiced by him as not; what was not formulated by him as having been formulated by him; what was formulated by him as not; an offense as a non-offense; a non-offense as an offense; a heavy offense as a light offense; a light offense as heavy; a curable offense as incurable; an incurable offense as curable; a serious offense as not serious; or a not-serious offense as serious.
2) //Announcement//. He announces that he is splitting off from the Community and asks other bhikkhus to take sides.
3) //Vote//. The issue goes to a vote in a Community of at least nine bhikkhus, with at least four on either side.
4) //Act or recitation//. The bhikkhus who side with the schismatic split from the others and recite the Patimokkha or perform other communal business separately.
According to the Commentary, the actual schism has not taken place until step 4, when the schismatic group conducts communal business or recites the Patimokkha separately. This is in accordance with A.X.35 but seems to conflict with the Cullavagga, so the Commentary explains that if the vote is taken in a split-off meeting of the Community, steps 3 and 4 happen simultaneously, and the schism has been accomplished. Otherwise, if the vote is taken outside of the boundary, the schism is not finalized until the split-off faction conducts communal business separately within the same boundary as the Community (Pv.VI.2 & XV.10.10).
We can notice from the way the Vibhanga and Commentary analyze the steps leading up to schism, that if a group of bhikkhus is living in a Community that does not adhere to the Buddha's teachings and they wish to leave the group so that they may more easily follow those teachings, they do not count as schismatics. However, they should be careful first to make sure that their views //are// genuinely in line with the Buddha's teachings and then conduct their departure in as amenable and unprovocative a manner as possible. In other words, instead of announcing a split, they should simply say that they want to go to a more congenial place to practice.
Schism is serious business -- one of the five most heinous crimes a person can commit. The other four are killing one's mother, killing one's father, killing an arahant, and maliciously causing a Buddha to shed blood. A bhikkhu who creates a schism is expelled and can never be readmitted into the Community during this lifetime (Mv.I.67). If he knows that his schism is against the Dhamma, then after death he will go immediately to Hell and be boiled there for an aeon. The same fate awaits those who join his schismatic group knowing that what he teaches is not the true Dhamma or Vinaya. Those, however, who follow him not knowing that his teaching is not the true Dhamma or Vinaya will not necessarily suffer that fate. If they realize their mistake and ask to be allowed back into the Community, they need only confess a thullaccaya and they are members of the Community in full standing as before (Cv.VII.4.4; Cv.VII.5.1-6).
Preventing a schism. The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu sees or hears of an attempt at a schism, it is his duty to reprimand the instigator three times, for the instigator, if he goes unreprimanded, may continue with his efforts as he likes without incurring a penalty. A bhikkhu who neglects this duty incurs a dukkata. The Commentary adds that this dukkata applies to every bhikkhu within a half-yojana (five-mile) radius who learns of the attempt at a schism; any bhikkhu outside that radius, even though he may not be subject to the penalty, should still regard it as his duty, if he is able, to go reprimand the instigator as well. (According to the Sub-commentary, any bhikkhu within the five-mile radius who is ill or otherwise unable to go reprimand the instigator is not subject to this penalty.) If the attempt takes place during the Rains Retreat, other bhikkhus are allowed to cut short their stay at other monasteries to help end the attempt (Mv.III.6-9).
If, after being reprimanded three times, the instigator abandons his efforts, he incurs no penalty and nothing further need be done.
If he is still recalcitrant, though, he incurs a dukkata; and the next step is to take him into the midst of a formal meeting of the Community (by force, if necessary, says the Commentary) and admonish him formally three more times. If he abandons his efforts before the end of the third admonition, well and good. If not, he incurs another dukkata. The next step is to recite a formal rebuke, by mandate of the Community, using the formula of one motion and three announcements given in the Vibhanga. If the instigator remains obstinate, he incurs an additional dukkata at the end of the motion, a thullaccaya at the end of each of the first two announcements, and the full sanghadisesa at the end of the third. Once he commits the full offense, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary stages are nullified.
Perception. The Vibhanga states that if the acts of admonition and rebuke are carried out properly -- i.e. the bhikkhu really is misstating the Buddha's teachings, is really aiming at a schism, and the various other formal requirements for a formal act are fulfilled -- then if he does not abandon his intention to agitate for a schism, he incurs the full sanghadisesa regardless of whether he perceives the act to be proper, improper, or doubtful. If the act is improperly carried out, then regardless of how he perceives its validity, he incurs a dukkata for not abandoning his intention (%).
The fact that the bhikkhu is not free from an offense in the latter case is important: There are several other, similar points in the Vinaya -- such as the Buddha's advice to the Dhamma-expert in the controversy at Kosambi (Mv.X.1.8) -- where for the sake of the harmony of the Community in cases that threaten to be divisive, the Buddha advises bhikkhus to abandon controversial behavior and to yield to the mandate of the Community even if it seems unjust.
Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses, in addition to the usual exemptions, state simply that there is no offense if the bhikkhu is not reprimanded or if he gives up his attempt at a schism.
Further steps. If the bhikkhu is truly stubborn, it is possible that he may continue in his efforts at a schism even after this sanghadisesa is imposed on him. However, the fact that the Community met to deal with his case should be enough to alert well-meaning bhikkhus that the schismatic is following a wrong course of action, and this should help unite the Community against his efforts. If they deem it necessary -- to keep the laity from being taken in by his arguments -- they may authorize one or more of their members to inform the lay community that the schismatic has committed this offense (see Pacittiya 9) and explain why. If the schismatic refuses to undergo the penalty or remains divisive, they may suspend him from the entire Sangha. If, unrepentant, he leaves to go elsewhere, they may send word to whatever Community he tries to join.
All of this shows one of the reasons why schism is regarded so seriously: As the Buddha states in the Discourse on Future Dangers (A.V.78), it is difficult to find time to practice when the Community is embroiled in controversy this way.
Summary: To persist in one's attempts at a schism, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
11.Should bhikkhus -- one, two, or three -- who are followers and partisans of that bhikkhu, say, "Do not, Ven. sirs, admonish that bhikkhu in any way. He is an exponent of the Dhamma, an exponent of the Vinaya. He acts with our consent and approval. He knows, he speaks for us, and that is pleasing to us," other bhikkhus are to admonish them thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sirs. That bhikkhu is not an exponent of the Dhamma and he is not an exponent of the Vinaya. Do not, Ven. sirs, approve of a schism in the Community. Let the venerable ones' (minds) be reconciled with the Community, for a Community in concord, on complimentary terms, without dispute, with a common recitation, dwells in peace."
And should those bhikkhus, thus admonished, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke them up to three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times by the bhikkhus they desist, that is good. If they do not desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
If the schismatic mentioned in the preceding rule begins to attract adherents, they are to be treated under this rule -- and quickly, before the schismatic gains a fourth adherent. The reasons are these:
1) One Community cannot impose a penalty on another Community (four or more bhikkhus) in any one formal act. (Mv.IX.2)
2) Penalties of this sort may be imposed only with the unanimous agreement of all the bhikkhus present in the meeting. If there is a fourth adherent present in the meeting, he can prevent the rebuke from being completed.
3) As the Sub-commentary points out, once a potential schismatic has gained four adherents, he has enough of a following to go through with his split.
The procedures for dealing with these partisans -- reprimanding them in private, admonishing and rebuking them in the midst of the Community -- are the same as in the preceding rule.
Summary: To persist in supporting a potential schismatic, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
12.In case a bhikkhu is by nature difficult to admonish -- who, when being legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus with reference to the training rules included in the (Patimokkha) recitation, makes himself unadmonishable (saying), "Do not, venerable ones, say anything to me, good or bad; and I will not say anything to the venerable ones, good or bad. Refrain, venerable ones, from admonishing me" -- the bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Let the venerable one not make himself unadmonishable. Let the venerable one make himself admonishable. Let the venerable one admonish the bhikkhus in accordance with what is right, and the bhikkhus will admonish the venerable one in accordance with what is right; for it is thus that the Blessed One's following is nurtured: through mutual admonition, through mutual rehabilitation."
And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to be rebuke him up to three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
If a bhikkhu breaks any of the rules of the Vinaya without undergoing the penalties they entail, or if he breaks them habitually even when undergoing the penalties, the other bhikkhus have the duty to admonish him, as explained under Sanghadisesa 8. If he shows disrespect while being admonished or refuses to mend his ways, he incurs a further penalty under Pacittiya 54. If his lack of respect while being admonished becomes habitual, he is to be treated under this rule.
The Commentary defines //difficult to admonish// as "impossible to speak to," and then further clarifies by saying that a bhikkhu difficult to admonish is one who cannot stand being criticized or who does not mend his ways after his faults are pointed out to him. It quotes from the Anumana Sutta (M.15) a list of traits, any one of which makes a bhikkhu difficult to admonish: He has evil desires; exalts himself and degrades others; is easily angered; because of this he harbors ill will, holds a grudge, utters angry words; accused, he throws a tantrum (literally, "explodes"); accused, he is insulting; accused, he returns the accusation; he evades back and forth; he does not respond; he is mean and spiteful; jealous and possessive; scheming and deceitful; stubborn and proud; attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.
A good number of these traits are exemplified by Ven. Channa -- according to tradition, the Buddha's horseman on the night of the great Going Forth -- in the origin story to this rule.
"Who do you think you are to admonish me? It is I who should admonish you! The Buddha is mine, the Dhamma is mine, it was by my young master that the Dhamma was realized. Just as a great blowing wind would gather up grass, sticks, leaves, and rubbish, or a mountain-born river would gather up water weeds and scum, so you, in going forth, have been gathered up from various names, various clans, various ancestries, various families. Who do you think you are to admonish me? It is I who should admonish you!"
The procedures to follow when a bhikkhu is difficult to admonish -- reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a formal meeting of the Community -- are the same as under Sanghadisesa 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu X is being difficult to admonish, incurs a dukkata if he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses are also the same as under that rule.
If the bhikkhu difficult to admonish carries on as before, even after incurring the full penalty under this rule, the Community may perform an act of banishment (//pabbajaniya-kamma//) against him for speaking in dispraise of the Community (Cv.I.13) or -- if he admits to performing acts that are offenses but refuses to see that they are offenses or to undergo the penalty -- the Community may exclude him from participating in the Patimokkha and Pavarana ceremonies (Mv.IV.16.2; Cv.IX.2) or suspend him from the entire Sangha. (Cv.I.26; Cv.I.31)
Summary: To persist in being difficult to admonish, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
13.In case a bhikkhu living in dependence on a certain village or town is a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct -- whose depraved conduct is both seen and heard about, and the families he has corrupted are both seen and heard about -- the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: "You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and heard about; the families you have corrupted are both seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough of your staying here."
And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, say about the bhikkhus, "The bhikkhus are prejudiced by favoritism, prejudiced by aversion, prejudiced by delusion, prejudiced by fear, in that for this sort of offense they banish some and do not banish others," the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sir. The bhikkhus are not prejudiced by favoritism, are not prejudiced by aversion, are not prejudiced by delusion, are not prejudiced by fear. You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough of your staying here."
And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.
A //corrupter of families// is a bhikkhu who -- behaving in a demeaning, frivolous, or subservient way -- succeeds in ingratiating himself to lay people to the point where they withdraw their support from bhikkhus who are earnest in the practice and give it to those who are more ingratiating instead. This is illustrated in the origin story of this rule, in which the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu (leaders of one faction of the group of six) had thoroughly corrupted the lay people at Kitagiri.
"Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, having finished his rains-residence among the people of Kasi and on his way to Savatthi to see the Blessed One, arrived at Kitagiri. Arising early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, he entered Kitagiri for alms: gracious in the way he approached and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and stretched out his arm; his eyes downcast, his every movement consummate. People seeing him said, 'Who is this weakest of weaklings, this dullest of dullards, this most snobbish of snobs? Who would go up and give him alms? Our masters, the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, are compliant, genial, pleasing in conversation. They are the first to smile, saying, "Come, you are welcome." //They// are not snobbish. They are approachable. They are the first to speak. It is to them that alms should be given.'"
The Vibhanga lists the ways of corrupting a family as giving gifts of flowers, fruit, etc., practicing medicine, and delivering messages -- although the Commentary qualifies this by saying there is no harm in delivering messages that have to do with religious activities, such as inviting bhikkhus to a meal or to deliver a sermon, or in conveying a lay person's respects to a senior bhikkhu.
//Depraved conduct// the Vibhanga defines merely as growing flowers and making them into garlands, but this, the Commentary says, is a shorthand reference to the long list of bad habits mentioned in the origin story, which includes such things as presenting garlands to women, eating from the same dish with them, sharing a blanket with them, eating at the wrong time, drinking intoxicants, wearing garlands, using perfumes and cosmetics, dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, playing games, performing stunts, learning archery, swordsmanship, and horsemanship; boxing and wrestling. Any one of these actions taken in isolation carries only a minor penalty -- a dukkata or a pacittiya -- but if indulged in habitually to the point where its bad influence becomes "seen and heard about," i.e., common knowledge, it can become grounds for his fellow bhikkhus to banish him from their particular Community until he mends his ways.
The Cullavagga, in a section that begins with the same origin story as the one for this rule (Cv.I.13-16), treats the act of banishment in full detail, saying that a Community of bhikkhus, if it sees fit, has the authority to perform an act of banishment against a bhikkhu with any of the following qualities:
1) He is a maker of strife, disputes, quarrels, and issues in the Community. 2) He is ignorant, inexperienced, and has many offenses for which he has not made amends. 3) He lives in unbecoming association with householders. 4) He is corrupt in his precepts, corrupt in his conduct, or corrupt in his views. 5) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha. 6) He is frivolous in word, deed, or both. 7) He misbehaves in word, deed, or both. 8) He is vindictive in word, deed, or both. 9) He practices wrong modes of livelihood.
This last category includes such practices as:
a) running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state, householders, etc. A modern example would be participating in political campaigns. b) scheming, talking, hinting, belittling others for the sake of material gain; pursuing gain with gain (giving items of small value in hopes of receiving items of larger value in return, making investments in hopes of profit, offering material incentives to those who make donations). (For a full discussion of these practices, see Ven. Nanamoli's translation of the Visuddhi Magga, //The Path of Purification//, pp. 24-30.) c) Practicing worldly arts, e.g., medicine, fortune telling, astrology, exorcism, reciting charms, casting spells, performing ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars, determining propitious sites, setting auspicious dates (for weddings, etc.), interpreting oracles, auguries, or dreams, or -- in the words of the Vibhanga to the Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 49 & 50 -- engaging in any art that is "external and unconnected with the goal." The Cullavagga (V.33.2) gives a dukkata for studying and teaching worldly arts or hedonist doctrines (//lokayata//). For extensive lists of worldly arts, see the Brahmajala and Samannaphala Suttas -- pp. 62-65 and pp. 35-38 in Ven. Bodhi's translations. For the connection between lokayata and hedonism (e.g., the Kama Sutra), see Warder, //Outline of Indian Philosophy//, pp. 38-39.
A bhikkhu banished for indulging in any of these activities is duty-bound to undergo the 18 observances listed in Cv.I.15 and to mend his ways so that the Community will revoke the act of banishment. The Commentary adds that a bhikkhu banished for corrupting families may not live in the monastery where he was misbehaving, nor enter the city or town where he was corrupting families, until after the banishment is revoked (this point is based on Cv.I.16.1). Also, even after the revoking of the banishment, he may never again accept gifts from the families he had corrupted. If they ask him why, he may tell them. If they then explain that they are giving the gifts not because of his former behavior but because he has now mended his ways, he may then accept it.
If a bhikkhu, instead of mending his ways after being banished, criticizes the act of banishment or those who performed it, he is subject to this rule. The procedure to follow in dealing with him -- reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a formal meeting of the Community -- is the same as under Sanghadisesa 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu X is criticizing his act of banishment, incurs a dukkata if he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses are also the same as under that rule.
Summary: To persist -- after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing an act of banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.
* * *
A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these thirteen sanghadisesa offenses is duty-bound to inform a fellow bhikkhu and to ask a Community of at least four bhikkhus to impose a six-day period of penance (//manatta//) on him. (The Canon says, literally, a six-night period: At the time of the Buddha, the lunar calendar was in use and, just as we using the solar calendar count the passage of days, they counted the passage of nights; a 24-hour period, which is a day for us, would be a night for them, as in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta (M.131), where the Buddha explicitly says that a person who spends a day and night in earnest practice has had an "auspicious night.")
Penance. Penance does not begin immediately, but only at the convenience of the Community giving it. During his period of penance, the offender is partially stripped of seniority and must observe a number of restrictions -- 94 in all (Cv.II.5-6). The four most important are:
1) He must not live under the same roof as a full-fledged bhikkhu.
2) He must live in a monastery with at least four full-fledged bhikkhus.
3) He may not go anywhere outside the monastery unless accompanied by four full-fledged bhikkhus.
4) Every day he must inform all the bhikkhus in the monastery of the fact that he is observing penance and the precise offense for which the penance was imposed. If visiting bhikkhus come to the monastery, he must inform them as well; if he goes to another monastery, he must inform all the bhikkhus there, too.
If, on any day of his penance, the bhikkhu neglects to observe any of these four restrictions, that day does not count toward the total of six. In addition, he incurs a dukkata each time he fails to observe any of the 94 restrictions.
Once the bhikkhu has completed his penance, he may ask a Community of at least 20 bhikkhus to give him rehabilitation. Once rehabilitated, he returns to his previous state as a full-fledged bhikkhu in good standing.
Probation. If a bhikkhu who commits a sanghadisesa offense conceals it from his fellow bhikkhus past dawn of the day following the offense, he must observe an additional period of probation (//parivasa//) for the same number of days as he concealed the offense. Only after he has completed his probation may he then ask for the six-day period of penance.
The Commentary sets the factors of concealment at ten, which may be arranged in five pairs as follows:
1) He has committed a sanghadisesa offense and perceives it as a sanghadisesa offense.
2) He has not been suspended and perceives that he has not been suspended. (If a bhikkhu has been suspended, no other bhikkhus will speak with him, and thus he cannot tell them until after his suspension has been lifted.)
3) There are no obstacles (e.g., a flood, a forest fire, dangerous animals) and he perceives that there are none.
4) He is able to inform another bhikkhu (i.e., a fellow bhikkhu suitable to be informed lives in a place that may be reached in that day, one is not too weak or ill to go, etc.) and he perceives that he is able. //A bhikkhu suitable to be informed// means a one who is --
a) in good standing (e.g., not undergoing penance or probation himself) and b) not on unfriendly terms with the offender.
5) He (the offender) desires to conceal the offense and so conceals it.
If any of these factors are lacking, there is no penalty for not informing another bhikkhu that day. For instance, the following cases do //not// count as concealment:
A bhikkhu is not sure whether or not the action he has done qualifies as a sanghadisesa and so waits until he can consult with a knowledgeable bhikkhu before informing anyone else.
A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest and commits a sanghadisesa in the middle of the night. Afraid of the snakes or other wild animals he might encounter in the dark, he waits until daylight before going to inform a fellow bhikkhu.
A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest, but the only other bhikkhu within one day's traveling time is a personal enemy who, if he is informed, will use this as an opportunity to smear the offender's name, so the offender travels another day or two before reaching a friendly bhikkhu whom he informs.
Once all of the first eight factors are complete, though, one must inform another bhikkhu before dawn of the next day or else incur a dukkata and undergo the penalty for concealment.
A bhikkhu who commits a slighter offense that he thinks is a sanghadisesa and then conceals it, incurs a dukkata (Cv.III.34.1).
The restrictions for a bhikkhu undergoing probation are similar to those for one undergoing penance and are discussed in detail at Cv.II.1.
Sanghadisesas are classified as heavy offenses (//garukapatti//), both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are burdensome by design, not only for the offender but also for the Community of bhikkhus in which he lives -- a fact intended to act as added deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress.
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CHAPTER
SIX
Aniyata
This term means undetermined or uncertain. The rules in this section do not determine fixed penalties, but instead give procedures by which the Community may pass judgment when a bhikkhu in uncertain circumstances is accused of having committed an offense. There are two training rules here.
1. Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman in a seat secluded enough to lend itself (to the sexual act), so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen (them), might describe it as constituting any of three cases -- involving either defeat, communal meetings, or confession -- then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat (there), may be dealt with for any of the three cases -- involving defeat, communal meetings, or confession -- or he may be dealt with for whichever case the female lay follower described. This case is undetermined.
//Woman// here means a female human being, "even one born that very day, all the more an older one." //To sit// also includes lying down. Whether the bhikkhu sits near the woman when she is already seated, or the woman sits near him when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference here.
//Private// means private to the eye and private to the ear. Two people sitting in a place private to the eye means that no one else can see if they wink, raise their eyebrows, or nod. If they are in a place private to the ear, no one else can hear what they say in an normal voice. A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door, a large bush, or anything at all that would afford them enough privacy to commit the sexual act.
For a bhikkhu to sit in such a place with a woman can be in itself a breach of Pacittiya 44 (see the explanations for that rule) and affords the opportunity for breaking Parajika 1 and Sanghadisesas 1, 2, 3, & 4 as well -- which is why this case is called uncertain or undetermined.
If a trustworthy female lay follower happens to see a bhikkhu with a woman in such circumstances, she may inform the Community and charge him on the basis of what she has seen. //Female lay follower// here means one who has taken refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha. //Trustworthy// means that she is at least a Stream-winner. Even if she is not a Stream-winner, the Community may chose to investigate the case anyway; but if she is, they have to. The texts do not discuss cases in which a man is making the charge but, given the low legal status of women in the Buddha's time, it seems reasonable to infer that if a woman's word was given such weight, the same would hold true for a man's. In other words, if he is a Stream-winner, the Community has to investigate the case. If he isn't, they are free to handle the case or not, as they see fit.
The wording of the rule suggests that once the matter is investigated and the bhikkhu in question has stated his side of the story, the bhikkhus are free to judge the case either in line with what he admits to having done or in line with the trustworthy female lay follower's charge. In other words, if his admission and her charge are at variance, they may decide which side seems to be telling the truth and impose a penalty -- or no penalty -- on the bhikkhu as they see fit.
The Vibhanga, however, says that they may deal with him only in line with what he admits to having done. The Commentary offers no explanations for this point aside from saying that in uncertain cases things are not always as they seem, citing as example the story of an arahant who was wrongly charged by another bhikkhu of having broken Pacittiya 44.
Actually, the Vibhanga in departing from the wording of the rule is simply following the general guideline the Khandhakas give for handling accusations. Apparently what happened was that this rule and the following one were formulated early on. Later, when the general guidelines were first worked out, some group-of-six bhikkhus abused the system to impose penalties on innocent bhikkhus they didn't like (Mv.IX.3.1), so the Buddha formulated a number of checks to prevent the system from working against the innocent. We will cover the guidelines in detail under the Adhikarana-Samatha rules, but here we may note a few of their more important features.
As explained under Sanghadisesa 8, if Bhikkhu X is charged with an offense, the bhikkhus who learn of the charge are duty-bound to question him first in private. If he admits to the charge, agrees that it is an offense, and then undergoes the penalty, nothing further need be done (Mv.IX.5.6). If he admits that he did the act, but refuses to see that it is an offense and/or refuses to undergo the penalty, then if the act really did constitute an offense, the Community may meet and suspend him (Mv.IX.5.8; Cv.I.26). The Khandhakas (Mv.IX.1.3 and Cv.XI.1.10) show that "not seeing an offense" does //not// mean that one denies doing the act; simply that one does not agree that the act was against any of the rules.
If, however, X denies the charge, and yet some of the members of the Community suspect him of not telling the truth, the issue has to go to a formal meeting. Once the case reaches this stage, one of only three verdicts is possible: that the accused is innocent, that he was insane at the time he committed the offense (and so absolved of guilt), or that he is not only guilty as charged but also guilty of "further misconduct" in having dragged out his confession to this point (Cv.IV.14.27-29). If the last verdict is the true one, then the bhikkhu must not only undergo the penalty for the offense but also be penalized with an act of further misconduct, which is the same as an act of censure. (Cv.IV.11-12)
When the Community meets, both the accused and the accuser must be present, and both must agree to the case's being heard by that particular group. (If the original accuser is a lay person, one of the bhikkhus is to take up the charge.) The accused is then asked to state his version of the story and is to be dealt with in accordance with what he admits to having done (Mv.IX.6.1-4). The Cullavagga (IV.14.29) shows that the other bhikkhus are not to take his first statement at face value. They should press and cross-examine him until they are all satisfied that he is telling the truth, and only then may they pass one of the three verdicts mentioned above.
If necessary, they should be prepared to spend many hours in the meeting to arrive at a unanimous decision, for if they cannot come to a unanimous agreement, the case has to be left as unsettled, which is a very bad question mark to leave in the communal life. The Commentary to Sanghadisesa 8 suggests that if one side or the other seems unreasonably stubborn, the senior bhikkhus present should lead the group in long periods of chanting to wear down the stubborn side.
If a verdict is reached but later discovered to be wrong -- the accused got away with a plea of innocence when actually guilty, or admitted to being guilty simply to end the interrogation when actually innocent -- the Community may reopen the case and reach a new verdict (Cv.IV.4.11; Cv.IV.8). If a bhikkhu learns that a fellow bhikkhu actually was guilty and yet got away with a verdict of innocence, and he then helps conceal the truth, he is guilty of an offense under Pacittiya 64.
Obviously, the main thrust of these guidelines is to prevent an innocent bhikkhu from being unfairly penalized. As for the opposite case -- a guilty bhikkhu getting away with no penalty -- we should remember that the laws of kamma guarantee that in the long run he is not getting away with anything at all.
Although these guidelines supercede both Aniyata rules, the rules still serve two important functions:
1) They remind the bhikkhus that charges made by lay people are not to be lightly ignored, and that the Buddha at one point was willing to let the bhikkhus give more weight to the word of a female lay follower than to that of the accused bhikkhu. This in itself, considering the general position of women in Indian society at the time, is remarkable.
2) As we will see under Pacittiya 44, it is possible under some circumstances -- depending on the bhikkhu's state of mind -- to sit alone with a woman in a secluded place without incurring a penalty. Still, a bhikkhu should not blithely take advantage of the exemptions under that rule, for even if his motives are pure, it doesn't look good to anyone who may come along and see him there. These rules serve to remind such a bhikkhu that he could easily be subject to a charge that would lead to a formal meeting of the Community. Even if he were to be declared innocent, the meeting would waste a great deal of time both for himself and for the Community. And in some people's minds -- given the Vibhanga's general rule that he is innocent until proven guilty -- there would remain the belief that he was actually guilty and got off with no penalty simply from lack of hard evidence. A bhikkhu would be wise to avoid such situations altogether, remembering what Lady Visakha told Ven. Udayin in the origin story to this rule:
"It is unfitting, sir, and improper, for the master to sit in private, alone with a woman....Even though the master may not be aiming at that act, it is difficult to convince those who are unbelievers."
Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika, sanghadisesa, or pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.
* * *
2.In case a seat is not sufficiently secluded to lend itself (to the sexual act) but sufficiently so to address lewd words to a woman, should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman in such a seat, so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen them, would describe it as constituting either of two cases -- involving communal meetings or confession -- then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat (there), is to be dealt with for either of the two cases -- involving communal meetings or confession -- or he is to be dealt with for whichever case the female lay follower described. This case too is undetermined.
This rule differs from the preceding one mainly in the type of seat it describes -- private to the eye and private to the ear, but not secluded. Examples would be an open-air meeting hall or a place out in the open far enough away from other people so that they could not see one wink, etc., or hear what one is saying in a normal voice. Such a place, although inconvenient for committing Parajika 1, Sanghadisesas 1 & 2, or Pacittiya 44, would be convenient for committing Sanghadisesas 3 & 4 or Pacittiya 45. As a result, the term //woman// under this rule is defined as under those rules: one experienced enough to know what is and is not lewd.
Otherwise, all explanations for this rule are the same as under the preceding rule.
Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a sanghadisesa or pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.
* * * * * * * *
CHAPTER
SEVEN
Nissaggiya Pacittiya ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The term //nissaggiya//, used in connection with training rules, means "entailing forfeiture." Used in connection with articles, it means "to be forfeited." //Pacittiya// is a word of uncertain etymology. The Parivara gives a didactic derivation -- that it means letting skillful qualities fall away (//patati//) with a deluded mind (//citta//) -- but the term is more likely related to the verb //pacinati// (pp. //pacita//), which means to discern, distinguish or know.
Each of the rules in this category involves an object that a bhikkhu has acquired or used wrongly, and that he must forfeit before he may "make the offense known" -- confess it -- to a fellow bhikkhu or group of bhikkhus. Once he has made his confession, he is absolved from the offense. In most cases, the forfeiture is symbolic -- after his confession, he receives the article in return -- although three of the rules require that the offender give up the article for good.
There are thirty rules in this category, divided into three chapters (//vagga//) of ten rules each.
Part One: The Robe-cloth Chapter ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the frame is destroyed (his kathina privileges are in abeyance), he is to keep an extra robe-cloth ten days at most. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The origin story for this rule is retold with more detail in the Mahavagga (VIII.13.4-8). Since the added details are what make it interesting, that is the version translated here.
"(The Buddha addresses the bhikkhus:) 'As I was on the road from Rajagaha to Vesali, I saw many bhikkhus coming along buried in robe-cloth, with a mattress of robe-cloth on their heads and a mattress of robe-cloth on their backs, and a mattress of robe-cloth on their hips. Seeing them, I thought, "All too soon have these foolish men come under the spell of luxury in terms of robe-cloth. What if I were to set a boundary, to lay down a restriction on robe-cloth for the bhikkhus."
"'Then traveling by stages, I came to Vesali. There I stayed at the Gotamaka Shrine. Now at that time, during the cold winter middle-eight nights (the four nights on either side of the full moon in February, the coldest time of the year in India) when snow was falling, I sat outside wearing one robe and was not cold. Towards the end of the first watch I became cold. I put on a second robe and was not cold. Towards the end of the middle watch I became cold. I put on a third robe and was not cold. Towards the end of the final watch, as dawn arose and the night smiled, I became cold. I put on a fourth robe and was not cold. The thought occurred to me, "Those in this doctrine and discipline who are sons of respectable families -- sensitive to cold and afraid of the cold -- even they are able to get by with three robes. Suppose I were to set a boundary, to lay down a restriction on robes for the bhikkhus and were to allow three robes." Bhikkhus, I allow you three robes: a double-layer outer robe, a single-layer upper robe and a single-layer inner robe (thus, four layers of cloth).'
"Now at that time, some group-of-six bhikkhus, thinking, 'The Blessed One allows three robes,' entered the village wearing one set of robes, stayed in the monastery wearing another set, and went down to bathe in still another. Modest bhikkhus... were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can the group of six bhikkhus keep extra robe-cloth?' They told this matter to the Blessed One. He...addressed the bhikkhus, saying, 'Bhikkhus, an extra robe-cloth is not to be kept.'
"Now at that time an extra robe-cloth accrued to Ven. Ananda, and he wanted to give it to Ven. Sariputta, but Ven. Sariputta was at Saketa. He thought, '...Now what should I do?' He told this matter to the Blessed One, who said, 'But how long is it, Ananda, before Sariputta will come here?'
"'Nine or ten days.'
"Then the Blessed One...addressed the bhikkhus, 'I allow an extra robe-cloth to be kept at most ten days.'
"Now at that time an extra robe accrued to the bhikkhus. They thought, 'Now what should we do?' They told this matter to the Blessed One, who said, 'I allow you, bhikkhus, to place an extra robe-cloth under dual ownership.'"
The offense under this rule involves two factors:
1) //Object//: a piece of extra robe-cloth, i.e., a piece of cloth suitable to be made into a robe or other cloth requisite, measuring at least four by eight inches (fingerbreadths), that has not been formally determined for use or placed under dual ownership. This category includes finished requisites as well as simple pieces of cloth, but does not include robe-cloth belonging to the Community.
2) //Effort//: One keeps it for more than ten days (except during the allowed period) without determining it for use, placing it under dual ownership, abandoning it (giving or throwing it away); or without the cloth's being lost, destroyed, burnt, stolen or taken by someone else on trust within that time.
Object. According to the Mahavagga (VIII.3.1), six kinds of cloth are suitable for making into cloth requisites: linen, cotton, silk, wool, hemp or canvas (any of the five preceding types mixed with jute). By extension, nylon, rayon and other synthetic fibers would count as suitable as well. Unsuitable materials -- such as cloth made of hair, horse-hair, grass, bark, wood-shavings or antelope hide (and by extension, leather) -- do not come under this rule. (For a full list of unsuitable materials, see Mv.VIII.28.) Mv.VIII.29 gives a list of colors -- such as black, blue and crimson -- and patterns that are not suitable for robes but that, according to the Commentary, are suitable for things like handkerchiefs and bed sheets. Pieces of cloth dyed these colors or printed with these patterns //would// come under this rule.
If a bhikkhu receives a piece of suitable cloth measuring four by eight fingerbreadths or more but does not yet plan to use it, he may place it under dual ownership (//vikappana//) until he has need for it. Once he decides to make use of the cloth, he must rescind the dual ownership (see Pacittiya 59) before making it into a finished requisite (if it isn't already). Once it is finished, he may then determine it for use (//adhitthana//) or place it under dual ownership again, depending on the nature of the article:
Each of the three basic robes, handkerchiefs, bed sheets and the sitting cloth are to be determined, and may not be placed under dual ownership.
//A rains-bathing cloth// (see NP 24) may be determined for the four months of the rainy season, and is to be placed under dual ownership for the remainder of the year.
//A skin-eruption cloth// (see Pacittiya 90) may be determined when needed and is to be placed under dual ownership when not.
//Other items of cloth// may be determined as "accessory cloths."
(The procedures for determining and placing under dual ownership are given in Appendices IV & V.)
Any cloth made of any of the suitable materials and of the requisite size counts as an extra cloth if --
it has not been determined for use or put under dual ownership, it has been improperly determined or placed under dual ownership, or its determination or dual ownership has lapsed.
Many of the cases in which determination and dual ownership lapse also exempt the cloth from this rule: e.g., the owner disrobes or dies, he gives the cloth away, it gets stolen, destroyed (bitten by things such as termites, says the Commentary), burnt, lost, or someone else takes it on trust. There are a few cases, however, where determination and dual ownership lapse and the cloth //does// fall under this rule. They are --
//Under dual ownership//: The first owner takes the cloth on trust; or the second owner formally rescinds the dual ownership.
//Under determination//: The owner rescinds the determination; or (if the cloth has been determined as one of the three basic robes) the cloth develops a hole. This latter case comes in the Commentary, which gives precise standards for deciding what kind of hole does and does not make the determination of the robe lapse:
1) //Size//. The hole has to be a full break (through both layers of cloth, if in the outer robe) at least the size of the nail on one's little finger. If one or more threads remains across the hole, then the hole makes the determination lapse only if either of the two "halves" divided by the thread(s) is the requisite size.
2) //Location//. On an upper robe or outer robe, the hole has to be at least one span (25 cm.) from the longer side and eight fingerbreadths from the shorter; on an under robe, at least one span from the longer side and four fingerbreadths from the shorter. Any hole closer to the edge of the robe than these measurements does not make the determination lapse.
Because of these stipulations, the Commentary notes that if one is patching a worn spot -- not a hole as defined above -- the requisite distance away from the edge of one's robe, the determination lapses if one cuts out the worn spot before applying the patch, but not if one applies the patch before cutting out the worn spot. If the determination lapses, it is an easy matter to redetermine the robe, but one must be mindful to do it within the time span allotted by this rule.
Effort. According to the Vibhanga, if one keeps a piece of extra robe-cloth past the eleventh dawn (except when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect), one commits the full offense under this rule. The Commentary explains this by saying that the dawn of the day on which one receives the cloth, or lets its determination/dual ownership lapse, counts as the first dawn. Thus the eleventh dawn would actually be the tenth dawn after one receives, etc., the cloth. (The precise definition of dawn is a controversial point. See Appendix I.)
Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one miscounts the days, or perceives a robe to be determined when it actually is not, one is not immune from the offense: The robe is to be forfeited and the offense confessed.
To use such a robe or piece of robe-cloth before one has forfeited it and confessed the offense, entails a dukkata. This point holds for each of the nissaggiya pacittiya rules.
End-of-vassa & kathina privileges. The fourth lunar month of the rainy season -- beginning the day after the first full moon in October and lasting to dawn of the day following the next full moon -- is termed the robe season, a period traditionally given over to robe-making. In the early days, when most bhikkhus spent the cold and hot seasons wandering, and stayed put in one place only during the Rains, this would have been the ideal period to prepare robes for their wandering, and would have been the ideal time for lay people who had come to know the bhikkhus during the Rains to show their gratitude and respect for them by presenting them with gifts of cloth for this purpose.
During this robe season, six of the training rules -- NP 1, 2, & 3; Pacittiyas 32, 33, & 46 -- are relaxed as a privilege for bhikkhus who have observed the three-month rains residence (//vassa//), to make it more convenient for them to make robes. Also, any cloth accruing to a particular monastery during this period may be shared only among the bhikkhus who spent the Rains there, and not with any incoming visitors.
If the bhikkhus who have spent the Rains in a particular monastery number five or more, they are also entitled to participate in a //kathina// ceremony in which they receive a gift of cloth from lay people, bestow it on one of their members, and then as a group make it into a robe before dawn of the following day. (//Kathina// means frame, and refers to the frame over which the robe-cloth is stretched, much like the frame used in America to make a quilt.) After participating in this ceremony, the bhikkhus may take advantage of the above-mentioned privileges for an additional four lunar months, up to the dawn after the full-moon day that ends the cold season in late February or early-to-mid March (called Phagguna in Pali). However, a bhikkhu's kathina privileges may be rescinded earlier than that for either of two reasons:
1) He participates in a meeting in which all the bhikkhus in the monastery, as a formal act of the Community, voluntarily relinquish their kathina privileges. (This act is discussed under Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 30 -- see BD, vol. III, p. 302.)
2) He comes to the end both of his commitment to the monastery (//avasa-palibodha//) and of his commitment to making a robe (//civara-palibodha//). (See Mv.VII.1.7; Mv.VII.2 & Pv.XIV.6.)
a) Commitment to the monastery ends when either of the following things happen:
-- One leaves the monastery without intending to return before the four lunar months are up. -- One has left the monastery, planning to return, but learns that the bhikkhus in the monastery have formally decided to relinquish their kathina privileges.
b) Commitment to making a robe ends when any of the following occur:
-- One finishes making a robe. -- One decides not to make a robe, -- One's robe-cloth gets lost. -- One expects to obtain robe-cloth, but doesn't obtain it as expected.
Only if Point 1 happens, or //both// Points 2a and 2b happen, do one's kathina privileges lapse before the dawn after the full moon day marking the end of the cold season.
During the period in which one's end-of-vassa privileges or kathina privileges are in effect, one may keep an extra piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without committing an offense under this rule. Once these privileges lapse, though, one must determine the cloth, place it under dual ownership, or abandon it within ten days. If one fails to do so by the 'eleventh dawn' after the privileges lapse, the cloth is to be forfeited and the offense confessed.
Forfeiture & confession. To be absolved of the offense under this rule, one must first forfeit the robe-cloth kept over ten days, and then confess the offense. This may be done in the presence of one other bhikkhu, a group of two or three, or a Community of four or more. After confessing the offense, one receives the robe-cloth in return. This is the pattern followed under all the nissaggiya pacittiya rules, except for the few in which forfeiture and confession must be done in the presence of a full Community, and in which the article may not be returned to the offender. (We will note these rules as we come to them.)
The Pali formulae to use in forfeiture, confession and return of the article for this and all the following rules are given in Appendix VI. We should note, though, that according to the Commentary one may conduct these procedures in any language at all.
In this and every other rule under which the article may be returned to the offender, it //must// be returned to him. According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who receives the article being forfeited without returning it incurs a dukkata. The Commentary qualifies this by saying that this penalty applies only to the bhikkhu who assumes that, in receiving an article being forfeited in this way, it is his to take as he likes. For the bhikkhu who knows that it is not his to take -- and this includes every bhikkhu who has read this passage and remembered it -- the offense is to be treated under Parajika 2, and the penalty determined by the value of the article. Viewed in this light, the act of accepting the forfeited article is like accepting an object placed in trust.
A bhikkhu who has received the robe-cloth in return after forfeiting it and confessing the offense may use it again without penalty, unless he keeps it as a piece of extra robe-cloth for more than an additional ten days.
Non-offenses. Aside from extra robe-cloth kept more than ten days while one's end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect, the Vibhanga says that there is no offense if within ten days the cloth is determined, placed under dual ownership, lost, stolen, destroyed, burnt, taken by someone else on trust, thrown away, or given away.
In connection with this last point, the Commentary discusses proper and improper ways of giving things away. The article counts as having been properly given if one says, "I give this to you," or "I give this to so-and-so" or "Take this, it's yours," but not if one says things like, "Make this yours," or "May this be yours." Apparently, if one simply hands the article over without saying anything to show that one is transferring ownership, it again does not count. As we noted above, perception is not a mitigating factor under this rule. If one gives extra robe-cloth away in an improper manner, then even though one may assume that the cloth has been given away, it still counts as one's own extra robe-cloth under this rule.
Current practice. As the origin story shows, the purpose of this rule was to prevent bhikkhus from having more than one set of the three robes at any one time. With the passage of time, though, gifts of cloth to the Community became more numerous, and the need for stringency in this matter became less and less felt. Exactly when spare robes became accepted is not recorded, although the passage on a student's duties to his preceptor (Mv.I.25.9) shows that the practice of having a spare lower robe was already current when that part of the Canon was compiled (see Appendix VIII). Mv.VII.1 also makes mention of a group of forest dwelling monks who were "wearers of the three robes," as if this were a special distinguishing characteristic. The Parivara (V.5) mentions the practice of using only one set of three robes as special, and the Visuddhi Magga (5th century A.D.) classes this practice as one of the thirteen optional //dhutanga// (ascetic) practices.
As we will see below, Pacittiya 92 suggests that in the early days the under, upper, and outer robes were all nearly the same size, so there would have been no difficulties in washing one robe and using the other two while the first one dried. Later, when the compilers of the ancient commentaries greatly enlarged the size of the upper and outer robes after deciding that the Buddha was much larger than an ordinary human being, getting by with just one set of three robes became less convenient. Thus many teachers at present suggest that even a frugal bhikkhu, when staying in monasteries, should use one spare under robe or a spare under and upper robe -- so that he will have no trouble keeping his robes clean and presenting an acceptable appearance at all times -- and save the three-robe dhutanga practice for periods when alone in the wilderness.
At any rate, since only one set of three robes may be determined as such, spare robes -- once they became generally accepted -- were determined as "accessory cloths." This point may be inferred from the Commentary's explanation of this rule, and the Sub-commentary's explanation of NP 7. The Commen-tary even contains a discussion of the views of various elders as to whether or not a bhikkhu who wishes to avoid the special rules surrounding the use of the three robes (such as the following rule) may determine his basic set as accessory cloths as well. The majority opinion -- with only one dissenting voice -- was yes, although at present many Communities do not agree with this opinion.
The Sub-commentary suggests an alternative way of dealing with spare robes: placing them under dual ownership and -- since none of the three robes may be placed under dual ownership -- calling them simply "cloth" (//civara//). This, however, plays havoc with Pacittiya 59, and the general use of the idea of dual ownership in the Canon, as a way of keeping cloth that one is not yet using.
Still, both methods of dealing with spare robes -- determining them as "accessory cloths" and placing them under dual ownership as "cloths" -- are in practice at present. And since spare robes have been accepted, the current effect of this rule is mainly to deter a bhikkhu from hoarding up robe-cloth in secret and from letting a hole in any of his basic set of three robes go unmended for more than ten days. Nevertheless, the spirit of the rule makes it incumbent on each bhikkhu to keep his cloth requisites to a minimum.
Summary: Keeping a piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under dual ownership -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
2.When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the frame is destroyed (his kathina privileges are in abeyance): If he dwells apart from (any of) his three robes even for one night -- unless authorized by the bhikkhus -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
In the origin story here, a number of bhikkhus went off on tour, leaving their outer robes with their friends at the monastery. Eventually the robes became moldy, and the bhikkhus at the monastery were burdened with having to sun them to get rid of the mold. The Buddha thus formulated this rule so that bhikkhus would be responsible for looking after their own robes.
The offense here consists of two factors: object and effort.
Object: any one of the robes that a bhikkhu has determined as his basic set of three -- the //antaravasaka// (under robe), //uttarasanga// (upper robe) and //sanghati// (outer robe). This rule thus does not apply to spare robes or other cloth requisites.
Effort: greeting dawn at a place outside of the zone in which any of ones robes are located, except when the exemptions mentioned in the rule are in effect.
//Dawn// is a concept that would seem intuitive enough, but the lack of a definition for the term in the Vibhanga has given rise to a variety of later interpretations. The Khuddasikkha -- a Vinaya manual written by Ven. Dhammasiri, a Sri Lankan, in the 11th or 12th century -- states that the sky lightens in four stages before sunrise: a slight reddening 2 hours before sunrise; a slight whitening 1/2 hour later; a second reddening 48 minutes before sunrise; and a second whitening 24 minutes after that. Burmese, Sri Lankan, and some Thai bhikkhus tend to follow this analysis, and differ among themselves only as to which of the four stages constitutes dawn, most of them favoring the first reddening. Other Thai bhikkhus ignore the Khuddasikkha entirely, and say that dawn occurs in the half hour before the point when, by natural light, one can see the lines in one's hand while holding it out at arm's length.
Appendix I discusses a passage from the Canon -- M. 66 -- that suggests that the first reddening and whitening is probably not the dawn meant by the Vibhanga, but as with many other controversial points of this sort, the wise policy is usually to adhere to the traditions of one's Community.
//Zones//. This is the most complex facet of this rule. The zone where a bhikkhu must be at dawn depends on the type of location where his robes are placed, whether or not the property around the location is enclosed (with a wall, a fence, or a body of water such as a moat, river, or lake, says the Sub-commentary) and -- if it is enclosed -- whether it belongs to one or more than one //kula//.
The term //kula// has different meanings for the different types of locations. According to the Commentary, a village, town or city is one-kula if ruled by a single ruler, and multi-kula if ruled by a council -- as in the case of Vesali and Kusinara during the time of the Buddha. At present, cities or towns governed under a social contract -- such as a town charter -- would count as multi-kula regardless of whether the highest authority in the government is invested in a single individual or not.
A building, a vehicle or a piece of land is one-kula if it belongs to one family, and multi-kula if it belongs to more than one (as in an apartment house).
According to the Sub-commentary, a monastery is one-kula if the people who initiated it belong to one kula -- of either type, apparently -- and multi-kula if they belong to several.
What follows is a synopsis of the specific places listed in the Vibhanga, together with explanations from the commentaries:
1. //A village, town, or city//:
a. Enclosed and one-kula: If the robes are in the enclosure, one may greet dawn anywhere in the enclosure.
b. Enclosed and multi-kula: If the robes are in a house, greet dawn anywhere in the house, in the public meeting hall, at the town gate, or one //hatthapasa// (1.25 meters) around any of these places (%). If the robes are in the public meeting hall or in the area one hatthapasa around it, greet dawn in the public meeting hall, at the town gate, or in the area one hatthapasa around either of the two.
c. Unenclosed: If the robes are in a one-kula dwelling, greet dawn in the house, or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%). (See 2 & 3 below for further details.)
2. //A dwelling with a yard//:
a. Enclosed and one-kula: If the robes are within the enclosure, greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.
b. Enclosed and multi-kula: Greet dawn in the room where the robes are located, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the area one hatthapasa around either of the two (%).
c. Unenclosed: Greet dawn in the room where the robes are located, or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).
3. //A monastic dwelling// (vihara -- //according to the Sub-commentary, this includes entire monasteries//):
a. Enclosed and one-kula: If the robes are within the enclosure, greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.
b. Enclosed and multi-kula: Greet dawn in the dwelling where the robes are located, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the area one hatthapasa around either of the two (%).
c. Unenclosed: Greet dawn in the dwelling where the robes are located or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).
4. //A field, orchard garden (park) or threshing floor//:
a. Enclosed and one-kula: If the robes are within the enclosure, greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.
b. Enclosed and multi-kula: If the robes are within the enclosure, greet dawn in the area one hatthapasa around the entrance to the enclosure or in the area one hatthapasa around the robes.
c. Unenclosed: Greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.
5. //Buildings with no yard (such as a fortress or city apartment block)//:
a. One-kula: If the robes are in the building, greet dawn anywhere within the building.
b. Multi-kula: Greet dawn within the room where the robes are located or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).
6. //A boat (and by extension, other vehicles)//:
a. One-kula: If the robes are in the vehicle, greet dawn anywhere within the vehicle.
b. Multi-kula (as in a commercial airplane or bus): If the robe is within a room, greet dawn in the room or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%). (For this reason, a bhikkhu traveling in an airplane overnight should wear his complete set of robes or have it with him in his cabin baggage, rather than in his checked baggage.)
7. //A caravan (according to the Sub-commentary, this includes groups traveling by foot as well as by cart; group hiking trips would thus be included here)//:
a. One-kula: If the robes are anywhere in the caravan, greet dawn anywhere up to seven //abbhantaras// (98 meters) in front of or behind the robes, or up to one abbhantara (14 meters) to either side.
b. Multi-kula: If the robes are anywhere in the caravan, greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the caravan.
8. //At the foot of a tree//:
a. One-kula: If the robes are in the area shaded by the tree at noon, greet dawn within that area. According to the Commentary, this doesn't include spots where sun leaks through gaps in the foliage, so be careful.
b. Multi-kula (as a tree on the boundary between two pieces of land): Greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.
9. //In a wilderness area (where there are no villages)//:
Greet dawn anywhere within a seven-abbhantara (98 meter) radius of the robes.
10. //In other areas//:
If the robes are located in a place other than those mentioned above (e.g., in the unshaded yard of an unenclosed monastery), greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.
Exemptions. 1) As in the preceding rule, this rule does not apply when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect.
2) In the origin story to this rule, the Buddha gives permission for a Community of bhikkhus to authorize an ill bhikkhu to be separated from his robes at dawn throughout the course of his illness without penalty. This authorization is to be given as a formal act with one motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//).
The Commentary discusses how long this authorization is to last, and concludes that once the bhikkhu has recovered, he should make every reasonable effort to get back to his robes as soon as possible without jeopardizing his health. The authorization then automatically subsides, with no further formal act being required. If his illness returns, the authorization is automatically reinstated.
3) In Mv.II.12.1-3, the Buddha directs the bhikkhus to declare a //sima// -- or territory in which formal acts of the Community are enacted -- as a //ticivara-avippavasa//, which means that if a bhikkhu's robes are anywhere within the territory, he may greet dawn at any other part of that territory without committing an offense under this rule. In the early days, when such a territory might cover many monasteries (the maximum allowable size is 3x3 //yojanas//, approximately 48x48 kilometers), this was a definite convenience for bhikkhus who had to leave one monastery to join in Community meetings at another one in the same territory. Since it was possible for such territories to include villages and homes as well, the Buddha added the extra stipulation that robes left in the houses of lay people lying in such a territory were not covered by this exemption.
At present the custom is to designate much smaller areas as simas -- usually only a fraction of the land in one monastery -- and although these can also be designated as ticivara-avippavasa, this arrangement in such cases is not the great convenience it is in the larger simas.
Forfeiture & confession. If a bhikkhu greets dawn outside of the zone where any one of his three determined robes is placed -- except when the exemptions are in effect -- the robe is to be forfeited and the offense confessed. Perception and intention are not mitigating factors here. If he thinks that he is in the same zone when he actually isn't, if he thinks the robe is not determined when it actually is, or if he means to be in the same zone when circumstances prevent him, he incurs the penalty all the same. If he then uses the robe before forfeiting it and confessing the offense, he incurs a dukkata.
The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as in the preceding rule. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiture, see Appendix VI. Once the robe has been forfeited, its determination lapses, so when the bhikkhu receives it in return he must re-determine it for use or give it away within ten days so as not to commit an offense under the preceding rule.
Non-offenses. In addition to the above-mentioned exemptions, there is no offense if, before dawn, the robe is lost, destroyed, burnt or stolen; if someone else takes it on trust; or if the bhikkhu gives it away or rescinds its determination. Because of this last allowance, the Commentary recommends that if a bhikkhu realizes that he will not be able to get back to his robe before dawn, he should verbally rescind the robe's determination before dawn arrives so as to avoid an offense, and then redetermine the robe after dawn has passed.
A note on Thai practice. The author of the Vinaya Mukha missed the Sub-commentary's discussion of monastic residences under this rule, and so came to the conclusion that none of the texts discuss the question of zones in a monastery. As a result, he formulated his own system, treating each separate monastic dwelling as a lay dwelling with a yard. Furthermore, he neglected to discuss the question of what counts as single-kula and multi-kula in such a dwelling. In the absence of any other standard, Thai bhikkhus have come to view a dwelling of two or more bhikkhus, in which the bhikkhus come from different families, as a multi-kula dwelling. If the bhikkhus live in separate rooms, then the room where the robes are placed, plus a radius of one hatthapasa around it, is the bhikkhu's zone. If two or more bhikkhus are spending the night in a single room, each bhikkhu must greet dawn within one hatthapasa of his robes.
Although there is no basis in the Canon or commentaries for this practice, it is so widely accepted in Thailand that the wise policy for anyone spending the night in the same dwelling or the same room with a Thai bhikkhu is to be aware of it and abide by it, to avoid the useless controversies that can arise over minor matters like this.
Summary: Being in a separate zone from any of one's three robes at dawn -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect, or one has received formal authorization from the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
3. When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the kathina privileges are in abeyance: If out-of-season robe-cloth accrues to him, he may accept it if he so desires. Once he accepts it, he is to make it up immediately (into a cloth requisite). If it should not be enough, he may lay it aside for a month at most if he has an expectation for filling the lack. Should he keep it beyond that, even when there is an expectation (for further cloth), it is to be forfeited and confessed.
There are two factors for an offense here:
1) //Object//: (a) out-of-season robe-cloth, made of any of the proper six kinds of material, in pieces measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths;
(b) the cloth is not enough to make the cloth requisite one has in mind, but one expects to receive more.
2) //Effort//: One keeps the cloth for more than 30 days, except when the privileges are in effect.
Object. Any gift of robe-cloth presented to the Community when the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect is an in-season robe-cloth. Thus, out-of-season robe-cloth includes any gift of robe-cloth:
1) presented to the Community at any other time,
2) presented at any time to a bhikkhu or group of bhikkhus (except for in-season cloth allotted to him/them by the Community); or
3) presented to the Community when the privileges are in effect, with the stipulation that it be treated as out-of-season cloth.
The reason why a donor would present cloth under category (3) is because, according to Mv.VIII.24-25, in-season cloth may be shared among only the bhikkhus who spent the vassa in that particular Community, and not among any visiting bhikkhus. The Bhikkhunis' NP 2 tells of a case where well-behaved but shabbily dressed bhikkhunis visited a Community of bhikkhunis when the end-of-vassa privileges were in effect; lay donors, wishing to help them out, gave cloth to the Community with the stipulation that it be treated as out-of-season robe-cloth so that the visiting bhikkhunis would also have a share.
Out-of-season cloth, if it is enough to make the cloth requisite one has in mind, is treated as extra robe-cloth under NP 1. If, however, it is not enough, and one expects to get further cloth from any source -- lay donors, the Community, cast-off cloth, or one's own resources -- it may be kept for up to 30 days with no need to be determined or placed under dual ownership.
The further cloth, when one receives it, has a life span of ten days, as under NP 1, and one must finish making one's requisite within the time period determined by whichever cloth has the shorter life span. Thus, if one obtains the expected cloth during the first 20 days, the requisite must be made within ten days, this being the life span of the second cloth. If one obtains it after the 21st day, the requisite must be made before the original 30 days are up.
If the second cloth turns out to be of different quality from the first, one is under no compulsion to put the two cloths together to make up the requisite if one does not want to, and may continue waiting for further cloth as long as the life span of the first cloth allows. The Commentary recommends that if the second cloth is of poorer quality than the first, one may determine it as accessory cloth; if the second cloth is of better quality, one may determine the first cloth as accessory cloth, and start a new 30-day countdown from the day of receiving the second cloth.
Effort. Days are counted by dawns. If, by the 30th dawn after one receives the original cloth, one has not determined it, placed it under dual ownership or abandoned it, it is to be forfeited and the offense confessed. The Sub-commentary adds that if at any time after the first ten days have elapsed one abandons any expectation for further cloth, one must determine the original cloth, place it under dual ownership, or abandon it before the following dawn. Otherwise, one commits an offense under NP 1.
As in the preceding rules, perception is not a mitigating factor here. If one miscounts the dawns, or thinks the cloth is properly determined, etc., when in fact it isn't, there is an offense all the same.
As for the question of out-of-season cloth that crosses the boundary between times when the privileges are and are not in effect -- i.e., cloth received less than a month before the privileges start, or less than a month before they end: The K/Commentary to NP 24 indicates that if cloth received when the privileges are still in effect is not enough to make a robe, the one-month grace period allowed in this rule begins the day after the privileges are rescinded. And the Commentary to NP 28 indicates that if the cloth covered in this rule comes toward the end of the Rains Retreat, and the day when the robe has to be finished falls in the robe season, one is allowed the entire robe season to finish it.
Still, these questions rarely come up in practice, as it is a simple enough matter to determine the original cloth as accessory cloth or place it under dual ownership until one has enough cloth to make one's requisite, remove it from those arrangements to make the requisite, and so avoid having to worry about this rule at all.
Forfeiture & confession. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as in the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI. Once the cloth is received in return, and it is now enough for the requisite one has in mind, it is classed as extra robe-cloth under NP 1. If not, the 30-day countdown starts all over again.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if, before the 30 days are up, the original cloth is stolen, lost, destroyed, burnt; if someone else takes it on trust; or if the owner determines it for use, places it under dual ownership or abandons it. And, as stated above, this rule does not apply when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect.
Summary: Keeping out-of-season cloth for more than 30 days when it is not enough to make a requisite and one has expectation for more -- except when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
4. Should any bhikkhu have a used robe washed, dyed, or beaten by a bhikkhuni unrelated to him, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The origin story here is one of the classics of Vinaya literature, although it is hard to say which is more memorable -- the dry, matter-of-fact style with which the narrative relates the improbable events, or the reaction of the bhikkhunis when they hear what has happened.
"Now at that time Ven. Udayin's wife had gone forth among the bhikkhunis. She often went to his dwelling, and he often went to hers. One day he went to her dwelling for a meal. Arising early in the morning, carrying his robe and bowl, he went to where she was staying and on arrival sat down in front of her, exposing his male organ. She sat down in front of him, exposing her female organ. He, full of lust, stared at her organ. His organ emitted semen. He said to her, 'Go and fetch some water, sister. I'll wash my under robe.'
"'Give it to me. //I'll// wash it.'
"Then she took some of the semen in her mouth and inserted some of it in her female organ. With that, she conceived a child.
"The bhikkhunis said, 'This bhikkhuni has been practicing unchastity. She's pregnant.'
"'It's not that I've been practicing unchastity.' And she told them what had happened. The bhikkhunis were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can this Master Udayin get a bhikkhuni to wash his used robe?'"
There are three factors for an offense here: object, effort and result.
Object: a used robe. //Robe//, here, according to the Commentary, means any robe that has been dyed and properly marked (see Pacittiya 58). This is its way of saying that the robe must be a finished cloth requisite of the type suitable for wearing, but need not be determined as one of one's basic three robes. In other words, it could also be as yet undetermined, or a spare robe determined as an accessory cloth.
//Used//, according to the Vibhanga, means worn around the body at least once. According to the Commentary, it can mean used in other ways -- e.g., rolled up as a pillow or worn draped over the shoulder or head -- as well.
Other cloth requisites, such as sitting cloths and bed sheets, are grounds for a dukkata. Non-cloth requisites are not grounds for an offense.
Effort. One tells an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or beat the robe.
A //bhikkhuni//, here, means one who has received the double ordination, first in the Bhikkhuni Sangha and secondly in the Bhikkhu Sangha. A bhikkhuni who has received only her first ordination is grounds for a dukkata. Female probationers and novices and not grounds for an offense.
//Unrelated// is explained by the Vibhanga as meaning unrelated back through seven grandfathers, either on the father's or the mother's side. The Commentary explains further that this means seven generations counted back starting from one's grandfather. Thus all descendants of one's great-great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfathers are counted as one's relatives. In-laws, though, are not counted. This definition of unrelated applies wherever the Vibhanga mentions the word. At the time of the Buddha, perceived ties of kinship extended more widely than they do today, and a bhikkhu at present would be well-advised to regard as his relatives only those blood-relations with whom ties of kinship are actually felt.
Perception is not an issue here. If a bhikkhu perceives a bhikkhuni as related when in fact she isn't, he is subject to the penalty all the same.
//Telling//, according to the Commentary, includes gesturing as well. Thus if a bhikkhuni is washing her robes, and a bhikkhu throws his robe down next to her, that would fulfill the factor here.
Result. The bhikkhuni washes, dyes or beats the robe as requested.
Offenses. A bhikkhu who tells an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, etc., his used robe incurs a dukkata in the telling. For every effort she then makes towards washing it, he incurs an extra dukkata. When she actually starts washing it, the robe is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. He incurs a nissaggiya pacittiya and a dukkata if he gets her to do two of the three actions mentioned in the rule -- e.g., washing and dyeing the robe; and a nissaggiya pacittiya and two dukkatas if he gets her to do all three.
The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as in the preceding rules. Once the robe is returned, it counts as an extra robe-cloth under NP 1.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if the bhikkhuni is related to the bhikkhu, if an unrelated bhikkhuni washes the robe unasked, if an unrelated bhikkhuni helps a related bhikkhuni wash it, if the robe has not yet been used, if one gets an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash a non-cloth requisite, or if one gets an unrelated female probationer or female novice to wash a used robe.
The Commentary discusses the case of a bhikkhu who gives a used robe to a female probationer to wash: She takes it, becomes ordained as a bhikkhuni in the meantime, and then washes it. The verdict: He incurs the full penalty under this rule. For the fun of it, the Commentary then goes on to discuss the case of a bhikkhu who gives his used robe to a lay man to wash. The lay man undergoes a spontaneous sex change and becomes a bhikkhuni before washing the robe, and again, the bhikkhu incurs the full penalty. What lesson is intended here is hard to say.
Summary: Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or beat a robe that has been used at least once is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
5. Should any bhikkhu accept robe-cloth from a bhikkhuni unrelated to him -- unless it is in exchange -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The reason behind this rule is expressed by a single sentence in the origin story: 'It's hard for a woman to come by things.' In the original version of the rule, the Buddha made no allowance for accepting robe-cloth in exchange, but this point was later changed at the request of the bhikkhunis. They had tried to exchange robe-cloth with the bhikkhus, who refused because of the rule as it stood at that time, and this upset the bhikkhunis. As the Commentary explains, their poverty was what made them complain, "If the Masters are not on familiar terms with us even to this extent, how are we supposed to keep going?"
The offense under this rule is composed of two factors: object and effort.
Object: any piece of robe-cloth of the six suitable kinds, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. Other requisites are not grounds for an offense.
Effort. The bhikkhu receives such cloth from an unrelated bhikkhuni and does not give her anything in exchange.
//Unrelated bhikkhuni// here is defined in the same terms as under the preceding rule: a bhikkhuni who has received the double ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their great x 7 grandfathers. A bhikkhuni who has received only her first ordination, from the bhikkhunis, is grounds for a dukkata. Female probationers and female novices are not grounds for an offense.
Perception here is not a mitigating factor: According to the Vibhanga, even if a bhikkhu perceives an unrelated bhikkhuni as related, he is still subject to the penalty. The Commentary adds that even if one does not know that the robe comes from a bhikkhuni -- as when many donors place robes in a pile for a bhikkhu, and one of the donors, unbeknownst to the bhikkhu, is a bhikkhuni -- this factor is fulfilled all the same. If a bhikkhuni gives robe-cloth to someone else to present to a bhikkhu, though, the bhikkhu commits no offense in accepting it.
The Commentary also states that receiving need not be hand-to-hand. If a bhikkhuni simply places robe-cloth near a bhikkhu as her way of giving it to him, and he accepts it as given, this factor is fulfilled.
As for the item given in exchange for the cloth, the Vibhanga states that it can be worth much more then the cloth or much less. Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahapaccari, one of the ancient commentaries, as saying that even if, in return for the cloth, the bhikkhu gives the bhikkhuni a piece of yellow myrobalan -- a medicinal fruit, one of the cheapest things imaginable in India -- he escapes the penalty under this rule.
Offenses. If all three factors of the offense here are fulfilled, the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata in accepting the cloth. He then must forfeit the cloth and confess the additional nissaggiya pacittiya offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as in the preceding rules.
Non-offenses. There is no offense:
if the bhikkhuni is a relation; if the bhikkhuni is not related, but the bhikkhu gives her something in exchange; if the bhikkhu takes the cloth on trust; if he borrows the cloth; if he accepts a non-cloth requisite; if he accepts robe-cloth from a female probationer or female novice.
Exchange. The origin story to this rule is where the Buddha explicitly gives permission for bhikkhus, bhikkhunis, female probationers, male novices and female novices to trade items with one another. NP 20 forbids bhikkhus from trading items with lay people and people ordained in other religions.
Summary: Accepting robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhuni without giving her anything in exchange is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
6. Should any bhikkhu ask for robe-cloth from a man or woman householder unrelated to him, except at the proper occasion, it is to be forfeited and confessed. Here the proper occasion is this: The bhikkhu's robe has been stolen or destroyed. This is the proper occasion in this case.
"Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had become skilled in giving Dhamma talks. A certain millionaire's son went to where he was, and on arrival bowed down and sat to one side. As he was sitting there, Ven. Upananda the Sakyan instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged him with a Dhamma talk. Then the millionaire's son...said to him, 'Tell me, Ven. sir, what would be in my power to give you for your welfare: Robe-cloth? Alms-food? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?'
"'If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one of those cloths (you are wearing).'
"'I'm the son of a good family, Ven. sir. How can I go about wearing one cloth? Wait until I've returned home. After going home, I will send you one of these cloths, or a finer one.'
"A second time...A third time, Ven. Upananda said to him, 'If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one of those cloths.'
"'I'm the son of a good family, Ven. sir. How can I go about wearing one cloth? Wait until I've returned home. After going home, I will send you one of these cloths, or a finer one.'
"'Are you making an offer when you don't want to give me anything, in that having made the offer you don't give?'
"So the millionaire's son, being pressured by Ven. Upananda, left having given him one cloth. People seeing him said to him, 'Why is it, master, that you go around wearing only one cloth?'
"He told them what had happened. So the people were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'They're insatiable, these Sakyan contemplatives, and not easily contented. It's no simple matter to make a reasonable request of them. How can they, after being made a reasonable request by the millionaire's son, take his cloth?'"
The factors for an offense here are three: object, effort, and result.
Object: a piece of any of the six suitable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.
Effort. One asks, except at the proper time, for such cloth from a lay person who is not related back through one's great x 7 grandfathers. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one perceives the lay person to be related when in fact he/she isn't, that fulfills the factor here.
Result. One receives the cloth.
The proper occasions. //Stolen//, according to the Vibhanga, refers to a robe stolen by anyone at all. //Destroyed// means burnt, carried away by water, eaten by such things as rats or termites, or worn out by use -- although the Sub-commentary adds here that worn out by use means worn to the point where the robe can no longer cover the body.
If all of a bhikkhu's robes are stolen or destroyed, he is not to go about naked. To do so incurs a dukkata (as opposed to the thullaccaya Mv.VIII.28.1 imposes on a bhikkhu who chooses to go about naked when he has robes to wear). A bhikkhu with no cloth to cover his body should make a covering of grass and leaves. If he happens on an unoccupied Sangha residence, he is permitted to take any cloth he finds there -- robes, sheets, mats, pillow cases, or whatever -- to wear as a makeshift robe as long as he has the intention of returning it when he obtains a proper robe.
The Commentary adds several points here:
If one picks leaves or cuts grass to make a covering for oneself under these circumstances, one is exempt from the penalty for damaging plant life under Pacittiya 11.
If, after getting one's makeshift robe, one has to go a great distance before getting a proper robe, one may leave the makeshift robe with any convenient monastery as property of the Sangha.
If, under these circumstances, one asks lay people for cloth and receives cloth of a type or color that normally is not allowed, there is no offense in wearing it until one can obtain suitable cloth.
The following rule adds extra stipulations on how much cloth one may ask for in circumstances like this.
Offenses. The act of asking for robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person not at the proper time entails a dukkata. The cloth, when one receives it, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as in the preceding rules. The Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth is given in Appendix VI.
Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if --
one asks at the right time, one asks from one's relations, one asks from people who have invited one to ask for cloth, one obtains cloth through one's own resources, or one asks for the sake of another bhikkhu.
The Commentary explains that this last point means two things: One may ask for cloth for the sake of another bhikkhu (1) from one's own relations or from people who have invited one to ask for cloth //or// (2) from the relatives of that bhikkhu or from people who have invited //him// to ask. This point applies for all rules where one is allowed to ask for the sake of another.
As for obtaining cloth through one's own resources, the Sub-commentary notes that one should be careful to do it in such a way as not to commit an offense under NP 20. Again, this applies to all rules that contain this exemption.
Summary: Asking for and receiving robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person, except when one's robes have been stolen or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
7. If that unrelated man or woman householder presents the bhikkhu with many robes (pieces of robe-cloth), he is to accept at most (enough for) an upper and an under robe. If he accepts more than that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
This rule is a continuation of the preceding one, dealing with the protocol in asking for robe-cloth when one's robes have been stolen or destroyed. The origin story is as follows:
"At that time some group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached bhikkhus whose robes had been stolen, said, 'Friends, the Blessed One has allowed those whose robes are stolen or destroyed to ask an unrelated man or woman householder for robe-cloth. Ask for robe-cloth, friends.'
"'Never mind, friends. We have already received (enough) robe-cloth.'
"'We are asking in your name, friends.'
"'Then go ahead and ask.'
"So the group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached unrelated householders, said, 'Bhikkhus have come whose robes were stolen. Give us robe-cloth for them.' And they asked for a lot of robe-cloth. Then a certain man, sitting in a meeting hall, said to another man, 'Master, bhikkhus have come whose robes were stolen. I gave robe-cloth for them.'
"And he said, 'I gave, too.'
"And another said, 'I gave, too.'
"They were offended and annoyed and spread it about: 'How can these Sakyan contemplatives, not knowing moderation, ask for a lot of robe-cloth? Will the Sakyan contemplatives deal in the cloth business? Or will they set up a shop?'"
Protocol. The Vibhanga states that when a bhikkhu's robes are stolen or destroyed, the amount of cloth he may ask for and accept from an unrelated householder who has not previously invited him to ask for cloth depends on the number of robes stolen or destroyed. If three, he may ask for and accept only enough for two. If two, he may ask for and accept only enough for one. If one, he should not ask for any cloth at all.
The K/Commentary mentions that these stipulations apply only when robes from one's determined set of three are stolen or destroyed. The way it phrases this suggests that if one's spare robes are stolen or destroyed, one has no right to ask for robe-cloth at all. The Sub-commentary, though, interprets this as opening a loophole so that if one loses any of one's spare robes, one may ask for as much cloth as one likes. It then accuses the K/Commentary of contradicting the Canon and Commentary, and of ignoring the purpose of the rule, which is to teach moderation and fewness of wants. Its conclusion: The protocol applies when any of one's robes are stolen or destroyed -- whether determined as the basic set of three, undetermined or determined as accessory cloths.
If, however, we recall that originally each bhikkhu had only one set of three robes, and that the allowance in the preceding rule was to relieve the hardship of having little or nothing to wear, we can agree with the K/Commentary's interpretation: that the allowance in the preceding rule applies //only// when robes from one's basic set of three are stolen and destroyed, and that this is the case we are concerned with here. If one's spare robes get stolen or destroyed, one may not make use of the allowance to ask for robe-cloth at all.
The Vibhanga states further that if the householder presents one with a great deal of cloth, with the invitation to take as much as one likes, one should take only enough cloth to make the allowable number of robes. The no-offense clauses add that one may take excess cloth if one promises to return the excess when one has finished making one's robe(s). And if the donor tells one to keep the excess, one may do so without penalty.
The factors of the offense for overstepping the bounds of this protocol are three:
1) //Object//: any piece of the six kinds of suitable robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.
2) //Effort//: One asks for more than the allowable amount of robe-cloth from an unrelated householder who has not previously made an invitation to ask. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one perceives the householder to be related when in fact he/she isn't -- or feels that he/she would be happy to offer the excess cloth even though he/she has given no previous invitation to ask -- this factor is fulfilled all the same.
3) //Result//: One gets the excess robe-cloth.
The offenses here are as follows: a dukkata for asking in the way that fulfills the factor of effort, and a nissaggiya pacittiya when all three factors are fulfilled. The procedures to follow in forfeiture, confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the same as in the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI.
Non-offenses. In addition to the two cases mentioned above -- one takes excess cloth with the promise to return the excess when one has finished one's robe(s), and the donors tell one to keep the excess -- there is no offense in taking excess cloth if:
the donors are offering cloth for reasons other than that one's robes were stolen or destroyed (e.g., they are impressed with one's learning, says the Commentary); one is asking from one's relatives or people who have previously made one an invitation to ask for cloth (//before// one's robes were stolen or destroyed, says the Sub-commentary); or one gets the cloth by means of one's own property.
The Commentary calls attention to the fact that the Vibhanga's no-offense clauses make no mention of asking for the sake of another. It then draws the conclusion, based on the fact that the rule was formulated in response to bhikkhus' requesting excess cloth for the sake of others, that in the circumstances mentioned in this rule, one may not ask for excess cloth for the sake of others. The Sub-commentary takes issue with this, and presents three arguments for its case:
1) There is no requirement that the working out of a training rule has to follow from the origin story. (It gives no examples, but Parajikas 3 & 4, Sanghadisesas 8 & 9, NP 4 and Pacittiyas 8 & 58 are all cases in point.) 2) The Ganthipadas state that since this training rule deals with what to do when presented with offerings for one's own sake, there is no need for the Vibhanga to mention the case of asking for another's sake. 3) If asking for another's sake is not allowable here, it should also not be allowable in the preceding rule.
Thus it concludes that here, as under the preceding rule, there is no offense in asking for excess cloth for Bhikkhu X from one's own relatives or people who have invited one to ask, or from Bhikkhu X's relatives or people who have invited X to ask.
Summary: Asking for and receiving excess robe-cloth from unrelated lay people when one's robes have been stolen or destroyed is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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8. In case a man or woman householder prepares a robe fund for the sake of an unrelated bhikkhu, thinking. "Having purchased a robe with this robe fund, I will supply the bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe:" If the bhikkhu, not previously invited, approaching (the householder) should make a stipulation with regard to the robe, saying, "It would be good indeed, sir, if you supplied me (with a robe), having purchased a robe of such-and-such a sort with this robe fund" -- out of a desire for something fine -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
"Now at that time a certain householder said to his wife, 'I will supply Master Upananda with a robe.' A certain bhikkhu on his almsround overhead the man saying this, went to where Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was staying and on arrival said to him, 'You have a lot of merit, friend Upananda. A certain man over there said to his wife, 'I will supply Master Upananda with a robe.'
"'He's my supporter, my friend.'
"So Ven. Upananda the Sakyan went to where the man was staying and on arrival said to him, 'My friend, is it true that you want to supply me with a robe?'
"'Now, wasn't I just thinking, 'I will supply Master Upananda with a robe'?
"'Well, if you want to supply me with a robe, supply me with a robe like this. What use is it to me to be supplied with a robe I won't use?'
"So the man was offended, annoyed and spread it about, 'They're insatiable, these Sakyan contemplatives, and not easily contented. It's no simple matter to supply them with a robe. How can this Master Upananda, without having first been invited by me, make stipulations concerning a robe?'"
The situation covered by this rule is this: An unrelated lay person has put aside resources to purchase a robe to present to a bhikkhu, but without yet asking the bhikkhu what kind of robe he wants. The factors for the offense here are four:
Object. The texts mention only that this rule concerns funds for a robe (civara), but without specifying whether this means funds only for finished robes or pieces of robe-cloth suitable for making into robes as well. They also do not mention whether funds for other requisites would be grounds for a lesser offense or no offense, although given the spirit of the rule, it would be a wise policy for a bhikkhu not to make stipulations, when uninvited, to a lay person who has prepared funds for purchasing any kind of requisite for his use.
Intention. One wants to get a better robe than the lay person is planning to buy.
Effort. One makes a request to the unrelated lay person that would involve raising the cost of the robe. As in the previous rules, perception is not a factor here. Even if one perceives the lay person to be related when he/she actually isn't, that would fulfill the factor here all the same.
Result. One gets the robe. The way the texts define this factor suggests that whether or not the lay person actually spends more on the robe than he/she actually planned is not an issue here.
Offenses. In the act of making a request that would fulfill the factors of intention and effort, the penalty is a dukkata. When one receives the robe it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures to follow in forfeiture, confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the same as in the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI.
Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if:
the lay person is a relative or has invited one to ask for cloth; one asks for another's sake; one is getting the robe with one's own resources; or one asks the lay person to get a robe less expensive than the one he/she is planning to get. The Commentary adds here that there is also no offense if one's request would result in a robe equal in price to the one the lay person has in mind.
Summary: When a lay person who is not a relative is planning to get a robe for one, but has yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants: Receiving the robe after making a request that would raise its cost is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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9. In case two householders -- men or women -- prepare separate robe funds for the sake of a bhikkhu unrelated to them, thinking, "Having purchased separate robes with these separate robe funds of ours, we will supply the bhikkhu named so-and-so with robes": If the bhikkhu, not previously invited, approaching (them) should make a stipulation with regard to the robe, saying, "It would be good indeed, sirs, if you supplied me (with a robe), having purchased a robe of such-and-such a sort with these separate robe funds, the two (funds) together for one (robe)" -- out of a desire for something fine -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
Explanations for this training rule are the same as those for the preceding one, the only difference being in the factor of effort: One asks the two donors to put their funds together to purchase one robe. Whether or not the request would raise the amount of money they would have to spend is not an issue here, although the Vibhanga says that if one makes a request that would //reduce// the amount of money they would spend, there is no offense.
The Commentary adds that, under the conditions mentioned here, making requests of three or more people to combine their robe funds into one is also covered by this rule.
Summary: When two or more lay people who are not one's relatives are planning to get separate robes for one, but have yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants: Receiving a robe from them after asking them to pool their funds to get one robe -- out of a desire for something fine -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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10.In case a king, a royal official, a brahmin or a householder sends a robe fund for the sake of a bhikkhu via a messenger (saying), "Having purchased a robe with this robe fund, supply the bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe": If the messenger, approaching the bhikkhu, should say, "This is a robe fund being delivered for the sake of the venerable one. May the venerable one accept this robe fund," then the bhikkhu is to tell the messenger: "We do not accept robe funds, my friend. We accept robes (robe-cloth) as are proper according to season."
If the messenger should say to the bhikkhu, "Does the venerable one have a steward?" then, bhikkhus, if the bhikkhu desires a robe, he may indicate a steward -- either a monastery attendant or a lay follower -- (saying), "That, my friend, is the bhikkhus' steward."
If the messenger, having instructed the steward and going to the bhikkhu, should say, "I have instructed the steward the venerable one indicated. May the venerable one go (to him) and he will supply you with a robe in season," then the bhikkhu, desiring a robe and approaching the steward, may prompt and remind him two or three times, "I have need of a robe." Should (the steward) produce the robe after being prompted and reminded two or three times, that is good.
If he does not produce the robe, (the bhikkhu) should stand in silence four times, five times, six times at most for that purpose. Should (the steward) produce the robe after (the bhikkhu) has stood in silence for the purpose four, five, six times at most, that is good.
If he should not produce the robe (at that point), should he then produce the robe after (the bhikkhu) has endeavored further than that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
If he should not produce (the robe), then the bhikkhu himself should go to the place from which the robe fund was brought, or a messenger should be sent (to say), "The robe fund that you, venerable sirs, sent for the sake of the bhikkhu has given no benefit to the bhikkhu at all. May the you be united with what is yours. May what is yours not be lost." This is the proper course here.
The protocols surrounding gifts of money and their proper use are quite complex -- much more complex than even this long training rule would indicate -- and require a detailed explanation. What follows is an attempt to make them clear. If it seems long and involved, remember that the purpose of the protocols is to free bhikkhus from the even more bothersome worries and complexities that come with participating in buying, selling, and monetary matters in general.
This rule is one of four nissaggiya pacittiya rules covering a bhikkhu's proper relationship to money. The others are # 18, 19 & 20. Although they sometimes seem to be splitting hairs, they focus precisely on the two acts involving money that are most burdensome to a sensitive mind: In the act of accepting money, or having it accepted in one's name, one is accepting all the cares, responsibilities, and dangers that come with its ownership; in the act of arranging a trade, one is accepting responsibility for the fairness of the trade: that it undervalues neither the generosity of the person who donated the money, nor the goods or services of the person receiving the money in exchange.
Thus to protect a bhikkhu from these mental burdens, this rule sets up protocols so that lay donors may have the convenience of dedicating amounts of money and other valuables to provide for a bhikkhu's needs, and so that the bhikkhu may benefit from such gifts without having to bear the responsibilities of ownership or of having to arrange fair trades.
If a bhikkhu follows the protocols recommended here, the money placed with the steward still belongs to the donor, and the responsibility for making a fair trade lies with the steward. The bhikkhu's only responsibility is to inform the original donor if, after a reasonable number of promptings, the steward entrusted with the money does not provide him with the requisite the donor had in mind, and then let the donor look after the matter if he/she cares to.
Although the rule itself mentions only funds for robe-cloth intended for individual bhikkhus, we should note from the outset that the Commentary extends it to cover all funds -- composed of money, jewels, commodities, land, livestock or other valuables that bhikkhus are not allowed to accept -- not only for individual bhikkhus, but also for Communities, groups of bhikkhus and buildings in a monastery.
The money rules & allowances: an overview. NP 18 forbids a bhikkhu from accepting gifts of money, from getting others to accept them, and from consenting to gifts of money meant for him being placed down next to him. NP 19 & 20 forbid him from engaging in buying, selling, or bartering, regardless of whether or not it involves money. In the Mahavagga, however, the Buddha makes the following allowance, called the Mendaka Allowance, after the donor who inspired it:
"There are people of conviction and confidence, bhikkhus, who place gold and silver in the hand of stewards, saying 'Give the master whatever is allowable.' I allow you, bhikkhus, to accept whatever is allowable coming from that. But in no way at all do I say that money is to be accepted or sought for." (Mv.VI.34.21)
Even given this allowance, though, it is important that the bhikkhu, in his dealings with the steward, does not say or do anything that would transgress NP 18-20. At the same time, it is important that he does not abuse the steward's services. Otherwise the steward will never want to perform this service for bhikkhus again. This is the main point of the origin story to this rule:
"Then Ven. Upananda the Sakyan approached the lay follower (his steward) and on arrival said, 'My friend, I have need of a robe.'
"'Wait just today, sir. Today there is a town meeting, and the town has made a rule that whoever comes late is fined 50 (kahapana).'
"'Friend, give me the robe this very day!' (Saying this,) he grabbed hold of him by the belt. So the lay follower, being pressured by Ven. Upananda the Sakyan, purchased a robe for him and arrived late. The people said to the lay follower, 'Why, master, have you come late? You have lost 50.' So he told them what had happened. They were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'They're insatiable, these Sakyan contemplatives, and not easily contented. It's no simple matter even to render them a service. How can Upananda the Sakyan, being told by a layman, "Wait just today, sir," not wait?'"
Stewards. According to the Commentary, there are three ways money may be placed with a steward: the steward is either indicated by the bhikkhu, indicated by the donor or his/her messenger, or else indicated by neither.
1) //Indicated by the bhikkhu// covers two sorts of cases:
a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu points him/her out, as mentioned in the training rule.
b) The donor, knowing that a particular lay person has volunteered to act as a steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu, gives the money to the lay person and informs the bhikkhu -- or has someone else inform him -- either before or after the fact.
2) //Indicated by the donor// covers cases where the donor chooses one of his/her own friends or employees to act as the steward for that particular gift, and informs the bhikkhu -- or has someone else inform him -- either before or after the fact.
3) //Indicated by neither// covers two separate cases:
a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu says that he has none. Another person happens to overhear the conversation and volunteers to act as the steward for that particular gift.
b) The donor gives the gift to the lay person who is normally the bhikkhu's steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu, but does not inform the bhikkhu or have him informed of the fact.
According to the Commentary, this training rule covers only cases of the first sort: the steward is indicated by the bhikkhu. I will discuss this case in detail first before going on to discuss the protocol in the other two.
The protocol in accepting. The Vibhanga gives the following guidelines:
If donors offer money, they are to be told that bhikkhus do not accept money.
If they ask who the bhikkhus' steward is, one may point out any lay person at all, saying, "That's the steward." One is //not// to say, "Give it to him/her" or "He/she will keep (the money)," for that would be to accept ownership and responsibility for the money, and thus be an infraction of the rule against accepting money. Also, one is not to say, "He/she will buy (the requisite)" or "He/she will get it in exchange," for even this much would be an infraction of the rules against trading.
The K/Commentary adds that if the donor asks, "To whom should I give this?" or "Who will keep this?" one is not to point anyone out. It doesn't say what one //may// do in such a situation, although a wise policy would be to broach the topic of stewards so that the donor will ask a question to which one may give a allowable answer.
The protocol in obtaining requisites from the fund. The rule states that a bhikkhu may give his steward up to three verbal and six silent promptings in order to get a requisite from the fund. The Vibhanga works out an arrangement whereby he may exchange two silent promptings for one verbal prompting, which leads the Commentary to lay out the following scheme: A bhikkhu may make up to --
6 verbal & 0 silent promptings 5 verbal & 2 silent promptings 4 verbal & 4 silent promptings 3 verbal & 6 silent promptings 2 verbal & 8 silent promptings 1 verbal & 10 silent promptings, or 0 verbal & 12 silent promptings.
When giving a verbal prompting, one may say only, "I need a robe (or whatever the requisite may be)" or statements to that effect. One may not say, "Give me a robe," "Get me a robe," "Buy me a robe," or "Get a robe in exchange or me," for these statements would be violations of the rules against trading.
According to the Commentary, promptings are counted not by the number of visits to the steward, but by the number of times the bhikkhu states his need/desire for the requisite. Thus if, in one visit, he states his need for a robe three times, that counts as three verbal promptings.
As for silent promptings -- or "standings" -- the bhikkhu merely stands in the steward's presence. If he/she asks, "What have you come for?' the bhikkhu should say, "You know," or "You should know."
The Vibhanga also notes that during the period when a bhikkhu has yet to receive the requisite, he should not accept an invitation to sit down at the steward's place, to accept alms, or to teach Dhamma there. If he does any of these things, that cuts back his number of allowed standings. The Sub-commentary contains a long discussion of what precisely this means, and finally sides with the decision in the Three Ganthipadas: that each time a bhikkhu sits, receives alms or teaches one sentence of Dhamma (see Pacittiya 7) under these circumstances, he cuts down his allowed number of standings by one.
If one obtains the requisite after making the allowable number of verbal and silent promptings -- or less -- there is no offense. If one does not obtain the requisite after the maximum allowable number of promptings, one should inform the original donor, and then leave the issue up to him/her. Not to inform the donor here, the Commentary says, entails a dukkata. If the donor, being informed, then makes arrangements to get the requisite for the bhikkhu, there is no offense.
The factors of an offense here are three:
1) //Object//: a fund left with a steward pointed out by a bhikkhu. 2) //Effort//: One makes an excessive number of promptings. 3) //Result//: One obtains the requested requisite.
There is a dukkata for the excessive promptings, and the requisite, when obtained, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the requisite in return are the same as in the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiture, see Appendix VI.
Cases where this rule does not apply. According to the Commentary, if the steward has been indicated by the donor, one may make any number of promptings at all without committing an offense. If the article is not forthcoming, one may get another lay person to handle the issue (although one should be careful to phrase one's request to this lay person so as not to transgress the rules against accepting money, trading, and buying). If the article is not forthcoming, one is not duty-bound to inform the original donor.
There is nothing in the Canon to contradict any of these points, but simple etiquette would suggest that one not harass the steward excessively, and that one should inform the donor if the article is not forthcoming, so as to let the donor handle the matter from there on in if he/she sees fit.
As for the third case, in which the steward is not indicated either by the donor or by a bhikkhu, the Commentary says that, as far as that fund is concerned, the steward should be treated as a person who is not related and has not made an invitation to ask. In other words, one may not make any requests of the steward at all, unless he/she happens to invite one to make a request. We can qualify this by saying that if the article is not forthcoming after a reasonable amount of time, one may inform the original donor.
Other funds. The Commentary includes a long discussion of how this rule applies to funds other than those intended for an individual bhikkhu's requisites. A few of the more relevant cases:
//Monetary funds for Sangha or group requisites//. If a donor comes with a gift of money and says that it is being offered to the Sangha or to a group for whatever purpose, one should follow the protocol for accepting as under this rule. For instance, if the donor says, "I'm giving this to the Sangha for you to make use of the four requisites," one may not accept it in any of the three ways covered by NP 18. As we will see under NP 18, there is a dukkata for the bhikkhu who consents to money's being placed next to him under these circumstances. There is also a dukkata, says the Sub-commentary, for every bhikkhu who uses any article bought with the money.
If, however, the donor says, "The money will be with your steward" or "with my people" or "with me: All you need to do is make use of the four requisites," then there is no offense in accepting and making use of this arrangement. The etiquette to follow in obtaining requisites depends on who the money is left with: if the bhikkhus' steward, follow the protocol under this rule; if the donor's workers, one may make any number of promptings; if the donor, follow the guidelines under Pacittiya 47.
//Non-monetary funds for Sangha or group requisites//. There are a number of other articles that may not be owned by bhikkhus, and that carry a dukkata penalty if they are. They include land, fields, and orchards; jewels; slaves; commodities (e.g., unhusked grain); and animals. If a donor wants to make a gift of such things to the Sangha, the Commentary says, the question of whether or not they may be accepted depends on how the donation is phrased. If the donor says, "I'm giving this to the Sangha" for whatever the purpose, the gift may not be accepted. As in the previous case, there is a dukkata for whoever receives it, and also for whoever uses an article obtained from proceeds coming from the gift.
If the donor says, "This is for the purpose of the four requisites," or "Accept whatever is allowable coming from this," without mentioning the Sangha or any bhikkhu as custodians or recipients of the unallowable object, the arrangement may be accepted without penalty. For instance, if a donor wants to present a herd of cows, saying, "These are for the purpose of milk products for the Sangha" (perhaps this sounds less stilted in Pali than it does in English), this is an acceptable arrangement. But if he/she says, "I am giving these cows to the Sangha to provide milk products for the Sangha," then it is not.
If a donor proposes to give pigs, chickens or other animals used only for their meat to the Sangha, the bhikkhus are to say, "We can't accept gifts like this, but we will be glad to set them free for you."
If, after setting up an allowable arrangement, the donor asks the bhikkhus to appoint a steward to look after it, they may. If not, they are to do nothing about the arrangement at all.
How the proceeds from such arrangements are to be used depends on what they are: If money, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this money to buy such-and-such," no bhikkhu may make use of what is bought with the money. If the proceeds are commodities, such as unhusked rice, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this rice to trade for such-and-such," the bhikkhu who makes the order may not use whatever is obtained from the trade, but other bhikkhus may without incurring a penalty. If the proceeds are allowable goods, such as fruit, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this fruit to trade for such-and-such," the Commentary says that any bhikkhu may use what is obtained from the trade, but this would seem to contradict NP 20.
//Building funds//. If a donor comes with money or other unallowable gift, and says, "I am giving this to the Sangha for the meditation hall (or any other building)," the gift may not be accepted. But if the donor says, "I am giving this to (or for) the meditation hall," without mentioning any individual bhikkhu, group of bhikkhus or the Sangha as custodians or recipients of the gift at all, then this arrangement is not to be refused, and the monastery steward is to be informed of what the donor said.
In the context of NP 18, this means that the bhikkhus are not to take the money directly, or to get anyone else to take it, but may consent to its being placed next to them, since it is not meant as a gift for them.
Many monasteries have donation boxes, and there is a question as to whether or not the bhikkhus may tell a donor in this case to put the money in the box. The Commentary to NP 18 states that when a donation has been placed down for a bhikkhu -- over his protests -- and someone besides the donor offers to put it in a safe place, the bhikkhu may point out a safe place to put money, but may not tell him/her to put it there, as that would imply that he is accepting responsibility for the money. If this also applies to funds given "to a building," then the bhikkhus should be able to say to the donor of such funds, "The donation box is over there," but they are not to say, "Put it there."
At any rate, after the money has been placed by the donor, the bhikkhus may then tell the monastery steward what the donor said, but are not to tell him/her to take the money, as this would violate NP 18. Since the steward in this case would be classed as "indicated by the bhikkhus," they are to follow the protocol in this rule when they tell the steward of their need for building materials, wages for the workers, and other necessities that come up in the course of the of the building's construction or maintenance.
The Commentary mentions two other acceptable arrangements:
(1) The donor places the money with the workmen, and tells the bhikkhus that their only responsibility is to check on whether the work is being done poorly or well.
(2) The donor says that the money will be kept with him/her or with his/her employees, and that the bhikkhus' only responsibility is to inform them of whom the money is to be given to. At present such a donor would be able to set up a checking account for the construction and upkeep of monastery buildings. In this case, the bank would be the steward "indicated by the donor," and the authorized bhikkhu signing a check drawing on the fund would be informing the steward of where the money should go. He should not, however, be the one who hands the check over to the payee or payee's representative. This point will be discussed in more detail under NP 20.
Since the steward in both of these cases is indicated by the donor, the bhikkhus may make as many requests as they like -- i.e., in the first case, telling the workers what to do; in the second case, telling the steward or donor who is to be paid -- but here again in this second case they should be careful to phrase their requests so as not to violate the rules against trading and buying.
In addition to building funds, it would seem that any charitable fund for schools, hospitals, etc. -- such as some wealthy monasteries have -- would come under this category, as long as the fund is not for requisites for the Sangha, either as a group or individually.
Fund management. The Commentary states that if a Sangha fund has been set up for a particular requisite, it should as a general rule be used to buy only that requisite. If, however, the Sangha has enough of one kind of //lahubhanda// -- goods that may be shared among the bhikkhus -- but not enough for another, the fund for the first kind may be diverted to the second kind by an //apalokana-kamma//: a formal meeting of the Community in which the motion is phrased in one's own words and unanimously accepted.
Funds for lodgings and furniture, though, since they are //garubhanda// (goods that may not be shared among the bhikkhus), may not be diverted to lahubhanda at all. But if there is Sangha furniture that is going unused and is in danger of deteriorating before it gets used, the Community may arrange to have it exchanged -- using the procedure allowed under NP 20, and making sure not to let it go for less than its full value -- and then use the proceeds for lahubhanda. The Commentary adds that proceeds of this sort should be used 'frugally, just enough to keep life going.' In other words, don't use them to splurge on anything excessive.
Summary: When a fund has been set up with a steward indicated by a bhikkhu: Obtaining an article from the fund as a result of having prompted the steward more than the allowable number of times is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Part Two: The Silk Chapter ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
11.Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of a mixture containing silk, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
//Santhata//, defined here as a felt blanket/rug, is a type of cloth described in the texts simply by its method of manufacture: Instead of being woven, it is made by strewing threads over a smooth surface, sprinkling them with a glue-like mixture made from boiled rice, rolling it smooth, and then repeating the process until the felt is thick and strong enough for one's purposes. Although felt made like this can be used for a number of purposes, its major use in the time of the texts seems to have been as a small personal rug for sitting or lying down, or as a rough blanket for wearing around oneself when sick or cold. Blanket/ rugs like this are still made and used in parts of India even today, and as the no-offense clauses to this and the following rules show, it is precisely to this type of blanket/rug that these rules apply.
There are three factors for the full offense here:
1) //Object//: a felt blanket/rug containing silk threads and intended for one's own use. 2) //Effort//: One either makes it oneself, gets someone else to make it, finishes what others have let unfinished, or gets someone else to finish what one has left unfinished. 3) //Result//: One obtains it after it is finished (or finishes it, if one is making it oneself).
According to the Commentary, intention and perception are not mitigating factors here. Thus if one is making a felt blanket/rug, and silk threads happen to float in on the breeze and land in the felt, one commits an offense all the same. Perhaps the Commentary's interpretation here is why bhikkhus no longer use felt rugs, for there is no way of knowing whether or not there are any stray silk filaments in them that would make them unsuitable for use.
There is a dukkata in the effort of making a blanket/rug with silk mixed in it -- or in having it made -- and once it is obtained (or finished, if one is making it oneself), it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are the same as in the preceding rules. Since there is a dukkata in using //any// felt blanket/rug made with silk in it, the bhikkhu receiving such a rug in return after forfeiting it may use it only in the ways described in the no-offense clauses.
According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata in making a blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for another's use, and a dukkata in acquiring or using such a blanket/rug made for someone else.
Non-offenses. There is no offense in making felt with silk mixed in it to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat.
Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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12.Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of pure black wool, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The origin story to this rule indicates that a pure black felt blanket/rug was considered stylish at that time, and thus inappropriate for a bhikkhu's use. This is a recurrent theme throughout the Vinaya: that stylish, luxurious, or elegant articles are not in keeping with the bhikkhus' way of life.
All other explanations for this training rule are the same as for the preceding rule, simply replacing "a felt blanket/rug made with silk mixed in it" with "a felt blanket made entirely of black wool."
Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug entirely of black wool for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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13.When a bhikkhu is making a new felt (blanket/rug), two parts of pure black wool are to be incorporated, a third (part) of white, and a fourth of brown. If a bhikkhu should have a new felt (blanket/rug) made without incorporating two parts of pure black wool, a third of white, and a fourth of brown, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
This is a continuation of the preceding rule and its purpose is to set the maximum amount of black wool a bhikkhu may include when making his felt blanket/rug or having it made for his own use. The Vibhanga gives precise measures for how much black, white, and brown wool one should use in making the rug, but the Commentary says that these quantities are relative: As long as black wool constitutes no more than half the total amount of wool used, the bhikkhu making the rug commits no offense.
As in the preceding rules, there is a dukkata in acquiring and using a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool no matter who it is made for. Thus if a bhikkhu makes such a rug, forfeits it, and receives it in return, he may use it only in the ways indicated by the no-offense clauses.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense if the rug is more than one-quarter white wool, more than one-quarter brown wool, or made entirely of white wool or of brown. The Sub-commentary here reiterates that the important point is that the rug be no more than one-half black wool. There is also no offense if one is making the felt -- or having it made -- for a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat.
Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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14.When a new felt (blanket/rug) has been made by a bhikkhu, it is to be kept for (at least) six years. If after less than six years he should have another new felt (blanket/rug) made, regardless of whether or not he has disposed of the first, then -- unless he has been authorized by the bhikkhus -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
"Now at that time bhikkhus were (each) having a new felt blanket/rug made every year. They were constantly begging, constantly hinting, 'Give wool. We need wool.' People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can these Sakyan contemplatives have a new felt blanket/rug made every year?...The felt blanket/rugs we make for ourselves last five or six years, even though our children wet them and soil them, and they get chewed on by rats. But these Sakyan contemplatives have a new felt blanket/rug made every year and are constantly begging, constantly hinting, 'Give wool. We need wool.'"
There are three factors for an offense here.
1) //Object//: a new felt blanket/rug for one's own use. 2) //Effort//: One makes it or has it made less than six //vassa// after one's last one was made, even though one has not been formally authorized by the bhikkhus to do so. 3) //Result//: One acquires the rug when it is finished.
The texts are silent on the factor of perception here, which suggests that if a bhikkhu miscounts the passage of years -- making a new rug when six years haven't passed even though he thinks they have -- he fulfills the factor of effort all the same.
According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata in the effort of making the rug or having it made. Once it is obtained (or finished, if one is making it oneself), it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are the same as in the preceding rules. Since the no-offense clauses allow one under these conditions to use a felt blanket/rug made for someone else, it would seem that the rug here, unlike those forbidden by the preceding rules, is not //ipso facto// unusable as a rug. Thus a bhikkhu who has forfeited his rug under this rule should be able to use it as a blanket/rug after receiving it in return.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if a bhikkhu makes a new felt blanket/rug after six or more years have past; if he makes one for another's use; if he uses one made for someone else; or if he makes felt to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat.
Also, as the rule indicates, there is also no offense if within less than six years he makes a felt blanket/rug for his own use after being authorized to do so by the bhikkhus. The Vibhanga explains this by saying that the Community, if it sees fit, may formally give this authorization to a bhikkhu who is too ill to do without a new felt blanket/rug before his six years are up. The pattern for this formal act -- one motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//) -- is in the Vibhanga.
Summary: Unless one has received authorization to do so from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for one's own use -- or having it made -- less than six years after one's last one was made is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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15. When a felt sitting rug is being made by a bhikkhu, a piece of old felt a sugata span (25 cm.) on each side is to be incorporated for the sake of discoloring it. If, without incorporating a piece of old felt a sugata span on each side, he should have a new felt sitting rug made, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
A sitting cloth -- for protecting his robes from getting soiled by any place where he sits down, and for protecting any place where he sits down from being soiled by him -- is one of the requisites a bhikkhu is allowed to have (Mv.VII.16.3). In fact, if he goes without one for more than four months, he incurs a dukkata (Cv.V.18). Pacittiya 89 gives stipulations for its size, and for the fact that it should have at least one border piece.
There is some question as to whether the felt sitting rug described in this rule counts as a sitting cloth. The Commentary to Pacittiya 89 says yes, the Sub-commentary no, but the Vibhanga's definition for sitting cloth under that rule states simply that it "has a border," and since the felt sitting rug also "has a border," it would seem to come under that definition, too.
The Commentary to that rule describes the border piece of a felt sitting rug as follows: "Having made a felt rug, then on one end in an area of one sugata span, cutting it at two points, one makes three border pieces." Whether these three pieces are to be left flapping, or are to be sewn back together, it doesn't say.
According to the Vibhanga, when one is making a felt sitting rug, one should take a piece of old felt -- at least one span in diameter or one span square -- and then either place it down in one part of the new felt as is, or else shred it up and scatter the pieces throughout the new felt. This, it says, will help to strengthen the new felt.
//Old felt// the Vibhanga defines as worn wrapped around oneself at least once: This is one of the few places indicating that felt was commonly used as a blanket. The Commentary rewords the Vibhanga's definition, saying "sat on or lied down upon at least once," which -- at least in the days of the commentators -- was the more common usage. The Commentary adds that, in addition to wanting to discolor the new felt sitting rug and make it stronger, one of the Buddha's purposes in formulating this rule was to teach bhikkhus how to make good use of old, used requisites, so as to maintain the good faith of those who donated them.
Offenses. As with the previous rules, there is a dukkata for the bhikkhu who makes a sitting rug -- or has one made -- that violates this rule, whether it is for his own use or for that of another; and a nissaggiya pacittiya offense when he acquires the rug thus made for his own use (or finishes it, if he is making it himself). The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the rug in return are the same as in the preceding rules. Since the no-offense clauses here, as under the preceding rule, allow one to use a felt sitting rug made without old felt for the sake of another, it would seem that a bhikkhu, having forfeited his rug, should be able to use it as a sitting rug after receiving it in return.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if, being unable to find a large enough piece of old felt to provide the one-span piece, one includes a smaller piece of old felt in the sitting rug; if, being unable to find any old felt at all, one does not include any old felt in the rug; if one makes use of a felt sitting rug made without old felt for the sake of another; or if one is making a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat. It seems logical that there would also be no offense for the bhikkhu making a felt blanket/rug that does not have any border pieces and that he is not planning to use for sitting, but for some reason none of the texts mention this point.
Summary: Making a felt sitting rug for one's own use -- or having it made -- without incorporating a one-span piece of old felt is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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16. If wool accrues to a bhikkhu as he is going on a journey, he may accept it if he so desires. Once he accepts it, he may carry it by hand -- there being no one else to carry it -- three leagues (48 km.=30 miles) at most. Should he carry it farther than that, even if there is no one else to carry it, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
"At that time wool accrued to a bhikkhu as he was on the road in the Kosalan districts, going to Savatthi. So, tying the wool into a bundle with his upper robe, he went along his way. People who saw him teased him, 'How much did you pay for it, venerable sir? How much will the profit be?'"
There are, in essence, three factors for an offense here: object, effort, and intention.
Object. //Wool//, under this rule, refers to wool that has not been made into goods (%). The Commentary explains that wool here thus does not refer to woolen cloth, woolen felt, woolen yarn, or even raw wool tied up with a thread, although this last point is in contradiction to the origin story, where the bhikkhu carried his wool tied up with a robe.
The Commentary goes on to say, though, that wool here //does// refer to even small quantities of "unmade" wool, such as wool placed in the ear when one has an earache, or wrapped around scissors in their sheath to protect them from rusting, so a bhikkhu should be careful not to travel more than three leagues with such things.
Effort. This factor includes not only carrying unmade wool more than three leagues oneself, but also placing it in a bundle or vehicle belonging to someone else without his/her knowing about it, and then letting him/her take it more than three leagues. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: If one travels more than three leagues, even if one thinks one hasn't, that fulfills this factor all the same.
Intention. The Vibhanga says that there is no offense for the bhikkhu who, after traveling three leagues, cannot find a proper place to stay and so carries his wool further until finding a proper place. Thus the offense under this rule is only for a bhikkhu who carries wool past the three-league mark for reasons other than looking for a place to stay.
Non-offenses. In addition to the issue of intention just mentioned, the no-offense clauses say that there is no offense for the bhikkhu who is retrieving lost or stolen wool; for the bhikkhu who carries the wool three leagues and then carries it back; or for the bhikkhu who gets someone else to carry the wool for him.
Summary: Carrying wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn for more than three leagues is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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17.Should any bhikkhu have wool washed, dyed, or carded by a bhikkhuni unrelated to him, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The reason behind this rule is expressed succinctly in the following conversation from the origin story:
"Then Mahapajapati Gotami went to the Blessed One, and on approaching, greeting him, stood to one side. As she was standing there, the Blessed One said to her, 'I trust, Gotami, that the bhikkhunis remain uncomplacent, ardent, and resolute?'
"'Since when, Lord, is there uncomplacency among the bhikkhunis? The masters -- the group-of-six bhikkhus -- keep having the bhikkhunis wash, dye, and card wool. The bhikkhunis, washing, dyeing, and carding wool, neglect...the training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, and the training in heightened discernment.'"
//Wool//, here, as in under the preceding rule, refers to wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who gets a bhikkhuni unrelated to him to wash woolen cloth or yarn that has not yet been used.
Otherwise, all the explanations for this training rule are identical with those for NP 4, except that here "beating" is replaced by "carding."
Summary: Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or card wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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18. Should any bhikkhu take gold and silver, or have it taken, or consent to its being deposited (near him), it is to be forfeited and confessed.
As mentioned under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to relieve a bhikkhu of the burden of ownership that comes as the result of accepting gifts of money or having them accepted in one's name. The discourses contain passages, though, indicating other purposes for this rule as well:
"For whomever gold and silver are suitable, headman, the five strands of sensuality are also suitable. And for whomever the five strands of sensuality are suitable, gold and silver are suitable. You may take it for certain that this is not the way of a contemplative, not the way of a son of the Sakyan." (S.XLII.10)
"Bhikkhus, there are these four stains because of which the sun and moon do not glow, do not shine, are not radiant. What four? Rain clouds...snow clouds...smoke and dust...an eclipse. In the same way, there are these four stains because of which contemplatives and priests do not glow, do not shine, are not radiant. What four? Drinking alcoholic beverages...indulging in sexual intercourse... accepting gold and silver...obtaining requisites through a wrong mode of livelihood." (A.IV.50)
Bhikkhus, in abandoning the use of money, make real their abandonment of worldly pursuits and show others by example that the struggle for wealth is not the true way to find happiness.
The factors for an offense under this rule are two: object and effort.
Object. The Vibhanga defines //gold// so that it includes anything made of gold. //Silver// it defines to cover coins made of silver, copper, wood, or lac, or whatever is used as a medium of exchange in business. The Commentary adds such examples as bones, pieces of hide, fruit, seeds of trees used as currency, whether they have been stamped with a figure or not. At present, the term would include coins and paper currency, but not checks, credit cards, bank drafts, or promissory notes, as these -- on their own and without further identification of the person carrying them -- do not function as true currency.
The Commentary, in discussing this training rule, also gathers a list of items from the Canon carrying a dukkata, rather than a nissaggiya pacittiya, when accepted by a bhikkhu. They include pearls and precious stones, unhusked grain, slaves, fields, orchards, and livestock. For convenience's sake, we will refer to these items from here on as dukkata objects (//dukkata-vatthu//), or D.O. for short.
Effort. This factor may be fulfilled by any of three actions:
1) //Accepting//. According to the K/Commentary, this includes receiving gold or money when it is offered as a gift or picking up gold or money left lying around ownerless. (As the no-offense clauses show, this factor does not cover cases where one picks up money left lying around the monastery or a house where one is visiting if one's purpose is to keep it in safekeeping for the owner. See Pacittiya 84.) According to the Commentary, a bhikkhu who accepts money wrapped up in a bolt of cloth would also commit an offense here, which shows that this act includes receiving or taking the money not only with one's body, but also with items connected with the body. Thus accepting money in an envelope or having it placed in one's shoulder bag as it hangs from one's shoulder would fulfill this factor as well.
The Vibhanga states that perception is not a mitigating factor. Thus a bhikkhu accepting an envelope that unbeknownst to him contains money would fall under this factor, too.
The K/Commentary adds the stipulation that in the taking there must be some movement of the money from one place to another. It offers no explanation for this point, but it probably refers to cases where money is forced on a bhikkhu, as when he is on alms round and a lay donor, against the bhikkhu's protestations, places money in his bowl. In this case, the bhikkhu could simply stand right there until he gets the donor or someone else to remove the money, and he would be absolved of an offense under this rule.
The commentaries add an extra factor -- the full offense is entailed only if the bhikkhu is taking the money for his own sake -- but there is no mention of this in the Vibhanga, so the added factor does not seem warranted. Thus whether the bhikkhu takes the money for himself or for others is not an issue here.
2) //Having money accepted//, according to the K/Commentary, includes getting someone else to do any of the actions covered under accepting, as described above. Examples from the texts include such things as telling the donor to give the money to a steward, telling the donor that so-and-so will take the money for him, telling the steward to take the money, to put it in a donation box, to "do what he thinks appropriate," or any similar command.
Anything that falls short of a command, though, would not fulfill this factor, as we have already seen under NP 10. Thus simply telling the donor that X is the bhikkhus' steward -- or that the monastery's stewards have placed a donation box in such-and-such a place -- would not be a factor for an offense here. Also, if the donor leaves money, say, on a table as a gift for a bhikkhu, then if the bhikkhu tells his steward what the donor did and said, without telling the steward to do anything with the money -- letting the steward figure things out on his/her own -- this too would not entail a penalty. The Commentary's discussion of stewards under the next point shows that while a bhikkhu who tells a volunteer steward to put such a donation in a donation box would incur a penalty, a bhikkhu who simply points out the donation box would not.
3) //Consenting to money being deposited//. The Vibhanga defines this action as follows: "He (the donor), saying, 'This is for the master,' places it, and the bhikkhu consents." (%) According to the K/Commentary, //placing// covers two sorts of situations:
(1) The donor places money anywhere in the bhikkhu's presence, and says, "This is for the master;" OR
(2) The donor tells him, "I have some money placed in such-and-such a location. It's yours." (One of the implications of this second case is that any monastery with a donation box should make clear that money left in the box is being placed with the steward.)
//Consenting// in either of these cases, says the Commentary, means that one does not refuse either in thought, word, or deed. Refusing in thought means thinking, "This is not proper for me." Refusing in word means telling the donor that such a gift is not allowable. Refusing in deed means making a gesture to the same effect. If one refuses in any of these ways -- e.g., one wants to accept the money, but tells the donor that it is not allowable; or one says nothing, but simply reminds oneself that such gifts are not proper to accept -- one avoids the penalty here.
The question of whether or not it is best to express one's refusal outwardly lies beyond the scope of the Vinaya, and often depends on the situation. Ideally, one should inform the donor so that he/she will know enough not to present such gifts in the future, but there are also cases where the donor is still new to the idea of rules and will simply be offended if the bhikkhu objects to what he/she means as a well-intentioned gesture. This is thus a matter where a bhikkhu should use his discretion.
The Commentary contains a long discussion of what a bhikkhu should do if, after he refuses such a donation, the donor goes off leaving it there anyway: If someone else comes along and asks the bhikkhu, "What is this?", the bhikkhu may tell him/her what he and the donor said, but may not ask him/her to do anything about it. If the person volunteers to put the money into safekeeping, the bhikkhu may point out a safe place but may not tell him/her to put it there.
Once the money is in a safe place, one may point it out to other people -- one's steward, for instance -- but may not tell anyone to take it. The Commentary gives directions for how to arrange an exchange with such money so as not to violate NP 19 & 20, but I will save this part of the discussion until we come to those rules.
The Vibhanga's definition of the action of "placing" money for a bhikkhu indicates that in this case the question of who the money is for //does// make a difference, since the nature of the donor's action is defined by what he or she says. If the donor means the money for the bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu accepts, that fulfills the factor here. This covers cases where the donor says, "This is for you," or "This is for you to give to X."
If the donor simply says, "This is for the Community," or "This is for Bhikkhu Y," and Bhikkhu X consents to its being placed down near him, then according to the Commentary, X incurs a dukkata. It does not say, though, what should be done with the money, aside from the fact that any bhikkhu who uses anything bought with it also incurs a dukkata. Its discussion of the following rule, though, would seem to imply that it should be returned to the original donor.
If money for Bhikkhu Y is placed near Bhikkhu X in this way, and Y in turn accepts the donation for himself, then of course Y would incur the full penalty under this rule. The Commentary's discussion under NP 10 indicates that if money for the Community is placed near Bhikkhu X, the Community is said to have accepted it only when all members of the Community unanimously agree to it. If one member disagrees, he saves all the other members from committing an offense -- except for X, who still has his dukkata.
The Commentary here also says that a bhikkhu who accepts monetary donations "placed nearby" him for monastery buildings incurs a dukkata as well. This refers to cases where the donor says, "This is for the Community to use in building such-and-such," and places the money down next to the bhikkhu. As the Commentary itself says under NP 10, if the donor does not mention the name of the bhikkhu or the Community as custodians or recipients of the funds, the donations are not to be refused. Rather, they are to be left there and the steward told of what the donor said.
Forfeiture & confession. A bhikkhu who accepts money or gold, has it accepted, or consents to its being placed down for him must forfeit the money and confess the offense in the midst of a formal meeting of the Community. The formula for forfeiture is given in Appendix VI. This is one of the few rules where the offender may not confess the offense to an individual bhikkhu or to a group of less than four. Once he has forfeited the money, the Community is not to return it to him, as there is no way a bhikkhu is allowed to possess money.
If a lay person then comes along, the bhikkhus should tell him, "Look at this." If he asks, "What should be bought with this?", the bhikkhus are not to tell him to buy anything, although they may tell him what in general is allowable for bhikkhus, such as the five tonics, as under NP 23 below. If he takes the money and purchases any proper items, all the bhikkhus except for the one who originally accepted the money may make use of them. If it so happens that one of the bhikkhus tells him explicitly to buy something, then the Commentary says that the item(s) bought this way may be used by all the bhikkhus except for the original offender and the bhikkhu who gave the order to buy. If the lay person does not volunteer to buy anything with the money, the bhikkhus should tell him to get rid of it.
If he does not get rid of it, they are to choose one of their number as the "money-remover," by means of the formal act -- one motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//) -- given in the Vibhanga. The money-remover's duty is to throw the money away without taking note of where it falls. If he does take note, he incurs a dukkata. The Commentary recommends that, "Closing his eyes, he should throw it into a river, over a cliff, or into a jungle thicket without paying attention to where it falls, disinterested as if it were excrement."
None of the texts mention what a bhikkhu is to do with dukkata objects he has received, but as we shall see under the following rule, the Commentary would seem to suggest that he return them to their donors.
Non-offenses. As mentioned above, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who, finding money lying around the monastery or in a house he is visiting, puts it away in safe keeping for the owner. This point is discussed in detail under Pacittiya 84.
Summary: Taking gold or money, having someone else take it, or consenting to its being placed down as a gift for oneself is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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19. Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of monetary exchange, it (the income) is to be forfeited and confessed.
There are two factors for an offense here: object and effort.
Object. The Vibhanga defines //money// in the same terms it uses to define gold and silver in the preceding rule: any type of gold, whether shaped into an ornament or not; and any coins or currency used in business exchange.
Effort. The Vibhanga's description of the kind of exchange covered by this rule differs from that given in the Commentary, so it is best to discuss them separately.
//The Vibhanga's interpretation//. Monetary exchange refers primarily to the type of business and speculation a gold dealer would engage in -- exchanging currency, trading gold ore for gold shaped into ornaments or vice versa, trading gold ore for gold ore, or gold ornaments for gold ornaments -- but the Vibhanga's discussion of the factor of perception shows that the factor of effort here includes any exchange in which the bhikkhu ends up with gold or money as the result of the exchange. Thus it would cover cases where a bhikkhu sells any kind of item -- allowable or unallowable -- for money.
At first glance, this would seem redundant with the preceding rule against receiving money, and the following rule against engaging in trade, but actually it closes a number of loopholes in those rules. In the preceding rule, a bhikkhu may point out a steward to a person who brings money intended for him; and in the following rule he can, if he words it right, propose a trade or tell a steward to arrange a trade for him. Thus, given just those two rules, it would be possible for a bhikkhu using "proper" procedures to have his steward engage in currency speculation and other money-making activities without committing an offense.
This rule, though, includes no such exceptions for "wording things right (//kappiya-vohara//)," and so closes those loopholes as far as this type of trading is concerned. As a result, a bhikkhu may not express a desire to his steward that he/she sell something belonging to him or take funds dedicated for his use and invest them for monetary return. And if the bhikkhu is going abroad, he must leave it up to his steward to figure out that his funds may have to be exchanged for foreign currency if they are going to be of any use.
//The Commentary's interpretation//. According to the Commentary, monetary exchange refers to any trade in which money is involved -- whether as the item the bhikkhu brings into the trade, gets out of the trade, or both. Buddhaghosa states that this interpretation is based on a passage that is not in the Vibhanga but logically should be. The Sub-commentary supports him, explaining that if monetary exchange covers trades in which money forms one side of the trade, it shouldn't matter which side of the trade it is on.
This, however, contradicts a number of points in the Vibhanga. (1) Its table of the possible actions covered by this rule includes only cases where the outcome of the trade for the bhikkhu is money. As we noted in the Introduction, we have to trust that the Vibhanga arrangers knew what was and was not an offense under a certain rule, and that if they had meant the rule to cover more than the alternatives listed in the table, they would have included them. (2) In the Vibhanga's discussion of how the forfeiture is to be conducted, it consistently refers to the offender as the "one who purchased money" and to the bhikkhu who throws the forfeited object away as the "one who removes the money." (3) If //monetary exchange// covers cases where the bhikkhu uses money to buy allowable things, then the discussion of how a bhikkhu could get his steward to use money rightfully placed with the steward to buy such things would have been included under this rule; instead, it is included under the following rule. All of this seems to indicate that the Commentary is on shaky ground when it tries to force its interpretation on the Vibhanga here.
Still, the Commentary's interpretation is widely followed and fairly complex, so it will be good to discuss it in some detail.
As under the preceding rule, the Commentary divides articles into three sorts:
//nissaggiya objects// (N.O.), i.e., articles such as gold and money, which entail a nissaggiya pacittiya when they are accepted,
//dukkata objects// (D.O.), articles such as pearls, precious stones, unhusked grain, fields, orchards, slaves and livestock, which entail a dukkata when they are accepted;
//allowable objects// (A.O.), articles that a bhikkhu may rightfully accept and possess.
It then works out the following scheme to cover all possible sorts of trade involving these objects:
Using to buy results in ~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ N.O. > N.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya N.O. > D.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya N.O. > A.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya D.O. > N.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya D.O. > D.O. a dukkata* D.O. > A.O. a dukkata* A.O. > N.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya A.O. > D.O. a dukkata* A.O. > A.O. a nissaggiya pacittiya under NP 20
The trades marked with asterisks point out one of the anomalies of the Commentary's interpretation: Why trades involving D.O. should entail only a dukkata, while A.O. > A.O. trades should entail a nissaggiya pacittiya is hard to fathom.
At any rate, to continue with the Commentary's explanations: N.O. > A.O. trades cover two possible cases, depending on whether the money was obtained properly or improperly under the preceding rule. If improperly, the object bought with the money is unallowable for all bhikkhus. This holds whether the bhikkhu makes the purchase himself or a steward makes it for him. The only way the item can be made allowable is to have an equal sum of money returned to the original donor and the item returned to the person who sold it, and then arrange for a proper exchange as allowed under the following rule. (At first glance, it may seem strange for the Commentary to insist that the price of the A.O. be returned to the original donor of the N.O., since the bhikkhus are in no way in his/her debt; this is probably the Commentary's way of ensuring that if the seller returns the purchase price of the A.O. to the bhikkhus' steward, it is not used to repurchase the A.O.)
If, however, a bhikkhu engages in a N.O. > A.O. trade using money obtained properly under the preceding rule, the item bought is unallowable only for him, but allowable for other bhikkhus once he has forfeited it. If N.O. > A.O. exchanges really were covered by this rule, though, this would contradict the Vibhanga, which insists that the item obtained as a result of this rule either has to be given to a lay person or thrown away. Thus it seems better to follow the Vibhanga in treating cases of this sort under the following rule.
The Commentary makes no mention of what should be done with items resulting from trades that carry a dukkata here, but its discussion of how to "undo" a trade so as to make the item allowable suggests the following scheme:
For a D.O > D.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess the offense. For a D.O. > A.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess the offense. If one wants to, one may then approach the person who sold the allowable object and arrange a proper trade in accordance with the following rule. For an A.O. > D.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it and confess the offense.
As an intellectual exercise, the Commentary considers the question of a trade that results in an A.O. that can never be made allowable, and comes up with the following scenario: A bhikkhu takes money improperly obtained under the preceding rule, uses it to get iron mined, smelted and made into a bowl. Since there is no way to undo these transactions -- the iron can never be returned to its state as ore -- there is no way any bhikkhu may ever properly make use of the iron no matter what is done with it.
As mentioned above, the Commentary's explanations here contradict the Vibhanga on a number of points, and contain several anomalies as well. It seems preferable to treat a number of cases it mentions here -- N.O. > D.O., N.O. > A.O., D.O. > D.O., D.O. > A.O., A.O. > D.O., or in other words, any trade resulting in an allowable or a dukkata object -- under the following rule instead.
Forfeiture & confession. When a bhikkhu has obtained gold or money in violation of this rule he is to forfeit it in the midst of a formal meeting of the Community, following the procedures explained under the preceding rule. The Pali formula for forfeiture is in Appendix VI.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga's no-offense clauses contain nothing but the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1.
Summary: Obtaining gold or money through trade is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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20. Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of trade, (the article obtained) is to be forfeited and confessed.
"Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had become skilled at robe making. Having made an outer robe of old rags, having dyed it well and stitched it nicely, he wore it. A certain wanderer, wearing a very expensive cloak, went to where he was staying and on arrival said to him, 'Your outer robe is beautiful, my friend. Give it to me in exchange for this cloak.'
"'Do you know (what you are doing), my friend?'
"'Yes, I know.'
"'Very well, then.' And he gave him the robe.
"Then the wanderer went to the wanderers' park wearing the outer robe. The other wanderers said to him, 'Your outer robe is beautiful, friend. Where did you get it?'
"'I got it in exchange for my cloak.'
"'But how long will this outer robe last you? That cloak of yours was better.'
"So the wanderer, thinking, 'It's true what the wanderers said. How long will this outer robe last me? That cloak of mine was better,' went to where Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was staying, and on arrival said, 'Here is your outer robe, my friend. Give me my cloak.'
"'But didn't I ask you, "Do you know what you are doing?" I won't give it to you.'
"So the wanderer was offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'Even a householder will give another householder the item he regrets (trading). How can one who has gone forth not give (extend the same courtesy) to one who has gone forth?'"
As we noted under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to relieve bhikkhus of the responsibilities that come with making trades -- the responsibility of having to get a fair price for one's goods and at the same time offering a fair deal to the person making the trade.
The factors for an offense here are two: object and effort.
Object. The Vibhanga defines //various types of trade// as covering deals involving the four requisites, "even a lump of powder, a tooth-cleaner or unwoven thread" -- these being its standard examples of objects with the least possible material value. The Commentary interprets this as limiting this rule to deals involving nothing but allowable objects (A.O. > A.O.), but there is nothing in the Vibhanga to suggest that this is necessarily so. The emphasis in the Vibhanga seems to be that this rule covers even allowable objects of the least possible value, and all the more so more valuable and restricted objects. In fact, since the Vibhanga explicitly limits the preceding rule to trades that result in money for the bhikkhu (N.O. > N.O.; D.O. > N.O.; A.O. > N.O.), it seems best to interpret this rule as covering all types of trade not covered in that rule:
N.O. > D.O.; N.O. > A.O.; D.O. > D.O.; D.O. > A.O.; A.O. > D.O.; and A.O. > A.O.
The Vibhanga and commentaries also mention that the goods one offers in trade are one's own goods, but they do not mention explicitly whether or not this also includes goods belonging to someone else that have been placed on trust in one's keeping (such as monastery funds placed under the supervision of a monastery official). Since the no-offense clauses make no exemptions for a bhikkhu who trades using goods received on trust from someone else, though, it would seem that such cases do fall under this rule as well.
Effort. //Engaging in trading//, according to the Vibhanga, involves two steps:
(1) The bhikkhu proposes an exchange, saying, "Give this for that," or "Take this for that," or "Exchange this for that," or "Purchase this with that."
(2) The goods exchange hands, the bhikkhu's goods ending up with the other person, and the other person's goods ending up with the bhikkhu.
The first step entails a dukkata; both steps together, a nissaggiya pacittiya. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: If a bhikkhu manages an exchange in a way that he thinks avoids a penalty under this rule but in fact doesn't (see below), he commits the full offense all the same.
Forfeiture & confession. Once a bhikkhu has received an article from trading, he is to forfeit it either to an individual bhikkhu, to a group of two or three, or to a full Community of four or more. Only then may he confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and the return of the article are the same as under NP 1. The Pali formula for forfeiture is in Appendix VI. The Vibhanga makes no mention of what the bhikkhu may and may not do with after receiving it in return, but we may borrow a page from the Commentary's discussion of the preceding rule and say that:
//If the exchange was N.O. > D.O.//, he should return the D.O. to its seller. If the N.O. was properly obtained under NP 18, there is nothing further to be done. If not, the bhikkhu should confess the offense for violating that rule. (If he accepts the purchase price in return, he must forfeit it in the midst of the Community. If not, he should simply confess the pacittiya offense.)
//If the exchange was N.O. > A.O.//, then if the N.O. was obtained in violation of NP 18, no bhikkhu may make use of the A.O. unless it is returned to the seller, the price of the article is turned over to the original donor of the money, and the A.O. is then repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule. (Again, if the seller refunds the purchase price, the offender should forfeit it in the midst of the Community. If not, he should simply confess the pacittiya offense.)
//If the N.O. in this case was properly obtained//, then the purchased article is allowable for other bhikkhus, but not for the offender. (Some might object that if the N.O. was properly obtained it should be treated as A.O., but we must remember that a bhikkhu who orders his steward to use money to buy an object is assuming ownership of the money, which goes against the spirit of NP 18 and the protocol of having a steward in the first place.)
//If the exchange was D.O. > D.O.//, the bhikkhu should return the purchased article to the seller and the original article (if the seller returns it to him) to the original donor.
//If the exchange was D.O. > A.O.//, the purchased article is not allowable for any bhikkhu unless it is returned to the seller, the D.O. is returned to the original donor, and the A.O. is then repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule.
//If the exchange was A.O. > D.O.//, the bhikkhu should return the purchased article to the seller.
//If the exchange was A.O. > A.O.//, the bhikkhu may make use of the article as he likes.
//If the exchange was wages in payment for services rendered//, the Commentary notes that there is no way the bhikkhu can rightfully get the payment back, so he should simply confess a pacittiya offense.
Non-offenses. In the origin story to NP 5, the Buddha allows bhikkhus to trade allowable articles with other bhikkhus, bhikkhunis, female probationers, and male or female novices. The present rule thus covers trades made only with people who are not one's co-religionists.
As for trades with people who are not one's co-religionists, the Vibhanga here adds that a bhikkhu commits no offense --
if he asks the price of an object; if he tells a steward (wording the request properly, as under NP 10); or if he tells the seller, "I have this. I have need of such-and-such," and then lets the seller arrange the exchange as he/she sees fit.
This last point may seem like a lot of hair splitting, but we must remember that if a trade is arranged in this way, the bhikkhu is absolved from any responsibility for the fairness of the deal, which seems to be the whole point of the rule.
The Commentary, in discussing these exemptions, raises the following points:
1) A bhikkhu who tries to avoid the technicalities of what is defined as engaging in trading by saying simply, "Give this. Take that," may do so only with his close relatives. Otherwise, telling a lay person to take one's belongings as his/her own is a "theft of faith" (//saddha-deyya//) -- i.e., a misuse of the donations that lay supporters have sacrificed for the bhikkhu's use. (See Mv.VIII.22.1) On the other hand, telling an unrelated lay person to give something is a form of begging, which carries a dukkata unless the lay person is related or has invited one to ask in the first place. (From this we may deduce that bhikkhus should not bargain after having asked the price of goods or services -- e.g., a taxi fare -- even in situations where bargaining is the norm.)
2) A bhikkhu desiring to get an article may tell his steward, "Having taken that, give (the seller) this." This, however, contradicts other passages in the Commentary itself, in which this form of speech is said to violate this rule when spoken directly to the seller. Since the Vibhanga includes orders to X to purchase an item as coming under this rule, it would seem that only the forms of speech allowed under NP 10 -- "I have need of such-and-such;" "I want such-and-such" -- would be allowed under the no-offense clauses here as well.
3) Under the previous rule, the Commentary mentioned that a bhikkhu engaging in an otherwise allowable trade for profit incurs a dukkata. Here it says that if a bhikkhu, proposing a trade by wording it right (//kappiya-vohara//), deceives the seller as to the value of his goods, he is to be treated under Parajika 2.
4) If a bhikkhu goes with his steward to a store and sees that the steward is getting a bad deal, he may simply tell the steward, "Don't take it."
5) The Commentary to NP 10 describes how a bhikkhu may make a purchase when his steward has left funds in safe-keeping on the bhikkhu's premises but is not around to arrange a trade when, say, a bowl-seller comes along. The bhikkhu may tell the seller, "I want this bowl, and there are funds of equal value here, but there is no steward to make them allowable." If the seller volunteers to make them allowable, the bhikkhu may show him where they are but may not tell him how much to take. If the seller takes too much, the bhikkhu may cancel the sale by saying, "I don't want your bowl after all."
In general it is not a wise policy to have funds left for safe-keeping on one's premises -- a Community allowing this exposes itself to the dangers of robbery and assault -- but the Commentary here seems less interested in describing ideal behavior than in simply drawing the line between what is and is not an offense.
Special cases. 1) The Bhikkhunis' Nissaggiya Pacittiya rules 4-10 show that if a lay donor gives money to a store owner to pay for whatever a bhikkhuni will request from the store, the bhikkhuni may avail herself of the arrangement. If the donor stipulates that this arrangement applies only to certain things, or to things worth a certain amount, she may request only what falls under the stipulation: This is the point of the rules. In effect, what this is doing is making the storeowner her steward. Such an arrangement would thus also seem allowable for bhikkhus, as long as they word their requests to the store owner properly, as advised under NP 10.
2) As mentioned under NP 18, checks, credit cards, bank drafts, and traveler's checks do not count as gold or money, but any trade arranged with them would come under this rule. With checks, the point where the full offense is committed is when the bhikkhu hands the check over to the seller -- or tells his steward to hand it over -- in exchange for goods or services. Simply signing a check does not come under this rule. Thus a bhikkhu responsible for monastery building funds of the sort discussed in the Commentary to NP 10 -- where the donor makes the bhikkhu(s) responsible for saying who money should go to -- may sign checks drawing on the fund without committing an offense here, unless he hands the check over to the seller or tells the steward, "Use this to buy X."
Similarly with credit cards: The offense is committed when the bhikkhu hands the signed credit card receipt -- or has it handed -- to the seller. The receipt is an acknowledgement of goods purchased or services rendered, which in the context of the card holder's agreement with the credit card company is his promise to repay the loan he is making on the company. This promise is what he is trading with the seller.
Summary: Engaging in trade with anyone except one's co-religionists is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Part Three: The Bowl Chapter ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
21. An extra alms bowl may be kept ten days at most. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
Alms bowls. This rule deals only with alms bowls that are fit to be determined for use. According to the Commentary, this means any that are --
1) made of the proper material; 2) the proper size; 3) fully paid for; 4) properly fired; and 5) not damaged beyond repair.
//Material//. In the Cullavagga (V.8.2 & V.9.1), the Buddha allows two kinds of alms bowls -- made of clay and made of iron -- and forbids eleven: made either of wood, gold, silver, pearl, beryl, crystal, bronze, glass, tin, lead, or copper. Using the Great Standards, it has recently been decided that stainless steel bowls are allowable, but aluminum bowls not. In the time of the Buddha, clay bowls were the more common. At present, iron and steel bowls are.
//Size//. The Vibhanga contains a discussion of three proper sizes for a bowl -- the medium size containing twice the volume of the small, and the large twice the volume of the medium -- but they are based on measurements that are not known with any precision at present. The author of the Vinaya Mukha reports having experimented with various sizes of bowls based on a passage in the story of Mendaka in the Dhammapada Commentary. His conclusion: A small bowl is just a little larger than a human skull, and a medium bowl approximately 27 1/2 English inches (70 cm.) in circumference, or about 8.75 inches (22.5 cm.) in diameter. He did not try making a large bowl. Any size larger than the large size or smaller than the small is inappropriate; any size between them falls under this rule.
//Fully paid for//. According to the Commentary, if a bowl-maker makes a gift of a bowl, it counts as fully paid for. If a bowl has been delivered to a bhikkhu but has yet to be fully paid for, it may not be determined and does not come under this rule until paid for in full.
//Fired//. The Commentary states that a clay bowl must be fired twice before it can be determined, to make sure it is properly hardened; and an iron bowl five times, to prevent it from rusting. Since stainless steel does not rust it need not be fired, but the accepted practice is to find some way to make it gray -- either by painting it on the outside or firing the whole bowl with leaves that will give it a smoky color -- so that it will not stand out.
//Not damaged beyond repair//. According to the Commentary, a clay bowl is damaged beyond repair if it has at least ten inches (fingerbreadths) of cracks in it, the smallest of the cracks being at least two inches long. (Cracks less than two inches long are said not to merit mending, and so do not count.) If a bowl has fewer cracks than that, they should be mended either with tin wire, sap (but for some reason not pure pine sap), or a mixture of sugar cane syrup and powdered stone. Other materials not to be used for repair are beeswax and sealing wax. If the total number of countable cracks equals ten inches or more, the bowl becomes a non-bowl, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new one.
As for iron and steel bowls, a hole in the bowl large enough to let a millet grain pass through is enough to make the determination lapse, but not enough to make the bowl a non-bowl. The bhikkhu should plug the hole -- or have a blacksmith plug it -- with powdered metal or a tiny metal plug polished smooth with the surface of the bowl and then redetermine the bowl for use.
If the hole is small enough to be plugged in this way, then no matter how many such holes there are in the bowl, they do not make it a non-bowl, and the bhikkhu should mend it and continue using it. If, however, there is even one hole so large that the metal used to plug it cannot be polished smooth with the surface of the rest of the bowl, the tiny crevices in the patch will collect food. This makes it unfit for use, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new one to replace it.
An extra alms bowl, according to the Vibhanga, is any that has not yet been determined for use or placed under shared ownership. Since a bhikkhu may have only one bowl determined for use at any one time, he should place any additional bowls he receives under dual ownership if he plans to keep them on hand. (The procedures for placing bowls under determination and dual ownership, and for rescinding their determination and dual ownership, are given in Appendices IV & V.)
Effort. According to the Commentary, once a bowl belonging to a bhikkhu fulfills all the requirements for a determinable bowl, he is responsible for it even if he has not yet received it into his keeping. For example, if a blacksmith promises to make him a bowl and send word when it is finished, the bhikkhu is responsible for the bowl as soon as he hears word from the blacksmith's messenger that the bowl is ready, even if he has yet to receive it. If the blacksmith, prior to making the bowl, promises to send it when it is done, then the bhikkhu is not responsible for it until the blacksmith's messenger brings it to him. (All of this assumes that the bowl is already fully paid for.)
If, within ten days after becoming responsible for a new bowl, a bhikkhu does not determine it for use, place it under dual ownership, abandon it (give it or throw it away), or if the bowl is not lost, stolen, damaged beyond repair, or taken on trust, then on the tenth dawn after receiving it he incurs the full penalty under this rule.
Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if the bhikkhu thinks that ten days have not passed when they have, or if he thinks that the bowl is damaged beyond repair or placed under dual ownership, etc., when it isn't, he incurs the penalty all the same.
Forfeiture & confession. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the bowl are the same as under NP 1. For the Pali formulae to use in forfeiting and returning the bowl, see Appendix VI. As with the rules concerning robe-cloth, the bowl must be returned to the offender after he has confessed his offense. Not to return it entails a dukkata. Once the bowl is returned, the ten-day countdown starts all over again.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if within ten days the bhikkhu determines the bowl for use, places it under dual ownership, abandons it, loses it, or if the bowl is stolen, damaged beyond repair, or taken on trust.
Summary: Keeping an alms bowl for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under dual ownership is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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22. Should a bhikkhu with an alms bowl having less than five mends ask for another new bowl, it is to be forfeited and confessed. The bowl is to be forfeited by the bhikkhu to the company of bhikkhus. That company of bhikkhus' final bowl should be presented to the bhikkhu, (saying,) "This, bhikkhu, is your bowl. It is to be kept until broken." This is the proper procedure here.
"Now at that time a certain potter had invited the bhikkhus, saying, 'If any of the masters need a bowl, I will supply them with bowls.' So the bhikkhus, knowing no moderation, asked for many bowls. Those with small bowls asked for large ones. Those with large ones asked for small ones. The potter, making many bowls for the bhikkhus, could not make other goods for sale. (As a result,) he could not support himself, and his wife and children suffered."
According to the Commentary, the phrase, a bowl "having less than five mends" refers to one that is not beyond repair, as explained under the preceding rule. Thus this rule does not apply to a bhikkhu whose bowl is beyond repair: As the K/Commentary notes, whether or not the damage in his bowl is actually mended is not an issue here.
A bhikkhu whose bowl is not beyond repair incurs a dukkata in asking for a new bowl, and a nissaggiya pacittiya in receiving it.
Forfeiture, confession, & bowl exchange. Once a bhikkhu has received a bowl in violation of this rule, he must forfeit it and confess the offense in the midst of the Community. (See Appendix VI for the Pali formula used in forfeiture.) He then receives the Community's "final bowl" to use in place of the new one he has forfeited.
The Community's final bowl is selected in the following way: Each bhikkhu coming to the meeting to witness the offender's forfeiture and confession must bring the bowl he has determined for his own use. If a bhikkhu has an inferior bowl in his possession -- either extra or placed under dual ownership -- he is not to determine that bowl and take it to the meeting in hopes of getting a more valuable one in the exchange about to take place. To do so entails a dukkata.
Once the bhikkhus have assembled, the offender forfeits his bowl and confesses the offense. The Community, following the pattern of one motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//) given in the Vibhanga, then chooses one of its members as bowl exchanger. The bowl exchanger's duty is to take the forfeited bowl and show it to the most senior bhikkhu, who is to choose whichever of the two bowls pleases him more -- his own or the new one. If the new bowl is preferable to his own, and yet he does not take it out of sympathy for the offender, he incurs a dukkata. The K/Commentary and Sub-commentary add that if he does not prefer the new bowl, there is no offense in not taking it.
Once the most senior bhikkhu has taken his choice, the remaining bowl is then shown to the bhikkhu second in seniority, who repeats the process, and so on down the line to the most junior bhikkhu. The bowl exchanger then takes the bowl left over from this last bhikkhu's choice -- the least desirable bowl belonging to that company of bhikkhus -- and presents it to the offender and tells him to determine it for his use and care for it as best he can.
If the offender treats it improperly -- putting in a place where it might get damaged, using it in the wrong sort of way -- or tries to get rid of it, thinking, "How can this bowl be lost or destroyed or broken," he incurs a dukkata.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu whose bowl is not beyond repair incurs no penalty if he asks for a new bowl from relatives or from people who have invited him to ask, or if he gets a new bowl with his own resources. He is also allowed to ask for a bowl for the sake of another, which -- following the Commentary to NP 6 -- means that Bhikkhu X may ask for a bowl for Y only if he asks from his own relatives or people who have invited him to ask for a bowl OR if he asks from Y's relatives or people who have invited Y to ask. Asking for and receiving a bowl for Y from people other than these would entail the full offense.
Summary: Asking for a new alms bowl when one's current bowl is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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23.There are these tonics to be taken by sick bhikkhus: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses. Having been received, they are to be used from storage seven days at most. Beyond that, they are to be forfeited and confessed.
Tonics. The five tonics mentioned in this rule form one of four classes of edibles grouped according to the time period within which they may be eaten after being received. The other three -- food, juice drinks, and medicines -- are discussed in detail at the beginning of the Food Chapter in the pacittiya rules. Here is the story of how this group came to be a special class:
"Then as the Blessed One was alone in seclusion, this line of reasoning occurred to him: 'At present the bhikkhus, afflicted by the autumn disease, bring up the conjey they have drunk and the food they have eaten. Because of this they are thin, wretched, unattractive, and jaundiced, their bodies covered with veins. What if I were to allow medicine for them that would be both medicine and agreed to be medicine for the world, and serve as food, yet would not be considered gross (substantial) food.'
"Then this thought occurred to him: 'There are these five tonics -- ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses -- that are both medicine and agreed to be medicine for the world, and serve as food yet would not be considered gross food. What if I were now to allow the bhikkhus, having accepted them at the right time (from dawn to noon), to consume them at the right time'....
"Now at that time bhikkhus, having accepted the five tonics at the right time, consumed them at the right time. Because of this they could not stomach even their ordinary coarse meals, much less greasy ones. As a result, afflicted both by the autumn disease and this loss of appetite for food, they became even more thin and wretched....So the Blessed One, for this cause, for this reason, having given a Dhamma talk, addressed the bhikkhus: 'I allow you, bhikkhus, having accepted the five tonics, to consume them both at the right time and at the wrong time (from noon to dawn).'" (Mv.VI.1)
The Vibhanga defines the five tonics as follows:
//Ghee// means strained, boiled butter oil made from the milk of any animal whose flesh is allowable for bhikkhus to eat (see the introduction to the Food Chapter in the pacittiya rules).
//Fresh butter// must be made from the milk of any animal whose flesh is allowable. None of the Vinaya texts go into detail on how fresh butter is made, but the Bhumija Discourse (M.126) describes the process as "having sprinkled curds in a pot, one twirls them with a churn." Fresh butter of this sort is still made in India today by taking a small churn -- looking like an orange with alternate sections removed, attached to a small stick -- and twirling it in curds, all the while sprinkling them with water. The fresh butter -- mostly milk fat plus some milk solids -- coagulates on the churn, and when the fresh butter is removed, what is left in the pot is diluted buttermilk. Fresh butter, unlike creamery butter made by churning cream, may be stored unrefrigerated in bottles for several days even in the heat of India without going rancid.
Arguing by the Great Standards, creamery butter would obviously come under fresh butter here. A more controversial topic is cheese.
In Mahavagga VI.34.21, the Buddha allows bhikkhus to consume five products of the cow: milk, curds, buttermilk, fresh butter, and ghee. Apparently, cheese -- curds heated to evaporate their liquid content and then cured with or without mold -- was not known in those days, but it seems proper to include it under one of the five. The question is which one. Some have argued that it should come under fresh butter, since the composition is similar -- milk fat and solids derived from curds. Others have argued that it should come under curds, as it generally regarded to be more of a gross food. Since the texts give no guidance here, the best policy would seem to be to follow the views of the Community to which one belongs.
//Oil//, according to the Vibhanga, includes sesame oil, mustard seed oil, "honey tree" oil, castor oil, and oil from tallow. The Mahavagga (VI.2.1) allows oil made from five kinds of tallow: bear, fish, alligator (shark?), pig, and donkey tallow. Since bear meat is one of the kinds normally unallowable for bhikkhus, the Sub-commentary interprets this list as meaning oil from the tallow of any animal whose flesh is allowable -- and from any animal whose flesh, if eaten, carries a dukkata -- is allowable here. Since human flesh, if eaten, carries a thullaccaya, oil from human fat is not allowed. The Commentary adds that oil made from any plants not listed in the Vibhanga carries a dukkata if kept more than seven days.
//Honey// means the honey of bees, although the Commentary lists two species of bee -- //cirika//, long and with wings, and //tumbala//, large, black and with hard wings -- whose honey it says is very viscous and ranks as a medicine, not as one of the five tonics.
//Sugar/molasses// the Vibhanga defines simply as essence of sugar cane. The Commentary interprets this as meaning not only sugar and molasses, but also fresh sugar cane juice. The Vinaya Mukha disagrees here, saying that sugar cane juice, if kept overnight, can quickly turn into alcohol and so should be classed as a juice drink. The Commentary also says that sugar or molasses made from any fruit classed as a food -- e.g., coconut, date palm, sugar beet, etc. -- ranks as a food and not as a tonic, but it is hard to guess at its reasoning here, since sugar cane itself is also classed as a food. The Vinaya Mukha seems more correct in using the Great Standards to say that all forms of sugar and molasses, no matter what the source, would be included here. Thus artificial sweeteners would also come under this rule.
According to Mv.VI.16.1, even if the sugar has a little flour mixed in with it simply to make it firmer -- as sometimes happens in sugar cubes and blocks of palm sugar -- it is still classed as a tonic as long as it is still regarded simply as "sugar." If there is enough flour mixed in so that people are conscious of the flour's being there, or if the flour is meant to serve more than simply as a firming agent, the mixture counts as a food and may not be eaten after noon of the day on which it is received.
Proper use. According to Mv.VI.40.3, any tonic received today may be eaten mixed with food or juice drinks received today, but not with food or juice drinks received on a later day. Thus, as the Commentary points out, tonics received in the morning may be eaten with food that morning; if received in the afternoon, they may not be eaten mixed with food at any time at all.
Also, the Commentary says at one point, one may take the tonic at any time during those seven days regardless of whether or not one is ill. At another point, though, it says that one may take the tonic after the morning of the day on which it is received only if one has a reason. This statement the Sub-commentary explains as meaning that any reason suffices -- e.g., hunger, weakness -- as long as one is not taking the tonic for nourishment as food. In other words, one may take enough to assuage one's hunger, but not to fill oneself up.
Mv.VI.27, though, contains a special stipulation for the use of sugar. If one is ill, one may take it "as is" at any time during the seven days; if not, then after noon of the first day one make take it only if it is mixed with water.
Forfeiture & confession. If a bhikkhu keeps a tonic past the seventh dawn after receiving it, he is to forfeit it and confess the nissaggiya pacittiya offense. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if he thinks that seven days have not yet passed when they actually have -- or thinks that the tonic is no longer in his possession when it actually is -- he incurs the penalty all the same (%).
The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the tonic are the same as under NP 1. The formula to use in forfeiting the tonic is given in Appendix VI. Once the bhikkhu receives the tonic in return, he may not use it to eat or to apply to his body, although he may use it for other external purposes, such as oil for a lamp, etc. Other bhikkhus may not eat the tonic either, but they may apply it to their bodies -- for example, as oil to rub down their limbs.
Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if within seven days the tonic gets lost, destroyed, burnt, stolen, or taken on trust; or if the bhikkhu determines it for use, abandons it or -- having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning possession of it in his mind -- he receives it in return and makes use of it (%).
The Commentary has an extended discussion of the last three points.
1) Determining the tonic for use means that, within the seven days, the bhikkhu determines that he will use it not as a medicine, but only to apply to the outside of his body or for other external purposes instead. In this case, he may keep the tonic as long as he likes without penalty.
2) Unlike the other rules dealing with robe-cloth or bowls kept X number of days, the no-offense clauses here do not include exemptions for tonics placed under dual ownership, but the Commentary discusses "abandons it" as if it read "places it under dual ownership." Its verdict: Any tonic placed under dual ownership may be kept for more than seven days without incurring a penalty as long as the owners do not divide up their shares, but after the seventh day they may not use it for internal purposes. The Sub-commentary adds that any tonic placed under dual ownership may not be used at all until the arrangement is rescinded.
3) The Commentary reports a controversy between two Vinaya experts on the meaning of the last exemption in the list -- i.e., "having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning possession of it in his mind, he receives it in return and makes use of it." Ven. Maha Sumatthera states that the phrase, "if within seven days" applies here as well: If within seven days the bhikkhu gives the tonic to an unordained person, having abandoned possession of it in his mind, he may then keep it and consume it for another seven days if the unordained person happens to return it to him.
Ven. Maha Padumathera disagrees, saying that the exemption "abandons it" already covers such a case, and that the exemption here refers to the situation where a bhikkhu has kept a tonic past seven days, has forfeited it and received it in return, and then gives it up to an unordained person. If the unordained person then returns the tonic to him, he may use it to rub on his body.
The K/Commentary agrees with the latter position, but this creates some problems, both textual and practical. To begin with, the phrase, "if within seven days," modifies every one of the other no-offense clauses, and there is nothing to indicate that it does not modify this one, too. Secondly, every one of the other exemptions refers directly to ways of avoiding the full offense, and not to ways of dealing with the forfeited article after it is returned, and again there is nothing to indicate that the last exemption breaks this pattern.
On the practical side, if the exemption "abandons it" covers cases where a bhikkhu may give up the tonic to anyone at all and then receive it in return to use for another seven days, bhikkhus could spend their time trading hoards of tonics among themselves indefinitely, and the rule would become meaningless. But as the origin story shows, it was precisely to prevent them from amassing such hoards that the rule was formulated in the first place.
"Then Ven. Pilindavaccha approached the residence of King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, and on arrival sat down on an appointed seat. Then King Seniya Bimbisara... approached Ven. Pilindavaccha and, paying homage, sat down to one side. As he sat there, Ven. Pilindavaccha addressed him: 'For what reason, great king, has the monastery attendant's family been imprisoned?'
"'Sir, in the monastery attendant's house was a garland of gold: beautiful, attractive, exquisite. There is no garland of gold like it even in our own women's quarters. From where could he have gotten it? It must have been stolen.'
"Then Ven. Pilindavaccha willed that the palace of King Seniya Bimbisara be gold. And it became made entirely of gold. 'But from where did you get so much gold, great king?'
"(Saying,) 'I understand, sir. This is simply the master's psychic power,' he had the monastery attendant's family released.
"The people, saying, 'The master Pilindavaccha displayed a psychic wonder, a superior human feat, to the king and his retinue,' were gladdened and delighted. They presented Ven. Pilindavaccha with the five tonics: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, and sugar.
"Now ordinarily Ven. Pilindavaccha was already a receiver of the five tonics, so he distributed his gains among his company, who came to live in abundance. They put away their gains having filled pots and pitchers. They hung up their gains having filled water strainers and bags. These kept oozing and seeping, and their dwellings were crawling and creeping with rats. People, engaged in a tour of the dwellings, having seen this, were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'These Sakyan contemplatives have inner store rooms like the king....'"
Thus it seems more likely that the Vibhanga's no-offense clauses should be interpreted like this: A bhikkhu is no longer held responsible for a tonic if he abandons it or gives it away -- no matter who he gives it to, or what his state of mind -- but he may receive it in return and use it another seven days only if he has given it to an unordained person, having abandoned all possession of it in his mind.
Summary: Keeping any of the five tonics -- ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses -- for more than seven days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
24. When a month is left to the hot season, a bhikkhu may seek a rains-bathing cloth. When a half-month is left to the hot season, (the cloth) having been made, may be worn. If when more than a month is left to the hot season he should seek a rains-bathing cloth, (or) when more than a half-month is left to the hot season, (the cloth) having been made should be worn, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
Bhikkhus in the time of the Buddha commonly bathed in a river or lake. Passages in the Canon give an indication of some of the dangers involved: They had to watch over their robes to make sure they weren't stolen or washed away by the river, and at the same time make sure they didn't expose themselves. (S.II.10 tells of a female deity who, seeing a young bhikkhu bathing, became smitten with the sight of him wearing only his under robe. She appeared to him, suggesting that he leave the monkhood to take his fill of sensual pleasures before his youth had past, but fortunately he was far enough in the practice to resist her advances.) A further danger during the rainy season was that the rivers would become swollen and their currents strong. During this time, then, bhikkhus would bathe in the rain.
Rains-bathing cloth. The Mahavagga (Mv.VIII.15.1-7) contains the story of a servant girl who went to a monastery and -- seeing bhikkhus out bathing naked in the rain -- concluded that there were no bhikkhus there, but only naked ascetics. She returned to tell her mistress, Lady Visakha, who realized what was actually happening and made this the occasion to ask permission of the Buddha to provide rains-bathing cloths for the bhikkhus, because as she put it, "Nakedness is repulsive." He granted her request, and at a later point (Mv.VIII.20.2) stated that a rains-bathing cloth could be determined for use during the four months of the rainy season -- beginning with the day after the full moon in July, or the second if there are two -- and that at the end of the four months it was to be placed under dual ownership. This training rule deals with the protocol for seeking and using such a cloth during the rains and the period immediately preceding them.
The protocol is sketched out in the Vibhanga, the details being filled in by the Commentary as follows: During the first two weeks of the fourth lunar month of the hot season -- the lunar cycle ending with the full moon in July, or the first if there are two -- a bhikkhu may seek a rains-bathing cloth and make it if he gets enough material, but may not yet use it or determine it for use. In seeking the cloth he may directly ask for it from relatives or people who have invited him to ask, or he may approach people who have provided rains-bathing cloths in the past and give them such hints as: "It is the time for material for a rains-bathing cloth," or "People are giving material for a rains-bathing cloth." If he asks directly from people who are not relatives or who have not invited him to ask, he incurs a dukkata; if he then receives cloth from them, he incurs the full penalty under NP 6. If he gives hints to people who have never provided rains-bathing cloths in the past, he incurs a dukkata.
During the last two weeks of the fourth lunar month of the hot season he may now begin using his cloth, although he may not yet determine it for use. This shows clearly that this rule is providing an exemption to NP 1, under which he otherwise would be forced to determine the cloth within ten days after receiving it. If he has not yet received enough material, he may continue seeking for more in the way described above and make himself a cloth when he receives enough.
When the first day of the rainy season arrives, he may determine the cloth. If he does not yet have enough material to make his rains-bathing cloth, he may continue seeking it throughout the four months of the rains. If he bathes naked in the rain when he has a cloth to use, he incurs a dukkata, although he may bathe naked in a lake or river without penalty. If he has no cloth to use, he may also bathe naked in the rain.
At the end of the four months, he is to wash his cloth, place it under dual ownership, and put it aside if it is still usable. He may begin using it again the last two weeks of the last lunar month before the next rainy season and is to redetermine it for use on the day the rainy season officially begins.
Towards the end of his discussion of this rule, Buddhaghosa adds his own personal opinion on when the rains-bathing cloth should be determined for use if it is finished during the rains -- on the grounds that the ancient commentaries do not discuss the issue -- one of the few places where he overtly gives his own opinion anywhere in the Commentary. His verdict: If one receives enough material to finish the cloth within ten days, one should determine it within those ten days. If not, one may keep what material one has, undetermined and throughout the rainy season if need be, until one does obtain enough material and then determine the cloth on the day it is completed.
Offenses. As the K/Commentary points out, this rule covers two separate offenses whose factors are somewhat different: the offense for seeking a rains-bathing cloth at the wrong time and that for using it at the wrong time.
//Seeking//. The factors here are three: object, effort, and result. The bhikkhu is looking for material for a rains-bathing cloth, he makes hints to people during the time he is not allowed to make hints, and he receives the cloth. There is a dukkata in the hinting and a full offense in receiving the cloth.
//Using//. The factors here are two: object -- he has a rains-bathing cloth -- and effort -- he has other robes to use, there are no dangers, and yet he wears the cloth during the period when he is not allowed to wear it. (The conditions here are based on the no-offenses clauses, which we will discuss below.)
In neither of these cases is perception a mitigating factor. Even if a bhikkhu thinks that the right time to hint for the cloth or to wear it has come when it actually hasn't, he is not immune from an offense.
Forfeiture & confession. A bhikkhu who has committed either of the two full offenses here is to forfeit the cloth and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1.
Non-offenses. As the rule states, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who hints for a rains-bathing cloth within the last lunar month of the hot season, or for one who wears his rains-bathing cloth during the last two weeks of that month.
The Vibhanga then refers to a situation that occasionally happens under the lunar calendar: The four months of the hot season end, but the Rains Retreat is delayed another lunar cycle due to the fact that a thirteenth lunar month has to be added to that year in order to bring the lunar year back into line with the solar year. (This usually occurs when there are two full moons in July.) In this case, it says that the rains-bathing cloth -- having been sought for during the fourth month and worn during the last two weeks of the hot season -- is to be washed and then put aside. When the proper season arrives, it may be brought out for use (%).
The Commentary adds that there is no need to determine the cloth in this period until the day the Rains Retreat officially starts, but it doesn't say whether the proper season to use the cloth begins with the Rains Retreat or two weeks before. It would make sense to allow the bhikkhu to begin using the cloth two weeks before, but this is simply my own opinion.
The Vibhanga then adds three more exemptions: There is no offense for a "stolen-robe" bhikkhu, a "destroyed-robe" bhikkhu, or when there are dangers. The Commentary interprets "robe" here as meaning rains-bathing cloth, and says that these exemptions apply to the dukkata offense for bathing naked in the rain. A bhikkhu whose rains-bathing cloth has been stolen or destroyed may bathe naked in the rain without incurring a penalty, as may a bhikkhu with an expensive bathing cloth who would rather bathe naked because of his fear of cloth thieves.
Strangely enough, Buddhaghosa's own K/Commentary makes the Vibhanga's exemptions refer also to the full offense. If a bhikkhu's other robes have been stolen or destroyed, he may wear his rains-bathing cloth out of season. The same holds true when, in the words of the K/Commentary, "naked thieves are plundering," and a bhikkhu decides to wear his rains-bathing cloth out-of-season in order to protect either it or his other robes from being stolen.
The Sub-commentary follows the K/Commentary in holding to both interpretations.
At present, much of this discussion is purely academic, inasmuch as most bhikkhus -- if they use a bathing cloth -- tend to determine it for use as a "cloth accessory" so as to avoid any possible offense under this rule.
Summary: Seeking and receiving a rains-bathing cloth before the fourth month of the hot season is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last two weeks of the fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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25. Should any bhikkhu, having himself given a robe-cloth to (another) bhikkhu, and then being angered and displeased, snatch it back or have it snatched back, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
"At that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan said to his brother's student, 'Come, friend, let's set out on a tour of the countryside.'
"'I can't go, sir. My robe is threadbare.'
"'Come, friend, I'll give you a robe.' And he gave him a robe. Then that bhikkhu heard, 'The Blessed One, they say, is going to set out on a tour of the countryside.' The thought occurred to him: 'In that case I won't set out on a tour of the countryside with Ven. Upananda the Sakyan. I'll set out on a tour of the countryside with the Blessed One.'
"Then Ven. Upananda said to him, 'Come, friend, let's set out on that tour of the countryside now.'
"'I won't set out on a tour of the countryside with you, sir. I'll set out on a tour of the countryside with the Blessed One.'
"'But the robe I gave you, my friend, will set out on a tour of the countryside with //me//.' And angered and displeased, he snatched the robe back."
As the Commentary points out, this rule applies to cases where one perceives the robe-cloth as being rightfully one's own even after having given it away, as when giving it on an implicit or explicit condition that the recipient does not later fulfill. Thus the act of snatching away here does not entail a parajika. If, however, one has mentally abandoned ownership of the robe and then for some reason snatches it back, the case would come under Parajika 2.
The factors for an offense here are two.
Object: a piece of any of the six allowable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.
Effort. One has given the cloth to another bhikkhu on one condition or another and then, angered and displeased with him, either snatches it back or has someone else snatch it back. In the latter case, one incurs a dukkata in giving the order to snatch the robe, and the full offense when the robe is snatched. Perception (with regard to the recipient/victim) is not a mitigating factor here. If he actually is a bhikkhu, then whether or not one perceives him to be so makes no difference as far as the offense is concerned.
Forfeiture & confession. A bhikkhu who has obtained robe-cloth in violation of this rule is to forfeit it and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1. The formula to use in forfeiting the cloth is given in Appendix VI.
Lesser offenses. There is a dukkata for angrily snatching back from a bhikkhu requisites other than cloth; and for angrily snatching back any kind of requisite -- cloth or otherwise -- that one has given to someone who is not a bhikkhu. The Sub-commentary adds that to give robe-cloth to a layman planning to be ordained, and then to snatch it back in this way after his ordination, entails the full offense.
According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if the recipient returns the robe of his own accord or if the donor takes it back on trust (%). The Commentary's discussion of the first exemption shows that if the recipient returns the robe after receiving a gentle hint from the donor -- "I gave you the robe in hopes that you would study with me, but now you are studying with someone else" -- the donor incurs no penalty. But if the donor's hint shows anger -- "I gave this robe to a bhikkhu who would study with me, not to one who would study with somebody else!" -- he incurs a dukkata for the hint, but no penalty when the recipient returns the robe.
Summary: Having given another bhikkhu a robe on a condition and then -- angry and displeased -- snatching it back or having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
26. Should any bhikkhu, having requested thread, have a robe woven by weavers, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The factors for an offense here are three: object, effort, and result.
1) //Object//: thread or yarn of the six allowable types for robe-cloth, that a bhikkhu -- with the purpose of making a robe -- has requested from people who are not his relatives or who have not invited him to ask.
2) //Effort//: He takes this thread to weavers who are unrelated to him and have not offered their services for free, and gets them to weave him robe-cloth measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.
3) //Result//: He receives the cloth.
Offenses. The Commentary has a table that works out the various combinations of offenses here based on two variables: thread properly or improperly received, and weavers proper or improper for the bhikkhu to ask. Thread properly received is any that the bhikkhu has requested from people who are related to him or have invited him to ask. Similarly, weavers proper for him to ask are any who are related to him or have offered him their services.
If both the thread and the weavers are classed as not proper, there is a dukkata in getting them to weave cloth, and a nissaggiya pacittiya in receiving the cloth when it is done.
There is a dukkata in receiving the cloth if the thread is proper, but the weavers not; OR if the thread is not proper, but the weavers are. (For ease of remembrance: a dukkata if one variable is proper and the other not.)
If both variables are proper, there is no offense.
The Commentary then has a field day working out the permutations if two different weavers -- one proper and one improper -- work on the cloth, or if proper and improper thread are used in the cloth -- proper warp and improper woof, or alternating strands of proper and improper thread -- which if nothing else goes to show how few truly burning issues have sprung up around this rule.
Forfeiture & confession. Robe-cloth received in a way that entails the full offense under this rule is to be forfeited and the offense confessed, following the procedure under NP 1.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga says that there is no offense "to sew a robe, or in a binding, a belt, a shoulder-strap, a bag for carrying the bowl, or a water-strainer." The Commentary interprets this as meaning that there is no offense in asking for thread or yarn to sew a robe or to make any of the other things listed. Since these articles are small, and since bhikkhus are allowed looms (Cv.V.28.2), perhaps they are things that bhikkhus could be expected to make themselves.
The no-offense clauses also say that there is no offense if they -- the donors or the weavers -- are relatives, if they have invited one to ask, if the cloth is for the sake of another, or if it is by means of one's own property. These exemptions apply both to asking for thread and for getting weavers to weave cloth. As under NP 6 & 22, "for the sake of another" means that one may ask from one's own relatives or from those who have invited one to ask OR from relatives of the other person or people who have invited him to ask. Asking for his sake from people other than these would entail the full offense.
If the cloth is obtained by means of one's own property -- i.e., one arranges to pay for the thread and hire the weavers -- the Commentary states that one is responsible for the cloth as soon as it is finished and fully paid for, whether or not it is delivered into one's possession. One must therefore determine it for use within 10 days of that date so as not to commit an offense under NP 1. If the weavers have promised to send word when the cloth is done, one's responsibility starts when one receives word from their messenger; similarly, if they have promised to send the cloth when done, one's responsibility begins when their messenger delivers it.
Summary: Taking thread that one has asked for improperly and getting weavers to weave cloth from it -- when they are unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
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27. In case a man or woman householder unrelated to a bhikkhu has weavers weave robe-cloth for his sake, and if the bhikkhu, not previously invited (by the householder), having approached the weavers, should make stipulations with regard to the cloth, saying, "This cloth, friends, is to be woven for my sake. Make it long, make it broad, make it tightly woven, well woven, well spread, well scraped, well smoothed, and perhaps I may reward you with a little something;" and should the bhikkhu, having said that, reward them with a little something, even as much as alms food, it (the cloth) is to be forfeited and confessed.
Here the factors for an offense are four:
Object: a piece of any of the six allowable types of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, which is being made for one's sake by the arrangement of a donor who is unrelated and has not given an invitation to ask.
Intention. One wants to get better cloth than what the donors are planning to give.
Effort. One approaches the weavers and gets them to increase the amount of thread going into the cloth. The Commentary explains that the bhikkhu's words quoted in the rule are meant simply to be an example of any way in which one might do this. The Vibhanga defines the reward of "alms food" as covering anything of even the slightest material value -- food, a lump of powder, tooth wood, unwoven thread, or even a phrase of Dhamma. A bhikkhu who offers to pay for the extra thread in full would thus also fulfill this factor.
The Sub-commentary adds that even if the bhikkhu doesn't deliver the reward, this factor is fulfilled all the same as long as the weavers, as a result of his stipulations, actually increase the amount of thread from that which they and the donors had agreed on.
Result. One receives the cloth.
Offenses. The bhikkhu incurs a dukkata as soon as the weavers add even a little extra thread to the cloth, and the full offense when he receives it. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if --
the donors are relatives, they have invited one to ask, one asks for the sake of another, one gets the weavers to make the cloth less expensive than the donors had ordered, or if it is by means of one's own property. (This last point refers only to cases where the bhikkhu was the one who had the weavers hired in the first place.)
Summary: When donors who are not relatives -- and have not invited one to ask -- have arranged for weavers to weave robe-cloth intended for one: Receiving the cloth after getting the weavers to increase the amount of thread used in it is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
28.Ten days prior to the third-month Kattika full moon, should robe-cloth offered in urgency accrue to a bhikkhu, he is to accept it if he regards it as offered in urgency. Once he has accepted it, he may keep it throughout the robe season. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.
The //third-month Kattika full moon// is the full moon in October, or the first if there are two. This is the final day of the Rains Retreat, and the day before the beginning of the robe season.
//Robe-cloth offered in urgency// is any piece of the six allowable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, offered by a person who does not want to wait until the robe season to make an offering, either because his/her survival is in doubt -- as when a soldier is going into war, a traveler is about to set out on a journey, or a woman has become pregnant -- or because he/she has developed new-found faith in the religion.
The Commentary points out that the period allowed for giving robe-cloth offered in urgency begins on the fifth day of the waxing moon before the end of the Rains Retreat; and that robe-cloth offered to an individual bhikkhu beginning on the sixth day of the waning moon can, under NP 1, be kept throughout the robe season because the tenth dawn after the sixth waning moon is the beginning of the robe season. Thus it would seem that this rule is giving only a one-day special allowance.
However, we should note that the Vibhanga implicitly, and the Commentary explicitly, treat robe-cloth offered in urgency as in-season cloth (see NP 3): In other words, the cloth goes to the Community, and is to be divided only among those bhikkhus who spend the Rains Retreat in that Community. Thus if a bhikkhu has broken the retreat, he must return his share to the Community, as he no longer has any right to it.
The factors for an offense here are two: //object// -- robe-cloth offered in urgency; and //effort// -- one keeps it past the end of the robe season: the dawn after the full moon following the Rains Retreat, if one does not participate in a kathina; or the end of one's kathina privileges, if one does. And, as noted above, if one has broken one's Retreat, one has no right to any share in such cloth and must return it to the Community immediately.
Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Thus if the period to keep the cloth has passed even though one thinks it hasn't -- or if it is not determined for use, etc., when one thinks it is -- one is still subject to the offense all the same.
The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1. See Appendix VI for the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if, before the robe season is over, one determines the cloth, places it under dual ownership, or abandons it (gives it away or throws it away); if it is lost, destroyed, burnt, or stolen, or if someone else takes it on trust.
Summary: Keeping robe-cloth offered in urgency past the end of the robe season after having accepted it during the last eleven days of the Rains Retreat is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.
* * *
29. There are wilderness abodes that are considered dubious and risky. A bhikkhu living in such abodes after the (fourth-month) Kattika full moon has passed may keep any one of his three robes in a village if he so desires. Should he have any reason to live apart from the robe, he may do so for six nights at most. If he should live apart from it longer than that -- unless authorized by the bhikkhus -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.
As we noted under NP 2, every bhikkhu who has spent the Rains Retreat has the right to live separated from his set of three robes during the following month. This rule is a partial one-month extension of this right for bhikkhus living in dangerous wilderness areas. The reason for this extension is that this one-month period was when thieves were active -- perhaps because they knew that bhikkhus had just received new cloth, or simply because now that roads were passable again it was time for them to get back to their work.
The Commentary defines this situation in terms of four factors:
1) The bhikkhu has spent the first Rains Retreat -- the one beginning with the full moon in July, or the second full moon if there are two in that month -- without break.
2) He is staying in a wilderness abode, defined in the Vibhanga as one at least 500 bow-lengths, or one kilometer, from the nearest village, this distance being measured by the shortest walkable path between the two and not as the crow flies. At the same time, he is not so far from a village that he cannot go for alms there in the morning and then return to eat in his abode before noon.
3) The abode is dubious and risky: dubious in that thieves are known to be about, risky in that people are known to have been hurt or plundered by them.
4) The time period for the extension is one month beginning the day after the fourth Kattika moon, the full moon one month after the end of the Rains Retreat.
The dawn after this full moon day is when the robe season normally ends for those bhikkhus who have not participated in a kathina. However, a bhikkhu living in the situation outlined above may keep one of his set of triple robes in the village where he normally goes for alms, and -- if he has a reason -- may stay apart from it six nights at most. As usual, nights are counted by dawns.
The factors for an offense here are two: //object// -- one of a bhikkhu's basic set of three robes; and //effort// -- staying away from the robe past the sixth dawn after first being apart from it. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one thinks that six nights have not passed when they actually have, one is not immune from the offense.
As the Sub-commentary points out, the Commentary and K/Commentary differ in their definition of the factor of effort here. According to the K/Commentary, the bhikkhu staying in a forest abode during the period in question is counted as being apart from his robe when it is placed in the village, and thus can keep it there while he is in his forest abode only six nights at a stretch. Thus, it says, if he is in his wilderness abode at the sixth dawn, he incurs the full penalty.
The Commentary, however, maintains that the bhikkhu staying in the wilderness abode is not counted as being apart from his robe when it is placed in the village, but if he leaves that abode on business and lets his robe remain in the village, he may stay away from the abode only six nights at a stretch. Thus, it says, if in returning from his business he cannot make it to his forest abode by the sixth dawn, and the village is closer, he may stop over in the village long enough to check up on the robe and still be immune from the offense.
The second interpretation makes more sense, in that if the bhikkhu is staying in his abode and going for alms in the village, he may check up on his robe every day. It is also more in line with the Vibhanga's definition of "any reason" -- i.e., "any business" -- which indicates situations where the bhikkhu would be away from his abode. The Sub-commentary, following Bhadanta Buddhadatta Thera, adopts the second interpretation.
Forfeiture & confession. A bhikkhu under these conditions who has been away from his robe for more than six nights is to forfeit it and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as under NP 1. The Pali formula for forfeiting the robe is in Appendix VI.
Non-offenses. There is no offense for a bhikkhu who has stayed away from his robe six nights or less; or
if, having been apart from his robe six nights, he enters the village boundary (and, according to the Commentary, stays long enough to check up on his robe); if, within the six nights, he rescinds the determination of the robe, places it under dual ownership, abandons it; or the robe gets lost, burnt, destroyed, stolen, or taken by someone on trust; or if he has been authorized by the Community to be apart from his robe. (This, according to the Commentary, refers to the authorization discussed under NP 2.)
The commentaries refer the reader to NP 2 for the remaining explanations to this rule, which would seem to indicate that if a bhikkhu's kathina privileges are still in effect, he is also immune from an offense under this rule during the period in question no matter how many nights he is away from his robe.
Summary: When one is living in a dangerous wilderness abode |
